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“Navigating ‘Normal’” is a qualitative study of five autistic writers in higher education. Focusing 
on disability disclosure, classroom accommodations, and learning and writing processes, this 
project examines classroom inclusivity from the perspectives of neurodiverse students. I argue 
that my five participants demonstrate kairotic skill regarding appropriate times and places to 
disclose their autism diagnosis, and sophisticated rhetorical techniques for managing stigma and 
meeting their needs as learners in classrooms devoid of helpful accommodations. In pursuit of 
inclusivity, I call for writing classroom practices that decenter normalcy as the goal of 
pedagogical intervention, instead foregrounding student self-advocacy. 
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Chapter One: Introduction: Navigating ‘Normal’ 
 
 
Reflecting on the pressures of attending college as a student with Asperger syndrome, Amy says, 
“Well, I know that in college it's expected that we're very outgoing, that we go to career fairs 
and talk with professors in office hours, and form study groups, and talk to people we've never 
met before about like, applying for internships, things like that.” She admits that college 
experiences like these were “pretty nerve-wracking at first,” since she “didn’t know how to talk 
professionally yet.” Amy believes that the behavioral expectations of college life exert “external 
pressures” on non-neurotypical students, and lead to a culture of exclusion or stigma around 
autistic traits like “smiling at inappropriate times, or showing the wrong expressions…and not 
really having a chance to explain why.” Experiencing this lack of acceptance and belonging 
could make an autistic student “want to change,” or to think their autism is “something that has 
to be fixed.” Ultimately, Amy says she “kind of got used to” the normative pressures and 
expectations of college life, though she doesn’t “quite feel successful yet.” “But, one thing,” she 
explained, “is trying to trust myself that if I have a goal, that I will…do what I have to do.” 
   
This dissertation is comprised of the stories and experiences of five students, including Amy, 
who self-identify on the autism spectrum and who are navigating the expectations of a university 
system designed without them in mind.  In the chapters that follow, these participants’ stories 
reveal what self-advocacy looks look for neurodiverse learners and writers in the context of an 
academic culture that promotes “normalcy,” both in mainstream best practices and in approaches 
to disability accommodation. Their experiences offer us a lens for re-envisioning foundational 
scholarship and practices in the field of composition and rhetoric, and the work that it does to 
serve normalcy in the college writing classroom. Three of my guiding research questions are:  
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• How do we define rhetorical and compositional ability, beyond labeling certain writers as 
rhetorically disabled?  
• How does current writing and rhetorical scholarship serve to consolidate and reinforce an 
understanding of intellectual ability that excludes neurodiverse learners?  
• And how might the answers to these questions affect all learners who negotiate “risky 
bodily identities” (Vidali) within the university?  
To find the answers, my research engages the perspectives of a community of students who I 
argue are limited not by their diagnosis, but by mainstream assumptions about learning, writing, 
and academic achievement in college. I employ frameworks from disability studies, particularly 
social or embodied models of disability, which help shift attention from individual student 
deficits to disabling practices and pedagogical norms. When we apply a disability studies 
framework, we consider not only the individual abilities or disabilities of individual students, but 
at how our teaching practices might contribute to a disabling environment for some (if not all) 
students.  
My work is in conversation with a number of scholars asking similar questions about 
cognitive disability, learning, and higher education. This scholarship is highly interdisciplinary, 
with scholars writing across such fields as special education, disability studies, and rhetoric and 
composition studies (Brueggemann, 2001; Brown and Klein, 2011; Baldwin et al, 2014; 
Harbinson and Alexander, 2009; Madriga and Goodley, 2010; Ness, 2013; Pennington and 
Delano, 2012; Price, 2011). A small percentage of this work features the perspectives of college 
students who self-identify as having a cognitive or learning disability, including autistic students 
(Vidali, 2007; Yergeau and Heilker, 2011; Jurecic, 2007; Delano, 2007; Gelbar et al, 2014; 
Madriga, 2010). For many of these authors, though, the goal of educational intervention on 
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behalf of autistic students is to help them be as “normal” as possible. My work approaches the 
same population, but from a perspective that emphasizes how they themselves understand or 
value the concept of “normal.” I employ these perspectives to unpack the tacit demands placed 
upon learners in higher education and address the consequences of those demands for an 
increasingly diverse student population. 
 
Autism’s Moment  
Autism is having a moment. In recent years, and coming off of the so-called “Decade of the 
Brain” in the 1990s, the cluster of behavioral symptoms identified as autism spectrum disorder 
has captured public attention and, in the mainstream public sphere, courted fear. Autism is often 
portrayed as a recent “epidemic,” as prevalence rates creep up and advocacy campaigns 
emphasize rapidly growing numbers of autistic children and portray a landscape of complicated 
family life and threatened futures (Saunders). There is, however, no concrete evidence to suggest 
that more people have autism today than before. It’s more likely that our vocabularies for talking 
about the mind and, more recently, the brain, as well as our cultural understandings of normal 
behavior, are always changing, and these changes influence how we identify “autistic” traits or 
behaviors. While its prevalence rate rises, over 70 years of research on autism have yet to locate 
a reliable biomarker or neurological marker.  Autism diagnoses are still based solely on 
observations of behavior corresponding to a handful of diagnostic criteria, including: “deficits in 
social-emotional reciprocity and in developing and maintaining relationships,” difficulties with 
thinking abstractly, repetitive motor movements (which is sometimes called stimming, or self-
stimulatory movement), highly restricted interests, and extreme sensitivity to sensory stimuli 
(like sounds or lights) (“Autism Fact Sheet”).  
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The most commonly circulated public stories about autism begin like this: Autism is an 
emerging brain-based disorder that is quickly taking over. Autism has no identifiable cause or 
cure, and renders children unable to form meaningful relationships, communicate effectively, or 
even lead independent lives structured by cherished cultural milestones such as moving away 
from home, higher education, an ambitious career, or marriage (Duffy and Dorner; Saunders). 
Autistic children might be non-verbal; display disruptive or even harmful behaviors; fail to 
connect with their peers and form meaningful friendships; or, they might be quirky and obsessed 
with esoteric or inane subjects; unintentionally rude in conversation and oblivious to social 
niceties; they might possess remarkable creative or artistic genius, but barely able to function in 
the “real world”; they might be happy being alone; they may not demonstrate love in 
conventional ways. On the darker side, autistic children and adolescents have been portrayed as 
sociopaths, unable to determine right from wrong, or to understand and respect the value of 
human life (Saunders). 
All of these representations circulate in the public sphere and stoke the flames of public 
conversations about what needs to be done about autism. Advocacy campaigns directed at public 
awareness tell competing stories about what autism is and what it means – some emphasize cure 
and the eradication of autistic symptoms from the human population, while others insist on 
autism as a category of socio-political identity and a component of rights-based discourse. As I 
have argued elsewhere, these competing representations of autism make deeper and more 
troubling assertions about the extent to which autistic people are assumed to be capable of 
communicating about themselves and their lives (Saunders). They can each be traced back to 
underlying paradigms for conceptualizing disability. First, the medical model locates disability in 
the individual body – a quick example of what that means is to think of a wheelchair user as 
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disabled because they are physically unable to walk and must instead use a wheelchair.  The 
logic of this might seem sort of obvious, because the medical model is pervasive and often taken 
for granted as objective. On the other hand, the social model locates disability in the built 
environment and in culturally-dictated bodily values – to use the same example, the social model 
would say that the wheelchair user is not inherently disabled, but rather becomes disabled when 
forced to navigate sidewalks that have no curb cuts, or subway stations that only have stairs 
(Shakespeare). Another example of how these bodily values manifest would be to consider the 
differences between hearing aids and eyeglasses, or eyeglasses and a cane. All three of these are 
prosthetic devices, but they are each inflected with cultural meaning and, in some cases, stigma. 
The social model of disability shifts our focus from the material body to the surrounding 
environment and values that inform how we read the body (Dolmage).   
When it comes to autism, the social/medical binary gets complicated. One of the key 
points of contention between the medical and social model is that of cure. Because it locates 
disability in the body, the medical model is preoccupied with curing impairments, and essentially 
idealizes a world in which such impairments don’t exist. The social model, on the other hand, 
thinks of disability as a socio-political category, similar to gender, race, or class, and regards 
disability as a quality of personhood. A social critique of the medical model often follows it to its 
logical extreme, where the cure imperative can resemble a eugenicist project in its ambitions to 
eliminate a certain group of people from the human population. The medical model might argue 
that a perfect world is one in which autism doesn’t exist, while the social model would critique 
that view for implying that a perfect world is one in which autistic people don’t exist.  
Things get more complicated by the emerging Neurodiversity movement, which has 
begun to dismantle the medical/social binary of disability by arguing that autism is both 
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neurologically real and socially desirable (Ortega). Neurodiversity thinks of autism as a 
neurological variation, and an extension of biodiversity, which makes any ecosystem more 
resilient; from this stance, there is little to gain from curing autism or other neurological 
variations, nor from therapies or treatments that aim to mitigate autistic traits as much as 
possible. The vocabulary of neurodiversity frames autism as a positive attribute: those who 
identify as neurologically not normal can claim disability-positive labels like neurodiverse, 
neurodivergent, or non-neurotypical – these are the terms you will see in use throughout this 
chapter and those that follow – rather than disabled or impaired. Those who do not identify as 
any of these would be labeled neurotypical, a brilliant act of switching the cultural script and 
“diagnosing” normalcy (Brownlow).  
It’s worth noting, however, that even while it contests medicalized representations of 
disability, the neurodiversity movement is itself a contested space. As I discuss later in Chapter 
Two, establishing autism as a fundamental neurological difference does present some challenges 
for those who resist identity typification and reduction, whether through a deficit lens or from a 
more disability-positive stance. Whether one appreciates being autistic or not, one’s entire 
complex identity should not be reduced to an attribute of autism. Second, neurodiversity’s claim 
that autism is a desirable difference can function to silence those in the autism community who 
identify as mental health care consumers, pursue particular therapies or psychiatric drugs, or 
otherwise claim to suffer from or be impaired by autism. Simply put, some autistic people want 
to feel better than they do and move more comfortably in the world, and the neurodiversity 
movement, which often treats autistic culture as analogous to Deaf culture, offers a limited 
vocabulary for voicing those experiences. Finally, I acknowledge the problematic optics of the 
fact that many of the scholars and journalists who applaud and promote the principles of the 
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neurodiversity movement happen to be non-autistic, myself included. The fact that non-autistic 
perspectives are among the most highly visible with regards to the neurodiversity movement 
suggests that it might not find as much traction actually within the autism community. The 
neurodiversity movement, as a response to contested medicalized and social models of disability, 
clearly has its own limitations and contestations. The points of contention between all three of 
these models shows us that we are in deep negotiation over the acceptable limits to human 
diversity and variation, and that makes disability an incredibly rich and high-stakes site of 
rhetorical study. For the purposes of my study, too, it is essential to follow the direction of my 
participants and their own informed stances on autistic experience and the meaning of autism.  
 
Autism and Higher Education  
It is in the context of these competing perspectives that students with disabilities enter the spaces 
of higher education. Students with any disability comprise an estimated nine percent of college 
students nationally, and the number of students with autism rises every year. Autistic students in 
particular have been found to experience significantly lower graduation and employment rates 
than other cognitively impaired students. One study estimated that up to 80% of adults with 
Asperger syndrome are unemployed (Roux et al). Autism has only been an official diagnosis 
since 1987 (and Asperger syndrome since 1994), so it is a relatively new diagnosis, and the first 
generation of students to grow up with an official autism diagnosis are only recently beginning to 
enter higher education, graduate school, and the workforce. In public high schools across the US, 
students with disabilities are legally guaranteed a “free and appropriate” education; this 
sometimes includes the development of an Individualized Education Plan, or IEP, that details 
custom curricular guidelines or particular accommodations for an individual student. While this 
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system is nowhere near perfect, there is a structure in place for dialogue about accessibility and 
inclusivity, and a legal mandate for students, teachers, and parents to fall back on to ensure 
educational justice. At the college level, however, students with disabilities age out of these 
legally mandated accommodations. Universities may offer a series of accommodations, but 
students must opt to pursue them on their own, by claiming a particular diagnosis and requesting 
particular kinds of help (Gose, “Merits” and “Standards”). This is a huge shift in approach to 
disability accommodation, and leaves students with few guarantees or protections. It is against 
this backdrop of changing accommodations and access that all students with disabilities, 
including those on the autism spectrum, must take an active role in configuring learning 
conditions for themselves.  
Self-advocacy for these students is complicated by the fact that there is no stable 
consensus on the meaning of autism; autistic students must navigate this instability every day. 
When we zero in on autism and rhetorical practice, one particular obstacle for autistic rhetors is 
Theory of Mind (Baron-Cohen et al), which suggests that autistics are incapable of imagining the 
mental states of others or predicting their actions, and therefore are mindblind. Critics of Theory 
of Mind argue that it makes autism seem tragic and irresponsibly positions the autistic subject on 
the margins of humanity, as a boundary marker between human and non-human (Duffy and 
Dorner). The influence of Theory of Mind can be found within rhetorical studies, as some 
scholars have portrayed autistics as so rhetorically disabled that they are not fully human. Todd 
Oakley, a cognitive rhetorician, suggests that autistic people “lack the wherewithal to engage 
fully in symbolic action” and see other people as “bags of skin acting in very unpredictable 
ways” (103). While this is an extreme view, compositionists like Ann Jurecic have described 
autistic writers in more subtle but equally damaging terms as unable to “consistently define a line 
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of argument, guide a reader from one point to the next, or supply background information for 
references that will otherwise be unclear,” all characteristics that follow from Theory of Mind 
(429). Melanie Yergeau, a self-identified autistic scholar in rhetorical studies, credits this vein of 
scholarship with contributing to the rhetorical degrading of the autistic subject, and connects it to 
a received rhetorical tradition that “promotes a compulsory sociality” (69). With the term “pro-
social,” Yergeau indexes bodily values that favor those who actively promote and prioritize 
sociality, group association, and cooperation. While these values on their own aren’t inherently 
problematic, pro-sociality has become interchangeable with effective rhetorical practice, and the 
range of rhetorical performances that might be considered effective narrows as a result. Like 
Yergeau, who has argued for thinking of autism as its own rhetoric (Yergeau and Heilker), I 
want to revisit these accounts of autism and rhetorical ability to think about how we might 
advance a more disability-positive, inclusive understanding of rhetorical practice. Such an 
understanding, as indicated by the chapters that follow, requires carving out a space for 
neurodiverse students to share their experiences, and connecting those perspectives to core 
scholarly traditions within composition and rhetorical studies. 
This dissertation makes three important contributions. First, I offer an account of the 
frustrations autistic students are experiencing in college that avoids interpreting their frustrations 
as evidence of individual deficits and instead shifts the focus towards teaching practices and 
environments for learning. My research both participates in the wider tradition in composition 
studies of advocacy on behalf of marginalized writers, while also critiquing current advocacy 
practices that contribute to the student marginalization they aim to address. Second, my work 
invites students back into pedagogical conversations that directly affect them and their learning 
conditions. This foregrounding of student perspectives and expertise helps to dismantle 
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entrenched norms that assign expertise and the ongoing project of improving classroom access 
solely to instructors and scholars. Third, my participants’ rhetorical choices contribute to a 
broader recognition of what effective rhetorical practice might look like, particularly in the realm 
of everyday classroom practice. While there is considerable scholarly support for recognizing a 
wider array of rhetorical resources and embodied knowledges (Lewiecki-Wilson), my data shows 
the shape that rhetorical work might actually take for students who must confront entrenched 
normative practices in classrooms across campus.  
 
Methods  
The methodology I follow is a mix of feminist and disability studies (DS) approaches to 
qualitative research.  I use the term “qualitative research” to align my work with a “tradition of 
inquiry concerned primarily with meaning and interpretation,” and an approach that is committed 
“to the idea that full and adequate knowledge of social behavior cannot be grasped until the 
researcher has understood the symbolic world in which the subject lives” (Barnes “Qualitative” 
115-6). I am most interested in understanding how my participants understand their own worlds, 
and how they interpret everyday experiences as students on the spectrum. I have designed my 
project to access and represent this emic, or insider, perspective. From feminist methodologies I 
borrow an emphasis on self-reflexivity – which I perform in a later section in this chapter on 
positionality – and collaboration. I aim to examine closely my positionality and political 
commitments as a researcher, and to offer my own transparent account of the “effect of the 
personality or presence of the researcher on what is being investigated” (Price “Qualitative” 3). 
This spirit of collaboration is reflected in my analytical approach, which involved giving over a 
lot of control in interviews to my participants and the topics they most wanted to discuss, and 
then letting my analytical approach – discussed earlier – follow from that. Such principles are my 
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ethical guidelines in a project that poses many challenges and complexities due to the socio-
political positioning and identities of both my participants and myself.   
My study began in 2011, when I decided to pursue interviews with self-identified autistic 
students as part of a qualitative methods graduate seminar. The original motivation for this work 
came from my noticing that nothing was recorded or outlined about autism and written 
communication in the diagnostic criteria outlined by the DSM. The DSM outlines diagnostic 
criteria for autism that primarily highlight social – rather than intellectual – impairments, and 
difficulties with communication. Outside of the DSM, prevalent theories of autism, including that 
of Mindblindness, suggest that autistic people are incapable of certain social communicative 
practices, including those of anticipating the perspectives of others, turn-taking, and recognizing 
standards of etiquette or appropriateness across different interactions. While autism is widely 
understood to affect spoken communication and social interactions, and while writing – at least 
within the field of composition and rhetoric – is known to be a highly social practice, there is 
little consensus about whether autistic traits are detectable in writing, or whether autistic students 
struggle with writing to a greater extent than neurotypical students. I wanted to investigate the 
relationship between autism and writing and situate this investigation in the context of 
conversations in composition and rhetoric about writing classroom access, inclusivity and 
neurological diversity, and rhetorical ability. My support for disability frameworks that 
emphasize disability as a social construct and a political movement meant that my project would 
ultimately not focus so much on autism, but on autistic people, and that my methods would 
prioritize speaking directly to autistic people and privileging their perspectives and embodied 
expertise.  
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 My research took place at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) from Fall 
2011 through Fall 2016. I designed my study to allow me to recruit undergraduate or recent 
college graduates from the University of Illinois or other four-year universities in the United 
States who self-identify as having an autism spectrum disorder, including Asperger syndrome. I 
recruited participants through three channels: 1) through the clinical psychologist working at the 
Disability Resources and Educational Services (DRES) office at UIUC; 2) through the program 
coordinator of The Autism Program (TAP), a community advocacy group run through the 
Family Resilience Center at UIUC; and 3) on three national listservs for scholars, students, and 
activists in disability studies and composition and rhetoric (DS-RHET, DS-HUM, SDS-Discuss). 
It should be noted that my listserv recruitment began as part of an IRB protocol amendment I 
completed in Spring 2015, and so far has not resulted in any new participants. All five of my 
participants were thus recruited from the University of Illinois.  My participants were either 
active patients of the clinical psychologist at DRES, consumers of other disability resources at 
DRES, or members of TAP. Due to privacy constraints, a short description of my research 
project was sent out on my behalf by the above representatives at TAP and DRES, and by myself 
to the three listservs. The project description read as follows:  
Writing Practices Research 
A graduate student in Writing Studies in the Department of English at the 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign is researching the writing practices of 
four-year college students and recent four-year college graduates with an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder within a disability studies framework with an emphasis on 
neurodiversity. This project involves conducting in-person or Skype interviews 
with students or recent four-year college graduates who self-identify as having an 
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ASD and are interested in sharing their experiences with writing both in and 
outside of the classroom. Participants must be 18 or older, have an Autism 
Spectrum Disorder or Asperger Syndrome diagnosis, and be a current four-year 
college student or recent four-year college graduate from a university in the 
United States. If you or someone you know would like to volunteer to be a 
participant: 
Contact: Pamela Saunders, saundrs2@illinois.edu 
Students interested in participating would contact me via e-mail and indicate their interest and 
availability. We then met in person for an informational interview, including the discussion and 
signing of my consent form, and then for at least three one-to-one interviews in a semi-public 
location on campus of the participant’s choosing. Some of the locations we used included a 
private office in the English Building, a café near the English Building, and the Student Union 
cafeteria. My fifth participant, Amy, completed her interviews over Skype, while I worked 
remotely from Massachusetts. Each interview lasted around 60 minutes, and was recorded (audio 
only) and later transcribed by me.  I asked participants to commit to a minimum of three 
interviews, and a maximum of six. The average number of interviews per participant was four.  
Interviews were scheduled at a minimum of one week apart, and were coordinated to fit the 
participant’s schedule. To date, I have collected a total of 19 interviews with five participants. 
My interview protocol included the following “starting” questions, the responses to which I used 
to develop more targeted follow-up questions for each participant:  
 
1. What are your earliest memories of reading or writing?  
2. What is/was your academic major, and why did you choose it?  
3. Are there any specialized practices or skills associated with your major? If so, where did 
you develop those skills?  
4. What are your professional goals after college?  
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5. Can you share an experience with writing in school that you would characterize as 
positive?  
6. Can you share an experience with writing out of school that you would characterize as 
positive?  
7. Make a list of all of the things you’ve written in the past week (Facebook wall posts, 
grocery lists, lab reports, e-mails, etc.). What kinds of writing do you regularly do?  
8. What kinds of feedback have you received on your writing?  
9. How and when do you decide to disclose/not disclose your disability to an instructor or 
Professor?  
10. Was there ever a time where you feel that you struggled with writing? Which aspects of 
writing would you say you struggled with, and why? 
11. What are some of the “labels” that you’ve received throughout your education? Do you 
agree with these labels?  
12. Are you worried that your instructors or professors misunderstand you as a student 
because of your diagnosis?  
13. Are there any assumptions about autistic people that you would like to dispute or 
comment on? 
14. Do you feel included in the social life of the University? Who do you hang out with on 
campus? What kinds of hobbies or activities do you do for fun? 
15. What would meaningful educational accommodations look like for you? Are you 
currently receiving these accommodations?  
16. Have you ever been invited to write or talk about your diagnosis in a classroom setting?  
17. Describe your writing process to me. How do you go about completing writing projects? 
What is your favorite/least favorite part of the writing process?  
18. Are there times when you prefer writing over spoken communication, and vice versa? 
19. Do you do any writing online?  
20. How do you learn best?  
21. What does your diagnosis mean to you in terms of how you learn?  
 
Some of these questions led to short brainstorming or multimodal writing activities. I asked all 
five of my participants to draw or otherwise visually represent their writing process, and then 
describe what they drew. I also asked all five participants to compile a short list of all the 
different types of written texts they produced in a given week, including emails, texts, lab 
reports, and blog posts. I used these brief brainstorming activities as an entry point into more 
reflective questions. Some participants (Toby and Mike) voluntarily brought actual writing 
samples to our interviews, and we used those samples to talk through the types of writing choices 
they made.  As I discuss in detail below, I decided to limit my data for this study to transcribed 
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one-to-one interviews, and did not make formal plans for collecting participant observation or 
written artifacts.  
While I focus on addressing the implications of my research specifically for the college 
writing classroom, I employ broad definitions of ‘writing’ and ‘writer’ throughout my analysis. 
One reason for my use of broad definitions is the fact that three of my participants – Sam, Toby, 
and Andy – have embraced forms of composing not traditionally found within the composition 
classroom. Both Toby and Andy are creative writers, and when asked to reflect on their writing 
processes they talked at length about both their process for writing academic essays and write 
poetry, lyrics and music, and short fiction. Sam spoke at length about his experiences writing 
computer code and comparing it to his process for writing academic essays. At one point Sam 
remarked on his own that coding is a form of composing, and perhaps the only form he actually 
enjoys. These interests and comparisons led me to employ a more inclusive definition of writing 
that includes words, numbers, symbols, musical notation, and images. My “emic” framework 
aimed to capture my participants’ own views of the world without pathologizing or dismissing 
them. What my definition of writing reflects more than anything is the way in which my 
participants themselves chose to interpret the act of writing, and which activities and processes 
they recalled when asked to reflect on their writing practices. Seeing as how one of the points of 
my project has been to identify educational standards for writing and learning that are too 
narrow, it seems appropriate to recognize a wider range of “counts” as writing in my analysis of 
my participants’ stories.  
 In addition to understanding writing as encompassing a broader range of activities and 
processes, I recognize all of my participants as writers, no matter their relationship to academic 
essay writing. Part of my justification for this is that doing so acts as a corrective to educational 
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discourses that over-emphasize writing deficits in cognitively impaired or non-neurotypical 
students, or that imply that these students are not cut out to do college-level work. By labeling all 
of my participants as writers, I hope to push back against those discourses and insist on their 
worthiness and fitness for higher education, as well as the complexity and skill they bring to all 
forms of writing. In a similar vein, I choose not to describe the quality of my participants’ 
writing, or to qualify their status as writers with labels indicating lower levels of achievement, 
such as “struggling writer,” “basic writer,” “underdeveloped writer,” or “inexperienced writer.” 
My participants have all experienced varying degrees of success and failure with regards to 
writing and academic achievement. Two of my participants (Mike, Amy) labeled themselves as 
strong writers, while the other three (Andy, Sam, Toby) expressed more ambivalent views of 
their writing abilities.  I want to avoid importing my own normative evaluations of their work 
and their level of writing skill, because doing so would only reify the educational norms I hope 
to dismantle with my project. Instead, I focus on how my participants evaluate their own writing 
skills, and how they define their own successes and challenges with writing in higher education.  
 My analysis proceeded with an interest in loosely grouping together conversational 
excerpts that emerged around particular themes. Because my interviews were only semi-
structured, and because I spent a significant amount of time with each student, each participant’s 
interview ended up being largely about whatever was at the forefront of their mind in terms of 
writing concerns, successes, and experiences. Topically, I chose to follow my students where 
they wanted to go, and to let their fascinations and interests dictate my analytical focus. Three 
broad themes that emerged across all of my interviews were the practices and risks of disclosing 
an autism diagnosis in college, perspectives on current college accommodations for non-
neurotypical students, and writing for a variety of audiences both in and outside of the university. 
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On these topics my participants had much to say, and while some (like disclosure) were only 
loosely connected with the act of writing, I chose to recognize their significance within the space 
of the writing classroom.  
Within disability studies, one of the more dominant qualitative research models of the 
past twenty years has been that of “emancipatory disability research,” which requires 
“researchers to full involve disabled people…in all aspects of the research process” (Barnes 
“Agenda” 5), but also requires that researchers be “openly committed to advancing disabled 
people’s political struggles” (Barnes “Agenda” 7). In other words, political outcomes for 
disabled people should matter to researchers operating under the emancipatory model. This 
approach closely follows the tenets of the social model of disability, which treats disability as a 
socio-political category much like gender, race, or class, and recognizes disability as a quality of 
personhood. In recent years, researchers in disability studies have begun to point out the limits of 
such a model of disability; namely, that it “oversimplifies” individual differences in the 
experience of impairment, or that it ignores material bodies. These emerging critiques have put 
pressure on the emancipatory model of disability research, particularly on the imperative that 
research be “socially progressive” (Barton and Marback 17).  In “Ethics from Praxis,” Barton 
and Marback critique the emancipatory research model as “unethical” because it is 
“unattainable” (17). The emancipatory imperative runs the risk of having the researcher decide 
for others “what the ethics of the situation are,” rather than working through complex ethical 
questions in “truly rhetorical interaction” (18). The debate is over the ethics of researchers 
importing their own understanding of ideal political outcomes into a situation, and how doing so 
might skew the kinds of experiences researchers choose to represent in their work.  
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I bring up this debate over the emancipatory model to highlight one complex feature of 
my methodology: that of my own political views about autism and how I choose to represent the 
political views of my participants. At times throughout my project, my participants have 
expressed views on autism, or autistic people, that are very different from my own. Margaret 
Price captures the complexity of this political representation when she asks, 
What are, what should be, our roles, as teachers and researchers…when we 
perceive participants’ or students’ views of disability to be regressive, even self-
destructive? Do we have some sort of “liberatory” obligation – and if we can 
move beyond simplistic conversion-oriented understandings of liberatory, what 
might that look like?” (“Methodology” 177) 
As a researcher, my “agenda” is influenced by the principles of the neurodiversity movement, 
which both borrows from the social model of disability – by recognizing autism as desirable – 
while also emphasizing the materiality of autism. However, I acknowledge that the 
neurodiversity movement is itself contested, and that I must recognize when my participants 
choose not to echo neurodiversity-endorsed perspectives on autism, instead expressing an 
understanding of autism that is more deficit-oriented or medicalized. While I don’t believe any 
of my participants wish to be neurotypical – they tend to squarely resist ableist ideologies on this 
level – they have at times expressed support for therapies that help autistics learn to behave more 
normally, including psychiatric medication, and, crucially, many of them have invoked the 
rhetoric of functioning to distance themselves from others on the autism spectrum. As a 
researcher with no psychiatric expertise whatsoever, I fully support any of my participants’ 
interests in pursuing psychiatric treatment that they find helpful. In terms of therapies or forms of 
social training, I read this as a very understandable desire to manage stigma. My participants do 
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what they have to do to get by, and my role is not to judge how they go about doing so according 
to any particular paradigm for conceptualizing autism. In fact, understanding exactly how they 
get by offers us significant and crucial insight into individual experiences of disability, and this 
insight can itself offer an emerging critique of the limitations of neurodiversity rhetorics.  
In reflecting on the “high-functioning” label many of my participants claim to identify 
their position on the autism spectrum, I recognize how the rhetoric of functioning functions to 
divide the autism community into so-called “acceptable,” or high-functioning, autistics, and 
those who are more profoundly impaired. Many autistic people employ the rhetoric of 
functioning to connote a kind of status that helps them mitigate stigma but marginalizes the 
implied “low-functioning” portion of the autism community. I recognize this act of rhetorical 
marginalization as harmful, but understand my role as a researcher as one of inhabiting the 
worldviews and interpretive frameworks of my participants in a way that doesn’t judge them or 
their choices. Ultimately, my aim is to render a life “visible to a [wider] public” (Couser 140), 
and that entails representing the views of a participant even when I do not agree with them. I 
look for insight into what the participant is saying, and recognize, in the words of Price, that 
there are “many different ways to survive in an ableist world” (“Normal” 70).  
At times, these views have put me at odds with other scholars doing qualitative research 
in disability studies. In my critique of Vidali’s work in Chapter Three, “Cripping Kairos,” I point 
out a tendency within disability studies to uplift student writing or participant experiences that 
are more politically disruptive, or activist in nature. While doing so admirably showcases 
important work being done to disrupt regressive views of disability and dismantle stigma, it also 
obscures what I understand as a wide gap between members of the disability community who 
have access to activist, politicized vocabularies for talking about disability, and those who do 
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not, or who, for a variety of different reasons, don’t identify with disability activism. Only 
representing the moves, choices, and risks of particular participants within the disability 
community results in an understanding of the everyday lived experience of disability that is 
partial and distorted. 
Ultimately, though, what I hope to demonstrate methodologically is that “methodology is 
not prescription, but movement, improvisation, revision” (Price “Qualitative” 181). My project 
reflects that sense of improvisation and revision in three unique design features or outcomes, 
which I address in the next section. First, my participant pool is small. Second, I do not formally 
collect or analyze writing samples. Finally, I do not collect or make use of participant 
observation data. In the next section, I discuss these methodological features of my project in 
greater detail, explaining the behind-the-scenes improvisations and revisions that led to them. 
First, though, I introduce my five research participants, outlining their interests and general 




At the time of our first interview, Sam was 19 and a sophomore majoring in computer science. 
He was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome in high school, after a rare, brief period of academic 
struggle and low grades. Sam’s frustrations with writing were perhaps the most acute of all my 
participants; he scored a perfect score on the written portion of the ACT and tested out of first-
year composition, yet revealed to me in our first interview that he had failed out of every college 
course thus far that had required substantial writing. He compares writing to “having your 
eyeballs extracted with a spoon,” and recalls how, in high school, his dad would intervene to 
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help him finish essay assignments. “My dad forced me to sit there,” he explained, “and ramble 
about a topic and then he would just write down everything I said about whatever I was supposed 
to write about…and then I turned that in as an essay.” Sam says he “somehow magically got a 
B” on the essay, “mostly because the teacher felt sorry for me I think.” Sam acknowledges, with 
ambivalence, that many of his teachers might pity him and give him higher grades on 
assignments as a result. He says it doesn’t seem fair that his diagnosis affords him greater access 
to help, since he just got lucky that “they had a [medical] word for” why he struggled with 
particular academic subjects.  
In spite of his avoidance of academic essay writing, Sam has embraced other forms of 
composition. He taught himself to write computer code in middle school, and his interest in 
computers led him to pursue computer science as a major. His favorite coding language is 
Python, since “there’s a lot of stuff that’s already been written in Python that you can use,” and 
because “it makes a lot more sense than other programming languages.” He thinks of coding as a 
kind of composition, only without the elements of writing essays that he finds so challenging.  
At this stage in his academic career, Sam is reflecting on the difference between learning 
processes and skills that his instructors and parents have emphasized, and those that he actually 
finds helpful. He spent years trying to take notes, due to “pressure from teachers and parents,” 
but has since realized that “it works for everyone but me”; he doesn’t take notes now because “I 
know better, and I can explain myself more adequately. Now I’m choosing not to take notes 
instead of simply being unable to take notes.” 
Sam wants to make friends in college, though he says he’s “still not sure what a friend is. 
Beyond the smile, nod, or wave. I’m working on it, but it’s hard, especially since I don’t live on 
campus.” He does participate in gamer groups that meet on campus, but feels left out of the 
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social fabric of the university. He often describes his and his peers’ experiences in class, using 
terms like “we” or “us,” but then adding “I say ‘us’ in the loosest terms.” He is currently worried 
about flunking out of a course on algorithms because the professor requires students to form their 
own groups outside of class to complete homework assignments. Now, Sam claims he’s “not 
doing the work. I tried for a while, but it was horrible. I think everyone else is friends with other 
people in the class. I don’t really have that. I can go weeks without even hearing about a project 
because everyone else is talking about it to each other. It causes me to miss a lot.” 
 
Toby  
At the time of our interviews in 2011, Toby was twenty-five and majoring in creative writing. He 
was in his seventh year as an undergraduate at the University of Illinois, and following a 
customized, independent plan of study that allowed him to take only one course per semester, if 
needed, and “counted” the assortment of courses he had completed as a cohesive degree 
program. Toby called his major “creative writing, mathematics, and technology.” “Those last 
two,” he explains, “are because that’s what I started out with and have since gone right off but 
they didn’t want me to think I’d done all that for nothing.” Toby was diagnosed with Asperger 
syndrome earlier than any of my other participants. Yet instead of claiming his medical 
diagnosis, Toby referred to himself throughout his interviews as a “demented poet songwriter,” a 
“wanderer,” a “non-standard thinker,” or a “stranger on this planet.” Like Sam, Toby prefers to 
not rely on his diagnosis except in extreme cases, when he might simply say, “look I’m autistic, 
don’t get on me [laughs].” His alternative labels play up his creative interests and cast his 
outsider status as a position of insight.  
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 More so than traditional creative writing pursuits, Toby is into music and songwriting. He 
composes lyrics and melodies that he has performed on acoustic guitar in videos he posts online 
and, more recently, in person at open mic nights around town. When asked about the DNA of his 
musical style, Toby lists his favorite bands as “Dylan, The Dead, Springsteen, Joni 
Mitchell…The Who, Floyd…[and] some more obscure people [like] Caravan…from the 
Canterbury scene.” He is extremely knowledgeable about “obscure 60s, early 70s bands,” and 
catalogs his extensive vinyl collection on a personal blog under his Internet alias.  
 Toby’s relationship with writing academic essays is strained. He mostly dislikes when 
instructors choose research topics for him, and, like Sam, has troubled finishing academic essays 
after he runs out of motivation. “Like just…I fail to think of anything at all, really,” he 
explained. He dislikes being “fed” writing and research topics by instructors, since he feels 
obligated to have something to say on a topic to which he doesn’t feel a connection. He wonders 
if his distaste for academic writing and research is a result of never having been exposed to more 
open-ended assignments that allowed him to bridge his interests and investments with the 
requirements of the course, but doesn’t particularly care to find out.     
 
Mike  
At the time of our interviews in 2013, Mike was twenty, and an upperclassman majoring in 
Communication at the University of Illinois. He had the most recent diagnosis of all of my 
participants, and had waited until he was an adult to pursue one. Mike was athletic and heavily 
involved in sports as a kid; now, in college, he plans to pursue a job in business, as a financial 
consultant, and later return to school for his MBA. Mike’s entire day is scheduled around the 
stock market, which he tracks relentlessly. He participates in a members-only stock market 
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forum, where he follows discussions about stock opportunities.  In school, Mike considers 
himself a strong writer, and was most proud of a recent policy paper he wrote on eliminating 
affirmative action.  
 Mike was by far my most reluctant informant, and at times seemed skeptical of my 
questions about how autism affected his student life. Mike firmly believed that his diagnosis was 
an asset, a sign that his abilities surpassed that of neurotypical students and employees, and 
insisted that he “will never use accommodations” of any kind. “I’m fairly high-functioning,” he 
explained, “so I don’t really need it.” Mike described his approach to disclosure as highly 
controlled and strategic: he only planned to disclose when he went to apply for jobs, as he 
believed claiming a certain federal status would give him an advantage on the job market. He 
distinguished himself from other autistic students by claiming high-functioning status, and using 
language that indicated his preference to not be grouped with other members of the autism 
community. He was also vocal about the lack of “successful” autistic role models in the public 
sphere, highlighting Temple Grandin’s appearance and public displays of oddity as an example 
of what not to do.  
Mike’s sole role model was Michael Burry, “one of the better hedge fund managers of all 
time,” reportedly self-diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, and credited with predicting the 2008 
subprime mortgage crisis. For Mike, Burry represents the potential of the unique talents of the 
autistic mind applied in the pursuit of wealth and power.  Mike is captivated by the mind, and 
often mentioned his favorite TED talks on topics such neuroplasticity and mindfulness 
meditation. He is interesting in learning as much as he can about “how you can train your brain 
to become more resilient to adversity and stress.” He believes that an “autistic mind in finance is 
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a needle in a haystack,” because “people need someone who’s very analytical, willing to sit at a 
computer for twelve hours in a day.” 
Despite his “confidence” in claiming an Asperger syndrome diagnosis, Mike’s approach 
to disclosure stands apart from my other participants in one regard: he has kept his diagnosis a 
secret from his family, particularly his father. He says this is to avoid a situation where his dad 
“will deduce that he’s autistic…I don’t want to be the one to tell my dad that he’s been autistic 
his entire life.” 
 
Andy 
At the time of our interviews in 2015, Andy was a junior psychology major at the University of 
Illinois. His plan, though, was to switch to majoring in social work and ultimately pursue a 
graduate degree and clinical license. Andy would like to work as a clinically licensed social 
worker in an educational setting, focusing on “using writing…[as a] mode” to work with 
“troubled teens.” He himself has used writing – both journaling and writing short fiction – in the 
past to work through periods of depression or tough transitions, as his family moved quite often 
in his early teens. On his path to the University of Illinois, Andy first attended a community 
college, where he took courses that encouraged his interest in “all aspects of the mind,” and 
introduced him to psychology as a major.  
 Like Toby, Andy has embraced fiction writing, and talked about his novel-in-progress 
throughout our four interviews. Andy considers himself to be an “above average” writer, though 
he admits to struggling with procrastination on school writing assignments and with what he 
calls “reading comprehension.” When asked to elaborate, Andy explained that he has failed to 
correctly interpret literary works in some of his college English courses; that he sometimes won’t 
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“get” a story until it is discussed in class; that sometimes he thinks a story is about one thing, 
when it turns out to be about something else. Outside of school, though, he is a highly motivated 
writer. One of his favorite activities is responding to Writers’ Digest prompts online, and he 
posts his responses to dedicated forums for other readers to enjoy.  
Andy’s current favorite pastime is playing an immersive video game called RuneScape, 
categorized in video game parlance as a fantasy MMORPG, or Massively multiplayer online 
role-playing game. Through RuneScape, Andy can interact with other players and form 
supportive social relationships. He claims that he as a “support network” through RuneScape, 
since there are “clans that you can join or basically like groups of people that are together for, 
like a similar purpose.” Communicating within the world of RuneScape requires extensive 
background knowledge in the different modes of communication available, as well as their 
affordances for individual players and groups of players. Understanding these communicative 
practices takes “time,” “practice,” and “interest,” explains Andy. Finally, Andy very much 
enjoys listening to metal music, particularly a Finnish band called Nightwish. 
 
Amy  
My interviews with Amy began in Fall 2016, when she was nineteen and a sophomore majoring 
in Agricultural and Biological Engineering. She was tested and subsequently diagnosed with 
Asperger syndrome after eighth grade, and identifies primarily with this diagnosis, claiming that 
she “would not go as far to say that I have autism.” Amy decided to participate in my project 
because she thought it would be “kind of neat to be a research subject.” In high school, Amy says 
she “didn’t need something like” an IEP, since she was “doing well in school.” In college, she 
does not seek accommodations related to her diagnosis, and doesn’t consider it to have any 
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impact on her academic work as an honors student. In addition to her coursework, Amy is an 
accomplished orchestral musician. Her other hobbies include learning German, nature 
photography, and just “going outside” in general. Amy is the only participant of mine who lives 
in university dormitory housing, though she says next year she wants to look for off-campus 
housing, so she can “have some private space” and be able to cook her own food. She hopes to 
eventually pursue a career in “ecological restoration,” or any position where she can “come up 
with technical solutions based on biology.” She doesn’t like “urban sprawl,” or “driving,” for 
“environmental reasons,” but sees herself living and working in the Chicago area to be near 
family after school.  
 Amy’s feelings about writing fall right in the middle. She says it’s sometimes “difficult 
trying to get a point across,” though “when it comes to length of a paper, I usually don’t have 
any trouble because I’m wordy.” Amy claims she “wasn’t really fond of writing essays unless I 
had a strong opinion about something,” and has happily spent time writing long pieces for 
nature- and preservation-related internships outside of school, including a report on grassland 
near her hometown. Amy views the development of writing skills as incremental, explaining 
how last year she had to write a fifteen-page paper, and that “now anything below fifteen pages 
is easy.” Her main concern about writing going forward would be the writing demands she might 
encounter as a graduate student. “I’ve heard some people have to write hundreds of pages,” she 
shared. Like Sam, Amy tested out of first-year composition at the University of Illinois. She 
claims her least successful writing moment occurred in sophomore year of high school, when she 
had to write a “literary interpretation of a short story”: “I thought I had completely understood 
the story and it turns out that I did not at all understand and, so the things I was writing was 
confusing and I missed, missed everything in it [laughs].” Amy admits that it was hard for her 
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“to see beyond the literal” and “look at symbolism,” but when offered the chance to revise, she 
spent “at least a whole Saturday thinking about it” and “rewrote it for an A minus.”  
Amy is adamant in her preference for writing over speaking, particularly in contexts 
where she feels pressure to demonstrate expertise on a particular subject. “With writing,” she 
says, “you have time to think about what you’re writing instead of having to form a whole 
sentence and speak it,” and people “only see the outcome, and not you trying to think of what 
you’re going to say.” One of Amy’s academic fears is asking questions in class, since doesn’t 
“want to ask a question and find out that I didn’t even know what I was asking about, if the 
question was important, if I was interrupting at a good time.” Amy is equally adamant in her 
preference for handwriting instead of typing on a computer, particularly when it comes to taking 
notes for class: “I don't understand how typing is supposed to help. Because you can't make 
connections between anything, if you have an arrow, if you need to draw a picture, all you're 
doing is typing.” 
 
Sample Size  
As the above introductions to my five participants indicate, having a small participant pool 
allows me to uncover nuanced, insightful details and differences that work against the tidy 
narratives of expert scholarship and educational norms. My relatively small group of five 
participants allows me to dismantle key autism tropes, particularly that of using statistics about 
portray autism as a steadily growing epidemic, and autistic people as a monolithic group. These 
tropes function to obscure the actual perspectives of autistic people and level out differences 
within the autism community. While my work follows from key tenets of the social model of 
disability, which would critique such tropes, this model too can problematically erase individual 
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experiences of disability or impairment. Colin Barnes acknowledges that there are valid 
methodological critiques of the social model of disability, particularly that it “oversimplifies 
differences in the experience of oppression within the disabled population” (“Agenda” 8). Citing 
Shakespeare and others, Barnes recommends that “social model influenced disability research” 
should “incorporate the feminist maxim that the “personal is political” to encompass private 
concerns including the experience of impairment (“Agenda” 8). Thomas Couser echoes this 
sentiment, claiming that disability “cannot be represented as a monolithic community” (126). My 
decision to design my study with a small sample size and case study approach follows from my 
understanding that the autistic community is not homogenous and resists generalization; 
attempting to synthesize the perspectives of many participants might lead to the erasure of 
important individual differences in identifying with autism and negotiating rhetorical ability. By 
devoting so much attention to each individual participant, I can tease out the “personal,” 
“political” differences among each participant, and leave room for interesting connections and 
contradictions between participants.  
Second, accessing a vulnerable population of students – particularly those with a 
diagnosis like autism – is hard to do. In addition to this goal of highlighting the individual 
experience of autism, my small participant pool is a result of some challenging constraints to 
ethnographic studies of disability. “Disabled populations,” writes Couser, “have…not been as 
visible, accessible, or attractive to ethnographers as ethnically distinct and geographically distant 
populations” (126).  In addition to the inappropriateness of representing the disability community 
as “monolithic,” this community is often geographically highly dispersed across many sites. In 
the context of my project, there are no sites on campus where I can reliably access a group of 
autistic students. Finally, because of the stigma surrounding autism and general privacy 
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guidelines around medical diagnoses, my recruitment options are limited and must be brokered 
through an intermediary party. Medical diagnoses are private, and it wouldn’t be appropriate for 
me to have access to, say, a list of registered autistic students at Illinois. I essentially have to wait 
for participants to come to me, a process that involves a lot of patience. It can also be daunting 
for an autistic student to reach out to a stranger via email, as explained in Chapter 4 in my 
analysis of Sam’s experiences writing for a variety of audiences. In fact, Sam admitted to me that 
it took him a while to compose his first e-mail to me, suggesting that my privacy guidelines are 
also an obstacle for potential participants.  
Finally, my relatively small participant pool is steadily growing. Roughly every other 
semester, I have gained a new participant, and I consider my recruitment efforts to be ongoing.  
 
Writing Sample Data  
I initially used a blanket IRB protocol covering all graduate student projects, including mine, that 
established strict procedural guidelines that prevented me from collecting writing samples from 
my participants, ostensibly for privacy reasons. While at the time the decision to forgo the 
collection writing samples as data was entirely due to established IRB guidelines, and I have 
since been granted permission to collect writing samples as part of my own protocol, to this day I 
don’t closely read writing samples or formally include them in my analysis. I realized that my 
project was becoming less about what my participants were writing, or how they were writing it, 
and more about their own perspectives on the writing process, and their experiences in writing 
classrooms.  
In his analysis of one ethnography of disability, Couser points out the significance of the 
author’s decision to “resist quantifying” his participant’s “intelligence or mental age,” instead 
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“preferring to explore how, and how well, she functions in a world not designed for her” (136). 
Reading samples of work that was gathered solely because an autistic writer wrote it suddenly 
felt highly diagnostic, normative, and problematic. I couldn’t figure out a way to include that 
data without making evaluative comments about the quality of the writing (whether high quality 
or not). It felt too much like what Prendergast identifies as the co-opting of the writing of the 
mentally ill in ways that supersedes their original author intentions. It felt too much like “exhibit 
A”  (Prendergast “Rhetorics”) of whether or not autistic students could write well or not, and I 
didn’t want my project to issue that sort of verdict. A few of my participants wanted to share 
their writing with me, and I gladly accepted it and used their work to further our conversations. 
However, overemphasizing the end product would take attention away from the stories my 
participants told.  
 
Participant Observation Data  
In addition to writing samples, which I eventually abandoned for ethical reasons, my project 
timeline includes a semester I spent trying to gather participant observation data, and later 
abandoning that data for privacy reasons.  I do so because my population of interest is considered 
a vulnerable population, and employing participant observation methods for this project could 
potentially attract unwanted attention disclose their diagnosis or identity in ways and to people 
they would not want.  
 A brief retelling of my early attempts at participant observation illustrates why it wasn’t 
feasible to continue this particular leg of data collection. Initially, I approached my participant 
Sam to ask if he would be interested in letting me observe him in a particular classroom space on 
campus. Sam expressed interest, and suggested that I observe his upper-level mandatory 
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computer science ethics course, in which he was currently enrolled. The course is for about 60 
students, all upperclassmen in computer science, and is notable within the computer science 
major for requiring a substantial amount of writing, mostly in the form of lengthy essays 
analyzing the ethical dimensions of historical or hypothetical technological advancements or 
calamities. To access the class, I would need to obtain permission from the Professor of the 
course, and would have to blatantly misrepresent my project to him to avoid revealing either 
Sam’s diagnosis or his status as my focal participant. I initially wrote to this Professor and told 
him I was doing a study of writing in STEM disciplines; he found this explanation to be 
sufficient, and invited me to come observe his course for a number of weeks. However, the 
Professor was enthusiastic about my project and wanted to discuss it with me at length, 
sometimes after class; it got harder and harder to misrepresent my work convincingly.  
 In addition to upholding this increasingly elaborate façade project, this Professor enjoyed 
moving students around his classroom, pairing them off or assigning random groups for smaller, 
breakout discussions. That meant that Sam would be traveling around what was a large lecture 
hall with amphitheatre-style seating. In order to observe his interactions and ways of being in the 
classroom, I had to subtly position myself nearby him, yet not “give away” that he was my only 
focal participant in the class. This proved increasingly difficult.  
 After three weeks of observations, and follow up conversations with Sam where we 
discussed his interactions in class, I decided to abandon the collection of participant observation 
data for this project. First, it was not worth the risk to Sam’s privacy. Second, maintaining the lie 
with the Professor of the course and Sam’s peers became a distraction. Third, and in the same 
vein as my work with writing samples, observing Sam’s behavior in class felt too “clinical” to 
me, and like Sam didn’t have the same agency to represent himself as he did in our interviews. I 
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Disability Studies as a field grew in part out of political activism that insisted on “nothing about 
us without us,” or the belief that individuals with disabilities can and should represent 
themselves in conversations concerning their rights, health, education, labor, and any other 
aspect of their lives. This principle emerged in response to innumerable historical and 
contemporary instances where disabled individuals were talked about, but not to, instances that 
stripped them of their agency and rendered them a virtually invisible population in the public 
sphere. I do think that the field of disability studies is loosening its tight association with identity 
politics, employing disability as a kind of framework for intervening in matters that don’t overtly 
seem to concern disability.  However, this history of nothing about us without us compels many 
disability studies scholars to disclose their positionality regarding the disability community. 
Margaret Price describes disability studies as “unusually reflexive or transparent”; as a field, she 
says, “we are perpetually explaining ourselves to ourselves.” Yet Price also argues that disability 
studies is “still too often considered a “special field,” and that its wider relevance must be made 
clear (“Methodology” 168). I believe my project contributes to this call for wider relevance, 
partly due to my own positionality, which I discuss at length in this section.  
I once referred to the move ethnographers often made, in the introductions to their books, 
to introduce themselves and analyze their positionality as “dropping the self bomb.” The time 
has come for me to do so myself, and in this next section I will endeavor to do so thoughtfully. I 
do not have an autism diagnosis, nor do I currently identify as disabled in any bodily or 
	 34	
neurological capacity. I use “currently” to align myself with Price’s call to identify my 
relationship to disability “in ways that are characterized by creativity, contradiction, and revision 
over time” (“Methodology” 171). At times in my life, I have been a consumer of mental health 
care, including cognitive behavioral therapy, and some psychiatric medications – I take 
alprazolam, or Xanax, to cope with my fear of flying on planes, for example – but, for all intents 
and purposes, identify somewhere within the envelope of neurotypicality. My immediate family 
includes two members who have struggled mightily with – and one who died from – substance 
abuse, which is sometimes understood to go hand in hand with certain mood disorders or 
psychiatric conditions. Substance abuse is not a facet of my own bodily experience in the world, 
but it is part of my family medical history and my proximity to it has altered me and informs my 
understanding of the complex nexus of nature, nurture, and other bodily and political 
contingencies that make up mental health and wellness. This personal experience informs my 
political conviction that stigma around non-neurotypicality – whether it be a mood disorder like 
depression, or a learning disability, or autism – has no place in scholarship, higher education, or 
the wider public sphere. I identify as an ally to those who experience and manage such stigma, 
and understand part of my agenda as a researcher to be dismantling such stigma.  
 Among the many contested spaces for conceptualizing autism and representing the 
experiences of autistic people, I support the neurodiversity movement’s commitment to ending 
deficit-based stigma for autistic people. This particular commitment within neurodiversity, rather 
than the movement as a whole, and coupled with privileging the experiences of my participants, 
is most representative of my own epistemological and political framework. Not all of my 
participants feel the same way that I do about autism, and I respect this. I also want to recognize 
how the neurodiversity movement can at times function to stigmatize personal experiences of 
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autism that don’t fit the image the movement projects. One male ethnographer who shall remain 
nameless once assured readers that the intimacy he established with his focal population of 
immigrant women made him an “honorary woman” in their eyes. I don’t presume to claim any 
kind of membership within the autism community, honorary or otherwise, and therefore don’t 
presume to know a correct, or even better, way of thinking about what is an intensely personal 
experience for my participants.  
 Instead, I use the following questions to guide productive reflection on what it means to 
work with members of the autism community as a neurotypical ally, and to work within the field 
of disability studies as a TAB, or temporarily able-bodied ally:  
• How might researchers who identify as disabled and those who identify as temporarily 
able-bodied collaborate productively in service of our larger commitments to self-
advocacy? 
• How can allies promote self-advocacy in interactions with research participants? 
• How can allies design projects that accommodate a range of different ways of identifying 
with disability? 
• How might allies responsibly represent participants who associate with and dissociate 
from disability in different ways? 
While I don’t have the definitive answers to these questions, they indicate a number of key 
convictions or priorities that I follow to do this work. First, I believe in collaboration between 
allies and members of the disability community, and don’t understand a personal, embodied 
experience of disability to be a prerequisite for studying disability and its effects. Second, I 
believe self-advocacy to be paramount for my participants, and consider each aspect of project 
design and execution – including data analysis – to have the potential to either promote or hinder 
	 36	
participant self-advocacy. Margaret Price echoes this interest in self-advocacy with her call for 
researchers to consider “What kinds of participants are we imagining as we design our studies, 
and how well do our methods reflect our participants’ strengths and abilities?” (“Methodology” 
166). Third, I understand that not everyone feels the same way about disability, and to obscure or 
otherwise misrepresent – or omit altogether – those differences would be methodologically 
irresponsible. Finally, I believe the possible benefits of doing this work outweigh the 
considerable risks. I take on these risks because of what I believe can be gained from 
“mapping…a life that would otherwise be hidden in plain sight” (Couser 140). In his 
investigation of the merits of disability ethnography, Couser insists above all that “the 
public…benefits from being given controlled access to [the]…lives” of members of the disability 
community (140). The risk lies, of course, in how exactly this “access” is “controlled,” and by 
whom.  
 In Chapter Two, I assemble key conversations happening at the intersection of disability 
studies and rhetorical studies and read them in the context of a foundational moment in 
composition scholarship and its legacy: that of cognition and composition. Cognition and 
composition scholarship was never overtly about disability –even when it employed 
developmental theories to suggest that “basic” writers were cognitively under-developed – yet it 
has had significant implications for disability. I argue that this scholarship sought to position the 
scholar/teacher as expert diagnostician, and to develop and uphold one standardized cognitive 
model of the writing process by which all students’ abilities would be measured; it also sought to 
“explain” difference, often by locating it in the brain, and then to intervene and rehabilitate. 
These scholarly goals and outcomes place cognition scholarship and its legacy at the center of 
conversations and understandings of ability and writing. Evidence of this legacy can be found in 
	 37	
wider field practices of associating writing and learning differences with deficit, and of 
responding to difference (again, always as deficit) with remediation. Reading this scholarship 
alongside theoretical work on rhetoricity, normativity, and embodied rhetorics illustrates how 
broader ableist perspectives inform composition’s tradition of advocacy on behalf of struggling 
students. My goal is to bring these conversations together in order to open up composition’s 
scholarly traditions and history to a new kind of disability-positive reading through the eyes of 
students like my participants.  
 In Chapter Three, I investigate disability disclosure as a rhetorical act loaded with 
kairotic potential and risk. I argue that one participant’s account of his disclosure choices in 
college challenges both the assumption that kairos, as a rhetorical resource, is unavailable to the 
autistic subject and the association of timing and disability in all educational contexts with delay. 
I also argue that this understanding of kairotic skill can revise both the notion of “time and a 
half” – which governs mainstream approaches to disability accommodation – and “crip time,” 
which theorizes how the disabled subject experiences temporality. Both “time and a half” and 
“crip time” equate disability with delay – one overtly, one more subtly. In this context, crip time 
can index a kind of rhetorical savvy related to time. Ultimately, I insist that the rhetorical work 
of disability disclosure is heavily informed by kairos as a rhetorical resource, and insist that 
autistic students like Mike leverage their kairotic expertise every day in deciding when, where, 
and how to disclose an autism diagnosis. It is imperative to recognize the choices of students like 
Mike as rhetorical work, and to interrogate the norms that create risky conditions for disclosure 
in the classroom.  
Chapter Four is devoted to a common theme from my conversations with participants: 
that of writing for various audiences in the university. In this chapter, I look for evidence of what 
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Yergeau calls “pro-social” values – and which she locates in the broader rhetorical tradition – 
specifically in compositions scholarship on audience as fiction. I explore how closely the field of 
composition has associated the measurement of intellect and cognitive maturity with a narrow set 
of social skills, as well as its unexamined bias towards particular performances of “pro-social” 
writerly identity. This chapter foregrounds the experiences of Sam and Toby, two students who 
have essentially given up on academic writing while embracing other forms of composition, 
including computer coding and poetry. Both Sam and Toby demonstrate the complicated social 
expectations that go into understandings of audience as fiction, illustrating how such a concept  -
- what Bartholomae calls an “enabling fiction” – begins to fall apart through the eyes of 
neurodiverse writers.  
While my work does critique foundational scholarly traditions within composition 
studies, the issue doesn’t ultimately lay with any one scholarly tradition, or pedagogical concept. 
Rather, I’d like to disrupt the wider, more pervasive practice of erasing students’ perspectives 
from conversations about their needs as learners. In my conclusion, I synthesize key points of 
insight from across my qualitative interviews: the majority of my participants choose never to 
disclose their diagnosis, and they negatively associate accommodations with unfair advantages. 
My participants who do want particular accommodations also don’t want to have to call attention 
to their differences in class. Their perspectives reflect the normative imperatives and stigmas that 
impede access in higher education, and demonstrate the insight that can be gained from formally 




Chapter Two: Positioning Disability within Composition and Rhetorical Studies 
 
In this chapter, I offer a synthesis of the theories and scholarly fields that animate, and are 
animated by, the experiences of my research participants. Building on Chapter 1’s sketch of the 
current landscape of autism and autistic students in higher education and public life, Chapter 2 
will outline my project’s intervention into three main scholarly fields. I draw from these fields 
the theories through which I read my participants’ experiences and the scholarly traditions to 
which my project responds, including those that it attempts to overturn or otherwise challenge.   
First, I broadly trace the employment of cognitive science theories and methods by 
scholars in composition studies in order to show how this body of scholarship has contributed to 
a wider tradition of positioning students of all abilities as patients within a corrective pedagogy 
that valorizes normalcy. When it comes to cognition in composition, there has been a tendency 
within the field to a) presume a concise, shared understanding of normal writing ability; b) focus 
less on how students are defining writing problems or deficits for themselves and more on the 
scholar as expert diagnostician, and c) rehabilitate students with writing deficits.  Moving 
forward from the enduring legacy of this diagnostic and normative approach to pedagogy, how 
might we shift our focus to how students define writing struggles and advocate for themselves as 
learners? In addition, how might we shift our focus away from diagnosing students to 
“diagnosing” pedagogical approaches that disable students of all abilities?  
Next, I synthesize smaller, more recent conversations within rhetorical studies on 
disability and rhetorical practice. The concept of rhetoricity, which has emerged out of 
conversations specifically about mental disability and effective rhetorical practice, including 
conversations about disability disclosure and the autistic rhetor, is central to how I understand 
	 40	
my participants’ own stories of rhetorical positioning. In turn, their stories enrich our 
understanding of rhetoricity as it is enacted, granted, or denied in everyday rhetorical encounters. 
Next, I offer an in-depth look at a major text at the intersection of disability studies and rhetorical 
studies – Jay Dolmage’s Disability Rhetoric – that both captures a received tradition of 
disembodied, normative rhetorical practice and suggests major disability-positive interventions 
into that received tradition. I argue that qualitative interviews with neurodivergent rhetors are 
necessary to the larger project Dolmage outlines, as well as to evolving understandings of 
rhetoricity as a robust concept that helps us to better understand the phenomenon of normativity 
as it governs rhetorical practice.  
Finally, I outline conversations surrounding theories of normativity, the social 
construction of disability, and embodiment within the field of disability studies.  These theories 
help me name tacit practices within higher education and scholarly research that determine the 
advantages and disadvantages afforded to students both within and outside of the disability 
community. I see my participants’ stories as contributing to emerging critiques of the social 
model of disability and renewed attention to quasi-medical or embodied models of disability, 
including critiques articulated through the Neurodiversity movement. My project contributes to 
the core disability studies tradition of “nothing about us without us,” while exploring the 
perspectives on disability of those who have not totally accessed or been exposed to the 
vocabularies, concepts, and principles that make up the ethics of social constructionism in 





Cognition in composition-rhetoric 
Within the field of composition studies there is a cohesive body of scholarship on cognition that 
emerged out of conversations about pedagogy, writing and learning, and basic writers from the 
process movement of the 1970’s and 1980’s. The employment of cognitive science concepts and 
methodologies in research from that era of composition studies sparked an enduring interest in 
writing and learning processes and the needs of writers who find themselves on the margins of 
the university. At the same time, it has contributed to a legacy of ableism in composition and 
anchors a tradition of corrective pedagogy that aims to make all students approach normalcy to 
the greatest extent possible.  
 Theories and methods from cognitive psychology helped to solidify an enduring myth in 
the field of composition studies that writing is neurologically most conducive to, and thus 
necessary for, effective learning. In 1977, Janet Emig suggested that writing uniquely serves the 
cognitive process of learning. Citing the developmental cognitive theories of Vygotsky, Luria, 
and Bruner, Emig asserts that “higher cognitive functions, such as analysis and synthesis, seem 
to develop most fully only with the support system of verbal language – particularly, it seems, of 
written language” (122). Outlining eleven fundamental differences between writing and talk, 
Emig sought to position the act of writing, rather than talk or reading, as the optimal conduit for 
learning. Writing is learned (whereas talk is a natural behavior), artificial, technological, slower, 
and “naked as a medium” (whereas talk is “rich” and “luxuriant” and “inherently redundant”). 
Writing needs to create its own context and anticipate an audience that is absent. Writing 
“usually results in a visible graphic product,” and therefore is a more “responsible and 
committed act.” Writing has always carried without a certain “mystique” that the mundane or 
ephemeral spoken word cannot match. Finally, Emig asserts that “Because writing is often our 
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representation of the world made visible, embodying both process and product, writing is more 
readily a form and source of learning than talking” (124). In establishing the necessity of writing 
to learning by calling on theories from the cognitive sciences, Emig built a case for devoting 
considerable scholarly attention to how students compose and employing theories and 
methodologies from cognitive science to do so.  
Over fifteen years later, at the tail-end of the era of cognition that Emig initiated, in his 
1993 article, “The Promise of Writing to Learn,” John Ackerman explains the appeal of 
cognitive theories and methods for the Process movement in Composition studies: such theories 
and methods were new, different, and seemed to overwhelmingly confirm writing’s place at the 
center of higher-order thinking and learning. “The introduction of a psychology of writing into 
new rhetorical and current traditional teaching philosophies made possible the link between 
scholarship in composition and rhetoric and process-over-product approaches,” explains 
Ackerman (335). Of the field’s enthusiasm for cognitive theories, Ackerman writes, “I suspect 
that early advocates of writing and learning, such as … Emig, gained a following because they 
presented cognitive theories that carried assumptions, metaphors, and goals attractive to writing 
teachers in English departments who were not necessarily accustomed to thinking about “mental 
models” and “information processing”” (339). Ackerman’s article goes on to suggest, somewhat 
provocatively, that Emig’s and other’s orginal shared hypothesis about writing and learning has 
not been upheld by subsequent research. In spite of this utter lack of proof that writing uniquely 
serves learning, it remains a given in the field, an accepted premise upon which to build other 
insights or theories. This pervasive interest in process and cognition emerged as the field pursued 
a line of inquiry about how writing actually happened – in order to debunk the “inspiration 
myth,” which tells of writers who mysteriously receive inspiration to compose successful, 
	 43	
compelling work, it was necessary to turn to what was considered fundamentally real, or 
concrete, or even just “attractive” and different: theories and methods of cognitive science. In 
doing so, write-to-learn itself became a major myth of the field, with consequences for diverse 
learners and those who found themselves on the margins of the university.  
 Composition studies borrowed from the field of cognitive science in two major ways that 
are relevant to my project. First, scholars such as Flower, Lunsford, Emig, and Rose borrowed 
experimental methodologies from cognitive science, specifically that of protocol analysis. 
Protocol analysis as a method comes from cognitive psychology. Flower and Hayes claim that 
protocol analysis helps composition researchers access the cognitive processes that drive the act 
of writing; it allows for researchers to map the brain in a manner like “following the tracks of a 
porpoise” in water. Just as the porpoise surfaces only briefly, and one must look for it surfacing 
to make out its direction, so does protocol analysis only offer brief “glimpses…of the underlying 
mental process” (Hayes and Flower 9). Protocol analysis offers researchers a glimpse into how 
the brain works during the act of writing, with the goal always being to develop a definitive 
model of the writing process. “The psychologist’s task in analyzing a protocol,” Hayes and 
Flower explain, “is to take the incomplete record that the protocol provides together with his 
knowledge of the nature of the task and of human capabilities and to infer from these a model of 
the underlying psychological processes by which the subject performs the task” (9).  Different 
scholars suggested changes to what became a kind of shared model, but there was little dispute 
over the utility of having one comprehensive visual model of the composing process for all 
learners.  
What this methodology also offered was a way to consolidate and legitimize a particular 
understanding of the writing process as normal, and therefore to standardize writing. The model 
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became the norm, as scholars marshaled it to describe or explain deficiencies in writers. Thus, 
protocol analysis ultimately helped produce and consolidate a more narrow and normative 
understanding of able writers. In one example of how this standardized model functioned to 
diagnose writers, Mike Rose’s 1985 edited collection, When a Writer Can’t Write, comprised a 
body of work that addresses “composing-process problems,” with the implied goal to find a cure 
or acceptable rehabilitation for said problems. Rose writes, “The more I read in cognitive 
psychology – and the more I adapted and analogized it to the writing process – the more sense I 
was making of some of my student’s behaviors” (228). In “Diagnosing Writing-Process 
Problems,” Muriel Harris argues that think-aloud writing protocols can be used as diagnostic 
tools for writing-process problems. Harris focuses on asking three key questions of these 
protocols: 1) Are the student’s composing strategies sufficiently flexible and complex? (178); 2) 
Are the student’s composing strategies productive? ; and 3) Is there anything missing or 
inadequate in the student’s composing processes? (179). “Once we have begun to identify these 
composing problems,” Harris explains, “there are pedagogical tools to help us fix them”(179). 
Here, the meaning of the terms “flexible,” “complex,” “productive,” and “inadequate” is taken 
for granted. There is a striking absence of any criteria for measuring these criteria in the context 
of studying a student’s writing process through protocol analysis. Flower and Hayes rely 
similarly on loaded value terms when they attempt to explain what makes a “good” writer: 
“Insofar as writing is a rhetorical act, not a mere artifact, writers attempt to “solve” or respond to 
this rhetorical problem by writing something…[and] a good writer is a person who can juggle all 
of these demands.” The demands that Flower and Hayes refer to here are the rhetorical situation, 
audience, and the writer’s own goals in writing. They conclude that “people only solve the 
problems they define for themselves. If a writer’s representation of her rhetorical problem is 
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inaccurate or simply underdeveloped, then she is unlikely to “solve” or attend to the missing 
aspects of the problem. To sum up, defining the rhetorical problem is a major, immutable part of 
the writing process” (Flower and Hayes 257). Here, Flower and Hayes invoke the vocabulary of 
cognitive developmental theories to paint a portrait of the “good” writer, or the developed writer. 
Such theories, as I argue below, allowed for researchers to explain good writers by their brains 
alone.  
 In addition to protocol analysis, composition researchers heavily employed 
developmental theories from cognitive science to “explain” why and how so-called basic writers 
struggled with writing, including Jean Piaget’s developmental scheme, as well as work by 
Vygotsky (a contemporary of Piaget) and Chomsky on language. Calling upon Vygotsky, Piaget, 
and Chomsky, scholars such as Lunsford and Shaughnessy located the writing deficiencies of 
basic writers in their developing brains. Flower employs Vygotsky and Piaget’s notions of inner 
speech and egocentric speech1 in her discussion of reader-based and writer-based prose. “Writer-
based prose,” Flower writes, “is writing whose meaning is still to an important degree in the 
writer’s head. The culprit here is often the unstated psychological subject. The work of the 
“remedial” student is a good place to examine the phenomenon” (30). “Transforming Writer-
based prose” to the more outwardly-oriented reader-based prose is “not only a necessary 
procedure for all writers at times, but a useful place to start teaching intellectually significant 
writing skills” (Flower 34). Here, Flower has employed developemental theories from Vygotsky 
and Piaget to theorize basic writers as stuck, so to speak, in an inwardly-focused level of 
developmental awareness of audience. Flower and other scholars called upon developmental 
																																																								
1 For Piaget, the recorded talk of children was egocentric and reflected the children’s “limited 
ability to “assume the point of view of the listener”.” Vygotsky called this phenomenon “inner 
speech” and identified it as “a forerunner of the private verbal thought adults carry on,” with an 
important self-regulatory function – “not simply a by-product of play”(Flower “Prose” 21). 
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theories to explain why basic writers possess certain deficits, suggesting that their brains are at a 
different or lower stage of development than those of writers of normal ability. Like scholarship 
on using protocol analysis to study the writing process, vaguely defined value terms like “good” 
or “developed” guide much of this work. The impulse of this scholarship is diagnostic, as its goal 
is to first sort writers into categories based on a particular understanding of ability, and then to 
intervene or “treat” the so-called basic writers, with the goal of turning them into writers of 
normal or exceptional ability. This diagnostic model, however, was often employed uncritically, 
and treated as a proven, entirely beneficial procedure for helping students. In some ways, this 
scholarship brought attention to struggling writers that had not been there before, with the intent 
of helping them to write more successfully at the college level.  And while many scholars in the 
field eventually became uncomfortable with using the brain to explain learning and writing 
differences, and turned towards an articulation of the social contexts influencing struggling 
writers, cognitive scholarship has maintained its legacy in composition scholarship.  
 The legacy of cognition in composition studies has influenced many paths of research 
and inquiry. Socio-cognitive scholarship, including the work of Bartholomae, Hayes, Bizzell, 
Brandt, and Rose, attempted to correct some of the more problematic assumptions underpinning 
cognitive theories and methods. In other corners of composition studies, cognition has continued 
in much the same manner, only with new a instrument of measurement: a computer. In his 2012 
article,  “Modeling and Remodeling Writing,” Hayes returns to his model of the composing 
process from 1980 and attempts to refine and test it by modeling the writing processes of young 
children (he formerly only studied adults). Borrowing from Fuller’s 1995 analysis of the 
different kinds of texts that children compose – flexible-focus texts, fixed-topic texts, topic-
elaboration texts – Hayes built a computer program to simulate actual children’s writing based 
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on his models. He was able to produce writing that looked just like the actual samples of 
children’s writing. “The expansion of my interest to include children’s writing,” he explains, 
“has led me to propose some elaborations of Bereiter and Scardamalia’s knowledge-telling 
model” (385). In 2012, Quinlan et al. tested the “monitor function” of Hayes’ model (345) by 
setting up an experiment where writers had to coordinate between two processes – editing and 
sentence completion – when confronted with an incomplete sentence that possibly also contained 
an error.  Most people finished the sentence first and then corrected the error. These results, 
Quinlan et al argue, show that “when task demands were high, the monitor more often shifted 
toward the efficient approach…[thus] the coordination of subtasks may depend on the relative 
availability of cognitive resources” (363). However, they are careful to point out that “it remains 
unclear how the results of this investigation might generalize to other populations, such as novice 
or struggling writers” (364).  
 One of the most explicit calls to circle back to cognitive science in order to understand 
the writing process came from Ann Jurecic in 2007. Jurecic’s article, “Neurodiversity,” is about 
a student in Jurecic’s college writing class whom she suspected of being autistic. Jurecic argues 
that the rise in students with Asperger syndrome and autism in college classrooms challenges 
composition and rhetoric scholars to consider what it means to accommodate and respect 
neurological difference in the writing classroom (423). Jurecic posits that writing “will be a 
particular challenge for students on the spectrum because it does not tap into their particular 
strengths,” meaning students with autism are assumed to struggle with social interaction and 
communication. While Jurecic uses the phrase “particular strengths” to frame her discussion of 
autistic writers and the writing they produce, her article is solely a discussion of autistic writing 
deficits. Specifically, Jurecic argues that students on the spectrum struggle with writing for an 
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audience because they lack a “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand and predict how 
another person (mind) might behave or react (426). Jurecic then outlines what she understands as 
the signs or symptoms of autistic writers, focusing on their inability to follow a line of thought 
and repeated references that readers might not follow. Jurecic ultimately argues that existing 
composition-rhetoric scholarship on cognition – scholarship that predates the social turn – can 
help us treat or fix autistic writing. For instance, Linda Flower’s research on cognition and the 
writing process, particularly her concepts of “writer-based” prose and “reader-based” prose, offer 
a useful heuristic for understanding the challenges autistic writers face (432). Flower’s concept 
of egocentric or “writer-based” prose seems to fit with Jurecic’s assessment of autistic writing. 
What this all points to, Jurecic suggests, is that we should return our attention to forgotten 
scholarship on cognition – scholarship that fell out of favor after the social turn – and “return 
carefully and critically to medical frameworks to discover what neuroscience has to offer” (434). 
Here, Jurecic is suggesting that autism exists somewhere beyond the social, that it is 
fundamentally more real than some of the struggles other writers face, struggles that scholars 
attribute to social marginalization and other socio-cultural phenomena. Second, Jurecic sees 
autistic writing and writers through a deficit lens, with the goal of intervening in order to make 
them more like “normal” or neurotypical writers. While Jurecic raises several vital points in her 
article, due to widespread criticism of her methods and deficit-focused descriptions of autistic 
writing, some of the important questions she raises have not received their due attention.  
Several scholars at the intersection of disability studies and composition studies have 
articulated the problematic relationship of disability to diagnostic pedagogical approaches in 
composition. Brueggemann et al argue that disability “has a troubled history in college 
composition” because “the ethic of higher education encourages students and teachers alike to 
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accentuate ability, valorize perfection, and stigmatize anything that hints at intellectual (or 
physical) weakness” (“Introduction” 46). They argue that composition-rhetoric scholarship that 
addresses disability often takes on a “diagnostic and/or prescriptive perspective,” and that early 
scholarship on disability would “isolate disability within one specific student group, use a 
diagnostic rhetoric, and seek remedial means to correct “problems”” (Brueggemann et al 
“Introduction” 47). In addition to this, a lot of cognitive scholarship that doesn’t directly address 
disability is doing the same work. Amy Vidali points out connections between disability studies 
scholarship on representations of disability and basic writing scholarship on the cognition of 
basic writers. She argues that these “seemingly disparate disciplines” share the concept of 
deficits and the myth of overcoming, to the extent that “basic and “disabled” labels may be used 
interchangeably by institutions seeking particular ends” (44). Vidali responds to this by arguing 
that these groups of students are not interchangeable but that they should “look toward a shared 
future of social justice that recognizes their differences” (44). I echo Brueggemann et al’s and 
Vidali’s arguments, and extend them to suggest that the normative and diagnostic impulses 
behind much of this research holds consequences for “able” writers as well.     
Overall, scholarship on cognition in composition studies enacts ableist principles in three 
major ways. First, it heavily emphasizes non-normative writers, or categorizing writers according 
to degrees of ability (i.e., “basic” or “blocked” writers), but without explicitly saying so. I use the 
word “non-normative” because nowhere are the basic or blocked writers at the heart of this 
scholarship explicitly connected to the disability community, even when it is suggested that their 
writing deficits are rooted in brain development or psychological hang-ups. They are instead 
invoked in conversations about ability. The difference is subtle, but worth pointing out, in the 
hopes of better understanding the reach of ableism in our pedagogical research and traditions. 
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Developing a comprehensive model of the writing process allowed scholars to settle on a 
representation of normal ability. They could then “see” deviations from that model where they 
might not have before. The model became the norm against which we sorted and labeled our 
students as writers. Second, one of the major goals of this scholarship was to explain ability with 
the brain. What this did was both make differences seem fundamentally more real and 
indisputable, and legitimize an investment in explaining, rather than accepting, those differences. 
To explain was to contain, in order to then intervene and rehabilitate.  Third, scholars and writing 
instructors constructed a normative expert role for themselves in diagnosing deficits in students 
and designing treatment plans, all of this happening with little criticism or awareness of the 
implications. In doing so, we assume a normative gaze in our pedagogical practice and research. 
This normative gaze in effect produces our students.  
 In recent years, many voices within composition studies have called for efforts to resist 
ableism in research and pedagogy. In 2001, Brueggemann et al argue for the collective goal to 
“enable composition” both as a field and in “our individual classrooms” (“Becoming Visible” 
370). “We argue,” they write, “that not only will the enabling of our pedagogy and curriculum 
for the college writing classroom make disabilities and people with disabilities…visible, but that 
it will also make visible the continuum that links “abled”…with “disabled.” With such a 
continuum, the us/them dichotomy that is often in place for designating and dividing disability 
and disabled persons disappears” (Brueggemann et al “Becoming Visible” 371). In a JAC article 
from 2001, Brueggemann advocates for an “enabling pedagogy,” or “a theory and practice of 
teaching that posits disability as insight”(795). By this Brueggemann suggests that disability 
helps us to understand things differently; that speaking from the subject position of disability 
offers insight into the erased experiences of disabled individuals. Lewiecki-Wilson and Dolmage 
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argue that we must adopt a disability studies approach to accommodation in the writing 
classroom. Such an approach flips the paradigm of the “teacher worrying about the disabled 
student” and instead focuses on “the disabling impact of some teaching.” Calling upon 
scholarship from Disability Studies, Lewiecki-Wilson and Dolmage argue that “Disability 
Studies…decenters ableist and normative assumptions: it examines the history and subjugating 
power of “the norm,” critiques the medicalization and objectification of bodies with differences, 
makes visible the invisible structuring power of ableism, and resists the standardization of 
learning that fits only a narrow range of people” (315).  
In a 2009 Rhetoric Review article, Vidali also examines how and when professors and 
mentors disclosed a student’s disability in letters of recommendation for graduate school. She 
does a case study with Nara, a student with a cognitive impairment. Every letter mentions her 
disability, as though they felt the need to “explain” Nara in the event that admissions committees 
will mistake her as normal or able. Vidali calls for better recognition of “how we explain 
difference to others, to ourselves, and at what cost” (201). And in spite of widespread critique of 
her ableist methodologies, Ann Jurecic raises significant points specifically about 
accommodating cognitive disabilities in the classroom. Jurecic suggests that our “conventional 
narratives of learning” are not sufficient to accommodate and respect neurological difference in 
the writing classroom. The academic essay itself is “rooted in ‘normal’ neurology” and has a 
neurotypical audience because it has a linear structure and doesn’t tolerate tangents. Jurecic 
argues that scholarship on cognition – scholarship that predates the so-called social turn in the 
field – can help us better understand autistic writing, or “how cognitive styles affect writing 
expression.” She ultimately suggests that we “return critically and carefully to medical 
frameworks to discover what neuroscience has to offer.” “The challenge for writing teachers,” 
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she writes, “is to find methods for teaching a range of students about academic expectations and, 
at the same time, to enable those students to communicate better the insights that come from 
their own ways of knowing – whether the students develop these ways of knowing through 
biology, culture, history, social and personal experience, or (most likely) an untraceable 
interaction of these elements” (434). In her 2011 book Mad at School, Margaret Price locates 
sites where ableism manifests itself in academia with her concept of “kairotic spaces,” or sites in 
which one’s behavior or identity performance is both highly spontaneous and high-stakes. Such 
examples include an in-class presentation, a meeting in office hours with one’s instructor, or 
even lunch with one’s advisor. One important characteristic of a kairotic space is the tacit 
acceptance and expectation of only a narrow range of normative performances in a space that is 
outwardly portrayed as laid-back or one in which a wide range of identity performances might be 
valued.  As Price suggests, while humanities scholars are often comfortable theorizing 
difference, we are less comfortable with examining difference in our day-to-day pedagogy. 
These are just a handful of the voices forming an interest in better valuing and accommodating 
university students with cognitive disabilities, including students self-identifying as autistic 
(Brueggemann et al, 2001; Jurecic, 2007; Price, 2007; Lewiecki-Wilson et al, 2008; Yergeau, 
2010; Dunn, 2011; Yergeau and Heilker, 2011; Vidali, 2007, 2008, 2011). They have begun to 
address the specific day-to-day challenges that arise in working with such a population in the 
writing classroom. Together, these scholars articulate a larger shift in focus towards unpacking 
and understanding how ableism influences pedagogy and research. I believe Jurecic’s point – 
that writing instructors must balance broader academic expectations with “enabling” students’ 
own ways of knowing – but I also believe, as many critiques of Jurecic have pointed out, that the 
approach Jurecic advocates by itself doesn’t devote enough attention to how students themselves 
	 53	
might play a more participatory role in this process, or how instructors might put the emphasis 
less on “enabling” students and more on avoiding “disabling” pedagogical approaches.  
In addition to a handful of calls for a return to cognitive research in composition, the 
legacy of cognitive science applications in writing research can also be loosely traced to the 
neuro-turn across several academic disciplines. These fields (including neurorhetorics, which I 
discuss in further detail elsewhere) tend to be more skeptical of neuroscientific research than 
composition scholars were of cognitive psychology research; on the whole, there is less 
unbridled enthusiasm and willingness to accept neuroscientific findings wholesale. Instead, many 
scholars who participate in the neuro-turn call for self-reflexivity in unpacking assumptions 
about the objectivity of neuroscientific research and an appreciation for “the power, promise, and 
potential perils of the neuroscientific turn for disciplinarity in the twenty-first-century academy” 
(Littlefield and Johnson 4) Overall, the neuro-turn of the late 1990s and early 2000s is 
characterized by a more self-conscious approach than that of earlier scholarship. Littlefield and 
Johnson outline several of the issues that the neuro-turn has presented for the humanities. 
Scholars who have attempted to employ neuroscience findings have run into their fair share of 
problems, including “the specter of reductionism, essentialism, and biologism” (4); such 
challenges “illuminate theoretical assumptions and boundaries that can be just as easily 
reinforced as reconfigured at moments of disciplinary upheaval” (4). Translation of specialized 
neuroscience literature is an especially big concern for cross-disciplinary application, since all 
disciplines use “specialized language” (Littlefield and Johnson 8) and sometimes complexity is 
lost and ideas get shifted in translation. Littlefield and Johnson caution against ignoring the 
“fallibility” of the neuro- or treating the neuro- as a “Latourian black box” (9). Tied to this call 
for critical reflection on the claims made by neuroscience research is an openly acknowledged 
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audience problem with neuro-turn scholarship that falls into the “neuro-criticism” camp. In 
turning a corrective lens to the field and practices of neuroscience, scholars struggle to reach a 
receptive audience, and often end up circulating their scholarship only among other neuro-critics. 
It wouldn’t be accurate to think of the neuro turn as totally new, yet in some ways, this more 
recent neuro-turn of the 1990s and 2000s is less optimistic than scholarship on cognition from 
the 1970’s and 80’s.  
However, I argue that this recent second neuro-turn is productive because it offers a 
slightly different vocabulary than that of cognitive science. This vocabulary, as it is employed by 
the Neurodiversity movement, clears a non-corrective space for non-normative individuals 
because it recognizes biological differences without casting them as deficiencies. Beginning in 
the early 1990’s when Judy Singer, an autistic sociologist, coined the term, the Neurodiversity 
movement’s understanding of autism does not map cleanly onto social or medical models of 
disability. Instead, the movement itself aims to change awareness of autism as either medical 
problem or social construct, and instead see it as an advantageous and entirely real human 
cognitive variation. Autistic people are neurologically different, proponents of the movement 
claim, but this difference is desirable and should not be corrected. Under the rubric of 
neurodiversity, certain therapies such as Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA), because they 
emphasize correcting behaviors and helping autistic individuals appear more outwardly normal, 
become more suspect and unfavorable. Additionally, people-first language –“a person with 
autism” – is avoided in favor of labels like “aspie” or “autistic,” which recognize autism as 
inseparable from an individual’s core identity. ‘You wouldn’t say a person with femaleness’ is 
one example of the logic in play behind these label choices. The neurodiversity movement 
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suggests that autism shouldn’t be considered a disability, but rather another variation, in the same 
way that eye color or hair color is treated as an accepted variation of the human form.  
To employ the language of neurodiversity is to refuse to recognize autism as a deficit, 
and to resist normalizing autistic writers. Ortega explains that the language or vocabulary of 
neurodiversity emerged out of novel brain research techniques and instruments in the early 
1990’s. Interested in how “neurological vocabulary” has been marshaled in the “constitution of 
identities” (74), Ortega claims that “Some autistic persons and groups draw on neuroscientific 
terms and metaphors in their self-definition, in their claims to neurodiversity and to rights and 
other social compensations, as well as in the practices consistent with those claims” (75). Orsini 
and Davidson argue that this vocabulary of cognitive difference is part of what they see as a 
distinctive advocacy movement within the autism community.  “Although the emergence of the 
autistic self-advocacy movement bears similarities with the disability movements that preceded 
it,” they claim,  “…we think there is something distinctive in the forms of autistic advocacy that 
have emerged in recent years…[because] the nature of autism means that for some autistic 
people, unlike members of other disability communities, social interactions of any kind can be 
challenging” (Orsini and Davidson 10).  
Charlotte Brownlow conducted a study of online autie or aspie communities in which 
members wrote about the meaning of autism, resisting its characterization as deficit and 
promoting autism as difference. Part of this work, Brownlow reveals, involves inverting 
diagnostic language in the construction of “Neurologically Typical Syndrome” (NT)” (243) in 
order to critique the “key ideas that have become prominent in shaping our understanding of 
autism” (243). There is a tendency to talk about autistics as possessing a “triad of impairments” – 
social interaction, communication, repetitive behaviors – and as lacking a theory of mind; these 
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characterizations of autistics are in opposition to the growing neurodiversity movement and its 
understanding of autism as neurological difference (245). One point Brownlow makes about 
autistic writing is that autistics are perhaps uniquely well suited to online writing and discussion 
groups given their preference for avoiding face-to-face communication, including nonverbal cues 
(248). The effect of these online constructions of NT syndrome is that “the traditional 
impairments in communications highlighted by professionals as associated with autism are 
questioned and inverted in order to present the NT communicative styles as those that are 
illogical and impaired, serving to challenge professional constructions of autism” (250).  
 Yergeau and Heilker imagine what this emerging autism advocacy would mean for 
composition and rhetoric in their 2011 article, “Autism as Rhetoric.” Together, they make the 
argument that autism is rhetorical in two ways. First, because we are “being swamped by a 
massive increase in fundamentally uncertain yet persuasive discourse” (486). That is, the 
mainstream public is increasingly confronted with advocacy campaigns, news features, 
fundraisers, and even television shows that feature autism in spite of the fact that we still don’t 
really know what autism is and “how we should respond to it” (486). These representations of 
autism are thus highly rhetorical in nature. Yet, the public doesn’t quite understand just how 
rhetorical these representations are, and tends to treat the medical consensus around autism as 
more stable than it really is. Second, Heilker and Yergeau argue that “autism itself is a rhetoric,” 
and thus we are “beholden to respond to it with cultural sensitivity, ethical care, and pedagogical 
complexity” (487). If autism is a rhetoric, then autistics are “minority rhetors” (487). Yergeau 
and Heilker’s most important point is that the principles of the neurodiversity movement compel 
the field of composition and rhetoric to seek accommodations for diverse writers and learners 
that do not have normative imperatives. They also compel the field to reconsider how we 
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conceive of, and then ostensibly measure, human rhetorical potential. We must use better 
theoretical frameworks for analyzing our students or their work. Jurecic’s article, for example, 
relies heavily on Theory of Mind to make her case about her student; such a theory is highly 
reductive and does little to promote the humanity and dignity of autistic people. In their book 
World of Autism, Orsini and Davidson ask: “How can we advance new, enabling narratives of 
autism that challenge deficit models?” (12).2 
There are some problematic aspects of the neurodiversity movement, and Singer herself 
is careful to point out that “not all is for the best in this brave new world” (Ortega 
“Cerebralizing” 87) that the neuroscientific revolution delineates. There is a risk in maintaining 
that autistics are fundamentally neurologically different from so-called neurotypicals. Like 
Yergeau and Heilker, Straus posits the existence of a distinct autistic cognitive style emphasizing 
local coherence, fixed focus, and private meanings, among other features (542). While the 
emphasis here is certainly on difference without deficit, the impulse to reduce autism to these 
typified features of writing might not be as productive as originally thought. It’s important to 
exercise caution here, because the act of trying to consolidate and typify autistic writing is 
reductive and, in the case of my research, hasn’t proven particularly useful. I haven’t found that a 
certain style of communicating coheres among all of my participants, and one point that I want to 
repeatedly emphasize is that it’s exceedingly difficult to generalize about the autistic community 
as a whole. Singer calls for more flexibility within the neurodiversity movement (Ortega 87), 
arguing that while it makes sense to emphasize differences in some contexts, in others it’s better 
to emphasize affinities. Ian Hacking suggests that the movement could slide into a more 
reductionist project of identity politics, in which we risk homogenizing the autistic community 
																																																								
2 I read this question similarly to Yergeau’s call for a “feminist, rhetorical, embodied, disability-
positive understanding of autism” (Yergeau “Theorize”). 
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and minimizing individual differences for the sake of group identity construction. The autistic 
community is highly heterogeneous, and there are significant divisions among its members, 
especially in light of language about “functioning” along a “spectrum,” with the most easily 
recognizable division between those who identify as “high-functioning” and those who are more 
profoundly impaired or who may not speak, thus confounding expectations for measuring 
functioning.3 There could be even greater stigma for those on the spectrum who, in spite of the 
assured naturalness of autistic traits, choose to seek out psychiatric drugs or therapies, for 
example (Prendergast “Rhetoricity Retold”).  
Both the original cognitive turn in composition studies and the more recent neuro-turn 
have offered vocabularies for recognizing difference and naming the struggles that 
neurodivergent writers face. Arguably, the more recent neuro-turn of the 1990s and 2000s has 
contributed to a less diagnostic/corrective and more accepting understanding of autism as 
difference and the complex identities that autistic people occupy. Still, it is crucial to better 
understand how autistic students themselves are employing these vocabularies (or not) from an 
emic perspective, and to resist reducing their experiences so that they fit neatly within a 
particular framework.  
 
Disability in Rhetorical Studies 
I have just broadly sketched composition studies’ legacy of employing cognitive science research 
to diagnose and treat writers of all abilities. In this section, I synthesize the similar and 
overlapping scholarly traditions and theories in rhetorical studies that shape how I conceptualize 
																																																								
3 I have never seen the term “low-functioning” used explicitly. However, the concept of low-
functioning is certainly invoked when using the “high-functioning” label, and there have been 
significant calls within the disability community lately to resist the rhetoric of functioning 
altogether. 
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disability and ableism in rhetorical practice. My project responds to these traditions and theories 
by foregrounding the voices of a community of so-called disabled rhetors. First, I study closely 
the scholarship of Jay Dolmage, whose disability-positive historiographic inquiry in Disability 
Rhetoric makes a significant intervention in traditional representations of disability and 
rhetorical practice in antiquity. His book includes a brief but careful critique of Debra Hawhee’s 
foundational work on ancient rhetorical practice and the body. Dolmage’s work enters into 
conversations in rhetorical studies on ability, rhetoric, and the body, and clears space for a 
revised, disability-positive understanding of rhetorical practice and bodily difference. My project 
aligns with the values and approaches for which he advocates. Next, I introduce the rhetorical 
phenomenon of rhetoricity as it has been conceived and refined by several scholars at the 
intersection of disability studies and rhetorical studies, including Cathy Prendergast, Margaret 
Price, and Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson. My project contributes to conversations on rhetoricity by 
considering how rhetoricity is experienced on a day-to-day basis from the emic perspective of 
neurodivergent rhetors. Finally, I examine Stephanie Kerschbaum’s work on disability disclosure 
as a fraught rhetorical act, and one that I specifically focus on in interviews with my participants. 
Disability disclosure is one example of how neurodivergent rhetors negotiate and sometimes 
violate rhetorical norms in their everyday life.  
While the entire field of rhetorical studies (which I don’t consider to be wholly separate 
from composition studies) is too broad to encapsulate here, research within rhetorical studies on 
ability, rhetoric, and the body has, until quite recently, tended to talk about disability in a 
consistent and one-dimensional way. For rhetoric scholars studying ancient rhetorical history and 
practice, disability is often located largely in discussions around Aristotle’s references to 
disability, and the concept of disability is often employed to characterize how Aristotle 
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conceptualized and positioned the female body and mind. In Aristotle’s teachings, women are 
essentially conceptualized as disabled men and excluded from the realm of rhetorical practice. 
This connection has been used to conclude, in the footnotes of scholarship, that the disabled – 
meaning any who would be considered disabled by antiquity’s standards – were wholly excluded 
from rhetorical practice. Until recently, there were a limited number of research projects in the 
field of rhetorical studies that devoted considerable attention to reclaiming a history of disability 
and rhetorical practice in antiquity.  
In response to this one-dimensional treatment of disability, there are two figures from 
antiquity who have recently emerged as central to discussions about disability and rhetorical 
practice in ancient times. Jay Dolmage rereads the myth of the Greek god Hephaestus in order to 
disrupt some of the aforementioned conclusions about disability. Hephaestus has crooked feet 
and is often depicted in a proto-wheelchair that he constructed for himself. He is regarded as an 
inventor, a clever trickster, a “trap-builder” and “machine-creator” who “embodied metis, the 
cunning intelligence needed to act in a world of chance” (119). Dolmage argues that historical 
events like war transform bodily values, and in certain historical contexts Hephaestus’s 
“disabilities” were highly valued. In Periclean Athens after the Ten Years’ War, there was a huge 
festival held in honor of Hephaestus. Many Athenians were returning from way wounded or 
disabled, and there was a new societal need for builders and craftspeople (1). Revealing that the 
myth of Hephaestus is told in conflicting ways across sites and periods in Ancient Greece and 
beyond, Dolmage argues that this cultural ambivalence over the myth of Hephaestus challenges 
the narrow ways in which contemporary historians of classical rhetoric understand disability to 
operate in Ancient Greek rhetorical practice. In fact, the representations of Hephaestus that 
Dolmage uncovers suggest that disability was valued and that Hephaestus’s disability enhanced 
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his “distinctly bodily intelligence” or metis (119). Positioning Hephaestus as exemplifying metis 
is a recognition of the rhetorical capacity in all bodies and of disability as generative of, rather 
than an impediment to, rhetorical practice. Hephaestus is thus a symbol of the “negotiation” of 
“hegemonic norms” that was rhetoric (126). Such a reading is at odds with more accepted ableist 
views of classical rhetorical history in which disability was understood as a condition that 
rendered bodies unfit for rhetorical practice. Dolmage’s work calls our attention to how we 
might be importing our own “hegemonic norms” onto a past with different bodily values, as well 
as to how we might revise our contemporary understanding of rhetorical practice to celebrate, or, 
at the very least, acknowledge and include all bodies.  
Perhaps more well-known than Hephaestus is the ancient orator Demosthenes. In Bodily 
Arts: Rhetoric and Athletics in Ancient Greece, Debbie Hawhee explores now-lost connections 
between ancient rhetorical practice and bodily training or athletics. Hawhee offers the figure of 
Demosthenes as a prime example of the necessity of bodily discipline to rhetorical training in 
Ancient Greece. Demosthenes is known as a disabled orator – he had a “puny body” and a 
debilitating stutter (156) – who was able to overcome his bodily deficits through strict discipline 
and constant struggle. Hawhee discusses Demosthenes as an example of “dedicated, agonistic 
learning” (156), and of how “training in public presentation was firmly rooted in gymnastic 
training”(155) and in “keen attention to elements of bodily delivery” (157). In Demosthenes’s 
case, this gymnastic training is rumored to have included putting pebbles in his mouth to treat his 
stutter. This and other kinds of “diligent rehearsal” made up Demosthenes’ training, which 
Hawhee argues “emerged out of an agonism with others – including himself as other – through 
which he produced…the convergence of desire for transformation, the commitment to practice, 
and the forcing of regular encounters with the other” (158). Demosthenes’s agonistic struggle 
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with his own self as other is understood to be what ultimately propelled him to greatness as a 
public orator. In Disability Rhetoric, Dolmage offers a critique of Hawhee’s reading of 
Demosthenes, pointing out how it retells the myth of overcoming, in which “bodily impropriety 
can be overcome – and therefore implies that disability should be overcome – and that if it isn’t, 
the rhetorical body is invalidated” (119). Because Hawhee does not consider how 
“Demosthenes’ difference could have queered his bodily/rhetorical performance in a generative 
sense,” she ends up reinforcing the necessity of overcoming disability to effective rhetorical 
practice, an all-too-familiar and damaging narrative for the disability community (119). Like 
Hephaestus, Dolmage reminds us that the story of Demosthenes’s overcoming of his deficits 
might not have been understood as such in ancient times. While Hawhee’s work makes 
important moves to reclaiming the body in rhetorical practice, in this particular instance she 
unwittingly reinscribes an ableist view of disability and rhetoric. Demosthenes became a rhetor 
only through intense physical struggle and discipline/bodily habits that allowed him to erase or 
effectively hide his impairments. In this sense, disability is an impediment to effective rhetorical 
practice rather than a subject position that affords unique knowledges and enhances rhetorical 
capabilities.   
Dolmage’s larger argument in Disability Rhetoric is that the received tradition of 
rhetorical practice has largely erased the body. He writes, “we have accepted a historical 
narrative in which rhetoric…denounces the body, overlooks its phenomenological and 
persuasive importance, and lifts discourse from its corporeal hinges”(69). While scholars such as 
Hawhee have contributed in-depth accounts of able bodies or overcoming bodies at the center of 
rhetorical practice, Dolmage specifically focuses on bodies that are different or deviant. 
According to Dolmage, our own selective history of rhetoric has “conditioned our experience of 
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rhetoric and disability,” and one of the consequences of the canon – our “chosen versions of 
rhetorical history – is that we “efface bodies” and “erase bodily difference” (83). Dolmage’s 
work is thus an attempt to reclaim the deviant body and reposition it as significant and central to 
understanding rhetorical practice. This includes developing and employing a definition of 
rhetoric that foregrounds the body. “I see rhetoric,” he writes, “as the strategic study of the 
circulation of power through communication” (3). Beyond this, though, Dolmage believes “that 
we should recognize rhetoric as the circulation of discourse through the body”(5). Dolmage then 
introduces his three theses about the body: the body is rhetorically invested; rhetoric is 
embodied; all bodies must be read through a normative matrix (89). 
This conceptualization of rhetoric as both discursively constructed and embodied aligns 
with theories from disability studies on the reciprocal relationship between language and the 
body, Sieber’s theory of complex embodiment, which I discuss in the next section. Rhetoric thus 
both produces bodies and is circulated through bodies. I think it is important here to clarify the 
imperfect alliance Dolmage constructs here with scholarship on embodied rhetoric and ability, 
such as Hawhee’s work. Not all scholarship on embodiment is about disability, but all disability 
scholarship is inherently “about” embodiment.  While Hawhee’s work brought renewed attention 
to rhetoric as an embodied practice, including understanding how rhetoric acts on and through 
the body, and how we read bodies through rhetoric, Dolmage builds on this to focuses not only 
on the body, but specifically on “bodily impropriety,” in order to locate potentialities for 
resisting the normative filter that we tend to import onto the past in our reading of ancient 
rhetorical practice. While I don’t engage with primary texts from ancient Greece or Rome, and 
my work is not historiographic in nature, I take from Dolmage’s larger project a call to frame my 
participants’ rhetorical work in a disability-positive way, and to see their everyday experiences 
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not as outside of traditional rhetorical practice, but as part of a tradition that we are only just 
beginning to uncover. “Rhetoric,” explains Dolmage, “can be seen as an operational, discursive 
means of shaping identity, community, cultural processes and institutions, and everyday being-
in-the-world” (2). This “everyday being-in-the-world” is what I access through the embodied 
accounts of my participants, and Dolmage’s work draws my attention to how I might read and 
represent my participants’ experiences in ways that resist ableist myths of overcoming.  
 
Rhetorical Theory and Disability Disclosure 
In thinking about how rhetorical practice might make room for “bodily impropriety,” it is 
important to consider how the denial of rhetoricity functions to silence rhetors whose bodies and 
minds violate the norm.  My participants belong to a community of rhetors who are categorically 
considered to be incapable of rhetoric. In her first article on the subject, “On the Rhetorics of 
Mental Disability,” Catherine Prendergast argues that “to be disabled mentally is to be disabled 
rhetorically” (202). As part of her research on Barbara, a friend diagnosed with schizophrenia, 
and how her writing has been appropriated by psychiatrists, Prendergast explains that there is a 
“moment at which something or someone is granted what might be called “rhetoricity”…given 
the present configuration of discourses on mental illness, the writing of schizophrenics can only 
be seen as a-rhetorical, simply as data: the test, the record of symptoms, Exhibit A” (202).  
Writing produced by the mentally ill is often read as an index of sanity or insanity, a practice that 
strips that writing of its original rhetorical purpose and therefore the author of his or her 
rhetoricity. This reception of writing produced by the mentally ill compromises their ability to 
speak for themselves and establish an ethos as rhetors. In an auto-ethnographic piece, self-
identified autistic rhetorical studies scholar Melanie Yergeau explains that “…I’ve had to get 
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used to not existing, rhetorically speaking. I will say something about autism, and someone will 
assert that nothing I’ve said matters or applies to anything…Because I do not have the capacity 
to intuit other minds or to understand the life experiences of others. Because it is just my autism 
talking” (Yergeau “Theorize”). In “Rethinking Rhetoric through Mental Disabilities,” Cynthia 
Lewiecki-Wilson argues for “an expanded understanding of rhetoricity as a potential, and a 
broadened concept of rhetoric to include collaborative and mediated rhetorics that work with the 
performative rhetoric of bodies that “speak” with/out language” (157). She acknowledges the 
“received tradition” of rhetorical practice and its emphasis on “the individual rhetor who 
produces speech/writing, which in turn confirms the existence of a fixed, core self, imagined to 
be located in the mind” (157). This received tradition has many implications for the cognitively 
impaired, including the implication that they are less than full citizens because they are excluded 
from public forums “where good men (sic), speaking well, engage in debate”(158). Citing Price, 
Lewiecki-Wilson, and Nirmala Erevelles in her book Mad At School: Rhetorics of Mental 
Disability and Academic Life, Margaret Price summarizes the concept of rhetoricity with the 
explanation “Rhetoric is not simply the words we write or sign, nor is it simply what we look 
like or sound like. It is who we are, and beyond that, it is who we are allowed to be” (27). In a 
2013 article, Prendergast revises her conceptualization of rhetoricity.  Reviewing the work of 
Lewiecki-Wilson, Johnson, and Guest Pryal, who have all qualified her original claim that “to be 
disabled mentally is to be disabled rhetorically,” she writes:  
“Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, for example, has argued that in consideration of 
disability and rhetoricity, a ‘sharp demarcation between individual rhetorical 
agency and its lack’ is to be avoided (Lewiecki-Wilson, 2013: 162)…Jenell 
Jonson has similarly called for an expanded notion of rhetoricity (Johnson, 
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2010)…Because rhetorical agency is ever-shifting in time, we cannot come to an 
assessment as to degree of rhetorical agency by looking at one point in history, or 
even one point in a life history…Katie Rose Guest Pryal…argues for the 
rhetorical force and artistry of memoirs written by authors with mood disorders 
(Guest Pryal, 2010). She argues that my assertion…fails to recognize how people 
who are mentally disabled might claim rhetorical agency through several sources, 
including the Platonic equation of poetry with divine madness” (2) 
These are important revisions because they better capture the conditions under which an 
individual with a mental disability, cognitive impairment, or mood disorder might effectively 
enact rhetorical agency. I see my participants fundamentally as rhetorical agents, and the goal of 
my project is not to show that they do or do not have agency. Instead, like Lewiecki-Wilson, 
Johnson, Guest Pryal, and Prendergast, I let my participants’ experiences call into question 
accepted notions of what rhetorical agency, or rhetoricity, is or looks like. And while 
understanding my participants as agents is a premise of my inquiry, I am reminded by Yergeau 
to not assume that this is a universally held presumption, not even by my participants 
themselves, nor do I conflate rhetorical agency with power. As I will show in the following 
paragraph, my participants must negotiate their identities and positionality in the face of 
narratives that they are not capable of doing so.  
The autistic figure has been interpreted by some scholars within rhetorical studies as 
marking the boundaries of human rhetorical capabilities. In a 1999 article in Written 
Communication, Todd Oakley argues that rhetorical theory needs “an account of that capacity for 
meaning shared by all human beings and molded through the use of the available symbolic 
resources within specific cultural contexts,” (94) and that “whatever theory of meaning scholars 
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of verbal and written communication use should agree with present, hard-won insights in the 
behavioral and brain sciences” (95). Here, Oakley focuses on identifying common ground 
between rhetorical theorists and cognitive psychologists, including an interest in understanding 
the fundamental human capacity and neurological basis for making meaning. Oakley identifies 
“autistic people” as “beings who lack the human rhetorical potential” because they lack the 
“general capacity to read the intentions of others” (102). Citing Baron-Cohen’s research on 
Theory of Mind, Oakley asserts that because autistic people “do not develop a full sense of self, 
they do not have a fully developed sense of other. Consequently, they do not inhabit a world of 
intentional stances” (102). Oakley offers examples of particular rhetorical situations in which 
autistic people would not fare well. To autistic people, other “beings are bags of skin acting in 
very unpredictable ways” (103). Oakley concludes that autistic people “lack the wherewithal to 
engage fully in symbolic action” (103). 
The rhetorical deficits of autistics are often explained, as they are above, as an absence of 
empathy. A recent burst of scholarship on empathy, however, pushes back against the 
assumption that effective rhetorical practice cannot be achieved without establishing an 
empathetic connection between rhetor and audience. Patrick McDonagh explains that our 
understanding of empathy has changed throughout history, and that the recent claim that 
“empathy is a fundamental human trait seems particularly weak” (47). His claim that empathy is 
a relatively recent concept challenges assumptions that it is somehow fundamental to human 
identity. David Lynch examines the implications of the empathy imperative for minority rhetors, 
reminding readers, as Susan Jarratt has argued, that the idea that empathy is necessary between 
rhetor and audience breaks down in contexts of unevenly distributed power. He performs a close 
reading of Temple Grandin’s memoir, arguing that she employs a “rhetoric of proximity” that 
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allows her audience a kind of mediated access while still maintaining her own irreducible 
complexity and showing her audience that “there is simply no way we can fully imagine what it 
is to be her” (Lynch 12). Grandin ultimately shows us how “we might come closer to each other 
without having to erase our differences in the movement” (Lynch 19) – she offers a way of 
getting around the problems of empathy discussed within rhetorical studies. While Lynch’s 
article was published in 1998, it holds up in conversations about empathy and autism today. In 
addition, scholars including Jack and Appelbaum and Yergeau (“Theorize”) ask whether it is 
even ethical to assume a lack of empathy in other humans, wondering what we lose when we 
refuse to grant autistic people a Theory of Mind. As Jack and Appelbaum argue: “Using empathy 
as a marker of rhetorical potential might seem to exclude individuals with autism from human 
rhetorical capacity on almost every level…a more responsible move, then, might be to question 
whether it is ethical for rhetoricians to assume a lack of empathy in other humans, or to consider 
whether rhetorical theories should be revised in order to better account for the full range of 
human rhetorical capacities, including those with neurological differences” (415). 
To return to my discussion in chapter one, since autistic people are presumed to lack a 
Theory of Mind, they are assumed to be incapable of establishing this empathetic connection. 
They are therefore assumed to be unable to establish or claim rhetoricity. Duffy and Dorner 
discuss the tragic narrative that the Theory of Mind constructs around the autistic subject:  
“The autistic mind, in [the Theory of Mind] narrative, is so radically alienated 
from “normal” modes of thought and communication that only through acts of 
great imagination can we, “normal” people, begin to understand it. We cannot 
know such a mind, so remote from our own sensibilities. Instead, we must 
imagine it; conjure it; fabricate it to the best of our abilities. The language of such 
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fabrications will be, necessarily, metaphorical and poetic, rather than strictly 
objective and scientific. We must, in the rhetoric of ToM, call upon tropes and 
figures to represent rhetorically that which we cannot represent literally”(208).  
Duffy and Dorner ultimately argue that these narratives radically distance us from autistic people 
and ignore “what autistic people think and feel. The theory is, in effect, “mindblind” with regard 
to autistic perspectives” (214). Such a narrative has had a huge influence on perceptions of 
autistic individual’s ability to self-advocate and claim rhetoricity.  
In spite of – and because of – the prevalence of damaging narratives about the rhetorical 
capabilities of autistic people, my participants navigate incredibly fraught rhetorical situations on 
an everyday basis. This everyday rhetorical work includes navigating the act of disability 
disclosure, where they as rhetors must negotiate identity claims that leave them vulnerable to 
judgment, ridicule, or erasure. In contemporary rhetorical studies scholarship at the intersection 
of disability and rhetoric, attention has recently turned to disability disclosure as a particularly 
complex rhetorical act. Stephanie Kerschbaum examines disability disclosure as it complicates 
our understandings of rhetorical agency, suggesting that to exercise agency in disclosing can 
paradoxically function to strip one of rhetorical agency in the eyes of one’s audience, especially 
when disclosing a cognitive impairment or mood disorder. When disclosing a disability, a rhetor 
is faced with any number of possible responses, and must be attentive to contextual and 
situational power differences that create or deny possibilities for disclosure. Some disabilities are 
instantaneously visually disclosed when a disabled individual appears to someone else (a 
wheelchair user, for instance). Other disabilities are somewhat hidden by physical appearance, 
and allow an individual to pass as able-bodied or able-minded. Autism is technically not a 
physical disability, yet I would argue that it can be read or mapped onto the body through 
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particular normative filters or ways of seeing4. Indeed, looking at the diagnostic criteria for 
autism spectrum disorder, all of the criteria are empirical descriptions of behaviors and 
appearances. Autism is as much embodied as it is enminded (Price), and we have visual 
stereotypes for autistic people as much as we do behavioral stereotypes.  
My research investigates how my participants negotiate rhetorical encounters having to 
do with autism. In Chapter 3, I examine comments that my participant Mike has made about 
disclosure and specific disclosure strategies that he feels lend him greater reliability, or a more 
credible ethos, with a neurotypical audience. I study how Mike navigates rhetorical encounters in 
ways he feels allow him to maintain rhetoricity and accomplish his educational and career goals. 
A project such as this, that looks at how neurodivergent rhetors define rhetorical situations and 
problems for themselves, is one that acknowledges their fundamental and inalienable rhetoricity. 
Rhetoricity is key to effective self-advocacy for all neurodivergent rhetors, and our 
understandings of rhetoricity must include the voices and perspectives of those who have been 
traditionally been theorized out of rhetoric. 
In the July 2015 issue of College English, Karen Kopelson analyzes an emerging genre of 
workplace guides for autistic prospective employees. She suggests that the self-help guides are 
implicitly focused on getting autistic people to start “learning to think and act rhetorically,” and 
that this “training in rhetoric…plays a central role in norming autistic employees and, more 
significantly, in attempting to ensure that they can norm themselves” (564). Autistic individuals 
are positioned as outside of rhetoric – they are presumed to not already know how to 
“think…rhetorically” – and their induction into the world of rhetorical practice rests on their 
ability to learn to behave as neurotypically as possible. Kopelson thus suggests that rhetorical 
																																																								
4 Consider, for example, stimming, or self-stimulatory behaviors.  
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training targeted at neurodivergent rhetors serves a normative and self-regulatory function. 
Disability disclosure is of particular interest here because disclosing autistic identity can actively 
work against the norming process widely understood to be key to effective rhetorical practice. 
While some of my participants openly challenge damaging perceptions of autistic people in their 
everyday interactions, others perform a careful rhetorical balancing act in order to inhabit the 
narrow range of acceptable or normative identities available to them in a neurotypical world. 
Their stories prompt me suggest ways to rethink or resist the normative function of rhetorical 
training and pedagogy. In doing so, I hope to bring the concept of the normal rhetor as it informs 
rhetorical training into greater relief as a rhetorical subject position with a narrow range of 
inhabitable identities and possibilities. 
 
Disability Studies Theories of Normativity  
I have just discussed emerging conversations in rhetorical studies that question widely-received 
rhetorical traditions that exclude disabled rhetors and employ autistic rhetors as markers of the 
boundary of human rhetorical capacity. These traditions create the conditions in which autistic 
rhetors must insist upon their inalienable rhetoricity in the face of a normative audience. In this 
section, I will unpack the concept of normativity in greater detail, linking it to concepts and 
theories within the field of disability studies that both overlap with scholarship on embodied 
rhetoric and disability in composition.  
Scholarship on embodiment in rhetoric is not always explicitly about disability, but, as 
disability scholars have argued, anytime we talk about the body we are talking about (dis)ability 
and (ab)normal bodies. Abnormal bodies are often invoked to consolidate an understanding of 
normal, able bodies. Within the field of disability studies, scholars have marshaled the concept of 
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embodiment to ground disability, so to speak, in the material world, and to distance it from other 
identities that are largely understood as socially constructed (race, or gender, for example). 
Disability is uniquely tied to embodiment for the very reason that disability is sometimes 
described as the only truly embodied identity category, or as the most embodied identity 
category. As Tom Shakespeare writes in his critique of the social model of disability, if one were 
to remove the “social oppression” that comes with disability, one is still left with bodies that may 
be in pain, that may be weak, or that may be more fundamentally impaired on a level that exists 
beyond or outside of social construction (272). The concept of embodiment unifies disability 
studies with feminist theory and queer studies, as all three fields are centrally concerned with 
bodies, particularly deviant bodies, and the normative constrains that influence all bodies.  
Disability Studies theorist Tobin Siebers theorizes disability as “a social location that is 
complexly embodied” (321), and calls for an understanding of disability that recognizes a 
reciprocal relationship between the body and social language. Siebers’ theory is part of a larger 
critique of the social model of disability, which until rather recently was the major paradigm 
employed in disability studies scholarship. Siebers’ theory of complex embodiment offers an 
articulation of why social construction is too narrow in how it conceptualizes minority identity 
formation and representation. Siebers wishes to classify “identity as an embodied 
representational category” (2-3). He wishes to restore “a sense of the realism of the disabled 
body” that would make it “impossible to view our society in the same light” (67). In suggesting 
that neither the social nor medical model of disability adequately captures the lived experience of 
disability, Siebers offers a theory of embodiment where the two classic opposing models inform 
and transform each other. This understanding of the reciprocity between the body and language 
informs my approach to understanding autism for the purposes of my research. The 
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Neurodiversity movement, discussed earlier in this chapter, is a major example of how Siebers’ 
theory of complex embodiment might shake out in practice. The Neurodiversity movement 
emphasizes a largely medical understanding of cognitive disability, yet, at the same time, insists 
on rewriting the social meanings that get attached to certain medical phenomena. Autistic people 
want to be understood as naturally different, yet they want those natural differences to not be 
interpreted as deficits. In representing the embodied experiences of my participants, I must 
attend to the reciprocity of the body and language. I specifically investigate the effects of the 
social phenomenon of normativity at it circulates on and through bodies and gazes.  
  In addition to the concept of rhetoricity discussed in the previous section, the 
concept of normativity has been hugely influential on how I have designed my project and 
questions.  Lennard J. Davis coined the term “normativity” in an effort to “focus not so much on 
the construction of disability as on the construction of normalcy” (3).  “I do this,” he writes, 
“because the “problem” is not the person with disabilities; the problem is the way that normalcy 
is constructed to create the “problem” of the disabled person”(3). Davis identifies the concept of 
the norm as an invention of the mid-nineteenth century. Before, the societies on which Davis 
focuses cultivated a culture of the ideal, which is important to note because “in a culture with an 
ideal form of the body, all members of the population are below the ideal” (4). Not so with the 
norm. Davis identifies the emergence of statistics in the early modern period (mid-1700s) and 
medical statistics in 1829 and, in France (and soon after England), public health initiatives in the 
early nineteenth century with creating the conditions in which the norm could flourish as a 
concept (5). Citing the French statistician Adolphe Quetelet as one “who contributed the most to 
a generalized notion of the normal as an imperative” and contributed the concept of the 
“l’homme moyen” or average man (5), Davis argues that all statisticians were “eugenicists” at 
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heart, explaining that “there is a real connection between figuring the statistical measure of 
humans and then hoping to improve humans so that deviations from the norm diminish” (7). 
Norms soon became central to the eugenicist projects of modern nation states. Even such 
unsuspecting practices as fingerprinting help establish the idea that “the marks of physical 
difference become synonymous with the identity of the person” (Davis 8). Here is how the norm 
works, according to Davis:  
“First, the application of the idea of a norm to the human body creates the idea of 
deviance or a “deviant” body. Second, the idea of a norm pushes the normal 
variation of the body through a stricter template guiding the way the body 
“should” be. Third, the revision of the “normal curve of distribution” into 
quartiles, ranked in order, and so on, creates a new kind of “ideal.” This statistical 
ideal is unlike the classical ideal which contains no imperative to be the ideal. The 
new ideal of ranked order is powered by the imperative of the norm, and then is 
supplemented by the notion of progress, human perfectibility, and the elimination 
of deviance, to create a dominating, hegemonic vision of what the human body 
should be.” (9)  
Davis goes on to argue for the need of a disability studies consciousness that recognizes and 
resists the “hegemony of normalcy,” which “must constantly be enforced in public venues (like 
the novel), must always be creating and bolstering its image by processing, comparing, 
constructing, deconstructing images of normalcy and the abnormal” (14). We need to “institute 
alternative ways of thinking about the abnormal” (17).  
What are the conditions for rhetoricity in the context of this concept of normativity? For 
the cognitively impaired, the rhetorical and political practice of self-representation is 
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compromised by the public’s normative gaze, which strips the mentally ill of their status as 
rhetorically enabled subjects. It is important to point out that the norm is always changing, since 
it is always  “a configuration that arises in a particular historical moment” (Davis 14). As I 
discussed in Chapter 1, understandings of autism are constantly in flux, and much of this flux has 
to do not with the behaviors that autistic people display, but with social understandings of those 
behaviors. Even though the norm is a constantly changing social construct, normalcy is treated as 
an apolitical or natural state; to be singled out or labeled as abnormal in a way that many 
understand as fundamentally real, rather than socially constructed, compromises in very real 
ways the ability of those labeled abnormal to be rhetorically enabled subjects. The conditions for 
rhetoricity as it is commonly understood require access to a normate subject position.  
Normativity is a phenomenon of a public sphere that serves an underlying ideology of 
ability, in which “Ability is the ideological baseline by which humanness is determined…The 
lesser the ability, the lesser the human being” (Siebers 10). Another way in which this ideology’s 
effects are felt is through what McCruer calls the cultural phenomenon of “compulsory able-
bodiedness,” which “demands that people with disabilities embody for others an affirmative 
answer to the unspoken question, Yes, but in the end, wouldn’t you rather be more like me?” 
(93). Compulsory able-bodiedness demands that the disabled subject do whatever possible to 
overcome bodily limitations and approach normalcy, all while disguising these actions as an 
admirable personal choice rather than a requirement for survival in an ableist world. Normativity 
is the constant redefining and measuring of the normate subject position hidden as a static, 
apolitical reality.  
When it comes to rhetoric, Yergeau and Heilker argue that neurotypicality is its own 
rhetoric, and this calls for “attention to normalized discourse patterns frequently portrayed as 
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desirable and ideal…[and] attention to ways of being that are not the ways of being” (489). 
Understanding both neurotypicality and autism as rhetorics and valuing both would require 
making room for and validating neurodivergent rhetoric in albeist contexts. It would resist the 
impulse to measure the success of neurodivergent rhetors by the credibility of their performance 
as normal rhetors, and would instead show how all rhetors are limited by the narrow confines of 
the normal or neurotypical rhetor subject position. 
 
Conclusion  
It is important, therefore, to examine the rhetoric of the neurodivergent more closely, in order to 
better understand when, where, and how they locate possibilities for resisting rhetorical 
situations that demand normalcy. In the following chapter, I follow this broader interest in the 
practices of neurodivergent rhetors and focus on the rhetoric of disability disclosure in the 
context of higher education. Overall, I intend for my project to respond to Melanie Yergeau’s 
call for a “feminist, rhetorical, embodied, disability-positive understanding of autism” (Yergeau 
“Clinically Significant”). I interpret this as a cross-disciplinary project that calls upon traditions 
within disability studies and challenges traditions within composition and rhetoric.  By 
synthesizing the scholarly threads that I have outlined above, I hope to map where my project 
might position itself in response to Yergeau’s call. Such an understanding of autism requires the 
voices of members of the autism community, and disability studies methods and traditions are 
poised to allow us to better access and frame the embodied experiences of my participants.  
Beyond merely arriving at the “understanding” for which Yergeau calls, I argue that it is 
imperative to consider how that understanding might be enacted in future pedagogy and 
scholarly research. In doing so, I join scholars from composition and rhetorical studies and 
	 77	
disability studies who are working to challenge traditions in these fields that function to 
marginalize neurodivergent rhetors and thus constrain our understanding of rhetorical practice as 





Chapter Three: Cripping Kairos: The Risky Rhetorical Performance of Autism Disclosure 
for the College Student 
 
 
When students with disabilities begin postsecondary education, their relationship to disability 
disclosure changes dramatically. Upon entering the university, they assume responsibility over 
their diagnosis, deciding when, where, and how to disclose this information in pursuit of a range 
of educational outcomes. Scholars such as Stephanie Kerschbaum, Melanie Yergeau, Amy 
Vidali, and Margaret Price have discussed the rhetorical complexities of this particular disclosure 
environment, analyzing how agency is distributed between rhetor and audience across the 
various contexts for disability disclosure in the university. Though the protocol for disclosure in 
higher education places students with disabilities in positions of considerably more agency than 
during their primary or secondary school years, Kerschbaum acknowledges that no rhetor can 
completely control the conditions in which they disclose, since they often contend with 
prevailing disability stereotypes that influence how their audience might respond. Disability 
disclosure is thus always an inherently risky rhetorical performance, and college, where 
disability accommodations operate much differently than high school, is often the first time that 
students with disabilities encounter real risk in disclosing.  
While I employ this scholarship in my framing of disability disclosure, I am interested 
less in debating how much agency my participants possess across various disclosure situations, 
and more in calling attention to their disclosure choices as rhetorical work. The concept of 
disability disclosure that emerges from this scholarship is that of a constant revealing, an 
ongoing embodied performance, not “a one-time confession or a functional event” 
(Kerschbaum). This theorizing of disclosure calls attention to its temporal dimension, since 
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bodies and the spaces through which they move are always changing. Though these scholars 
employ the concept indirectly, I argue that kairos is invoked here as a crucial component to 
understanding the ever-changing rhetorical conditions for disability disclosure. I offer examples 
of how my participant Mike navigates and exploits the kairotic dimensions of autism disclosure 
in risky, contradictory ways and in service of his larger rhetorical goals. Calling attention to this 
rhetorical work necessitates acknowledging and locating complicity in the rhetorical situations 
that demand risky and paradoxical disclosure performances from neurodivergent rhetors in 
higher education.  
In this chapter, I argue that much of the rhetorical performance of disability disclosure in 
higher education comes down to kairos, or how neurodivergent rhetors discern and manipulate 
the rhetorical contingency of time and place. I first revisit my discussion of disclosure from 
Chapter 2 to establish an understanding of disability disclosure in higher education as a 
constantly evolving rhetorical situation that demands a particular kairotic expertise. I name and 
unpack kairos as a crucial component of the rhetorical performance of disclosure that many 
scholars reference, though in varied and more general terms. I then consolidate my discussion of 
disclosure and kairos around narratives about autism as told by Theory of Mind scholarship. 
Theory of Mind as a framework for understanding autism doesn’t explicitly address deficits 
related to timing, but it alludes to ethical deficits related to empathy and raises questions about 
the ability of autistics to sense appropriateness in terms of time, place, and subject matter. The 
kairotic performance of disclosure is especially fraught for the autistic subject, who is presumed 
to lack an ethical understanding of his or her relationship to others, given an assumed inability to 
consider what others might think or feel. I argue that naming and unpacking kairos as a critical 
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piece of the rhetorical performance of disclosure calls our attention to the rhetorical work of a 
population considered to exist outside the bounds of human rhetorical capability. 
As a general outcome of disability disclosure in the university, I examine the disability 
accommodation trope of “time and a half” and analyze its underlying philosophy on disability in 
college. The vast majority of students who request accommodations in higher education are at 
some point offered “time and a half” in testing environments; this implies that the only 
significant difference between a “normal” student’s academic performance and that of a student 
with a disability is that the latter will take longer to achieve the same results. I compare this trope 
and its implications with Alison Kafer’s notion of “crip time,” which theorizes how the disabled 
subject embodies temporality and futurity in different ways. Kafer openly acknowledges that 
“Recognizing some people’s need for “more” time is probably the manifestation of crip time 
most familiar to those of us in the academy. Disabled students (or at least those with approved 
paperwork) are permitted more time on exams, for example…” (26).  But she cautions against 
understanding crip time merely as “this kind of blanket extension,” suggesting that the term 
encompasses an understanding of disability as time not expanded or contracted, but “exploded” 
(27). As they are commonly employed in educational contexts, however, both the trope of “time 
and a half” more overtly and the concept of “crip time” more subtly suggest that the relationship 
of disability to time is often understood in terms of delay.     
The medical diagnostic criteria for autism highlight social and communicative deficits, an 
emphasis echoed by the prevailing academic and broader cultural expectation that autistic 
students are fundamentally awkward and unable to discern appropriateness regarding time and 
place. This expectation suggests that autistics are unable to access and exploit the kairotic 
dimensions of rhetorical situations. Such an assumption functions to obscure the skilled 
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rhetorical performances autistics stage every day in high-stakes disclosure situations. In the case 
study that follows, I explore how my participant Mike skillfully invokes kairos as he describes 
his pursuit of educational goals, showing how he flips the trope of “time and a half” by framing 
his diagnosis as a superability that allows him to sustain longer periods of work than 
neurotypicals. I show through my conversations with Mike that his disclosure choices reflect a 
keen sense of timing and appropriateness that has gone unacknowledged as rhetorical work. 
Mike’s experiences show us that kairos is not only available to a rhetor who has been 
categorically denied rhetoricity, it is a crucial rhetorical resource from which Mike and students 
like him draw in order to resist stigma. 
 
Disclosure, Kairos, and Autism  
In this section, I explore scholarship that addresses disability disclosure in higher education, 
often but not always explicitly through the lens of time. I read this scholarship in light of Theory 
of Mind narratives about autism and deficits related to timing and social appropriateness. These 
narratives establish particular expectations around autism and disclosure that my participants 
disrupt simply by telling their own stories.  
Stephanie Kerschbaum’s work on agency and disclosure, discussed in the previous 
chapter, is worth revisiting here for her robust theorization of disability disclosure:  
I suggest that disability disclosures manifest within a complex system influenced 
by myriad factors, including circulating narratives of disability and able-
bodiedness, relationships among interlocutors, and institutional and 
environmental contexts. Over time individuals learn ways of managing disability 
discourses, motivated by past experiences as well as by their short- and long-term 
goals for identity construction and social interaction. In this way, disability self- 
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disclosures can be understood as the culmination of recurring processes in which 
past experiences are brought to bear on a present moment as individuals recognize 
opportune moments for action (63). 
In this passage, Kerschbaum cites the “factors” that make up the “complex system” in which 
disability disclosures happen. The first factor is “circulating narratives of disability and able-
bodiedness,” which, in this case, influence prevalent attitudes in higher education towards 
cognitive disability. As I will show, some of the narratives that circulate in Mike and Andy’s 
lives include that which frames disability as an individual, private problem to be mitigated for 
the comfort of neurotypicals; and, more generally, that the cognitively disabled or 
neurodivergent are not fit to be in college or the workforce. The next factor is “relationships 
among interlocutors,” which necessitates a consideration of how power is distributed across 
different sites of rhetorical engagement and between different types of audiences. Depending on 
one’s particular “short- and long-term goals for identity construction and social interaction,” the 
audience and context for disclosure can change. The third factor is “institutional and 
environmental contexts,” which requires an understanding of the resources available in any given 
time or place, the rhetor’s positioning with regards to both stated and unstated institutional goals, 
and how different contexts shape interactional norms.  
Beyond these factors, though, Kerschbaum highlights that disclosure performances 
emerge “over time,” considering both “past” and “present” in recognizing “opportune moments 
for action.” Kerschbaum indirectly invokes kairos in her theorizing of how disclosure 
performances manifest – the ability to recognize “opportune moments for action” is key. It is 
important to note that Kerschbaum’s project engages with disclosure through the vantage point 
of academic knowledge production. Kershbaum specifically anchors her article around personal 
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experiences where it was suggested to her that she disclose her deafness in her academic writing, 
in service to her scholarly contributions.  
My project does not consider how and why academics with disabilities disclose in their 
scholarship, but instead considers how students with cognitive disabilities navigate the power 
structures and educational goals particular to their status as undergraduates. However, I would 
like to make use of Kerschbaum’s description of the rhetorical work of disclosure in order to 
consider how my participants are actively calling upon their rhetorical resources in identifying 
“opportune moments for action” within what Price calls the “kairotic spaces of academia.” 
Kerschbaum’ s discussion of disclosure captures the kind of partial agency that rhetors exercise 
when they disclose a disability. “Just as a writer cannot fully imagine all the potential and future 
readers of a text,” she writes, “I cannot predict all the different orientations readers may take 
toward my written disclosures. But deciding how to shape those disclosures is a deeply agentive 
act even if that act does not result in the kind of responses I want” (69). Here, Kershbaum is 
recognizing that while there are components of the rhetorical situation of disclosure that rhetors 
have little control over, it is still a “deeply agentive act.” In the case of my project, my 
participants are exercising considerably more agency than they did in primary or secondary 
school, where their diagnosis and educational plans were often negotiated by parents, counselors, 
teachers, and medical care providers. Rather than attempt to locate evidence of agency in my 
participants’ stories, though, I will instead treat the process of “deciding how to 
shape…disclosures” not as a “deeply agentive act” but as also a deeply rhetorical act. This 
becomes an incredibly significant distinction to make when examining the disclosure practices of 
a population of students whose rhetorical ability is frequently questioned or ignored.  
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 Amy Vidali takes up disability disclosure in higher education from the vantage point of 
personal statements and letters of recommendation. In one case study, Vidali examines five 
letters of recommendation written in support of one student’s application to graduate school. The 
student, Nara, has experienced a traumatic brain injury following a car crash. Vidali reported that 
all five letters of recommendation disclosed Nara’s brain injury, writing that “[Nara] asked for 
four LRs when applying to graduate school…[and] later discovered that her disability appeared 
in each letter, although she felt that she had not given permission for such disclosures. In 
response, Nara felt she had to change her admissions essay and ask for a fifth letter to “prove” 
she was an academically competent student with a brain injury” (186). In Nara’s letters 
“disability functions like rhetorical hiccups in that it appears awkwardly, consistently, and with 
little explanation or purpose,” (186) and the “positioning of Nara’s disability reveals that as a 
genre, LRs must argue for “normal” bodies and minds, even when difference is clearly present” 
(199). Nara put it best, though, when she suggested that “perhaps her letter-writers “felt that a 
high-functioning person with a hidden disability needed explaining,” because if her work were to 
stand alone, “then others might mistake that I am like them”” (200). This case study is primarily 
an example of a rhetorical situation where a student’s disability is disclosed for them, as Nara’s 
first four letters did. Nara’s decision to seek a fifth letter that she hoped would reassure her 
audience of her own “high-functioning” status and intellectual competence in spite of her brain 
injury was a response to the rhetorical situation in which her differences were called out without 
her direct involvement. It was a careful rhetorical performance designed to mitigate what she 
perceived as the negative impact of the manner in which the other four letters portrayed her 
disability.  
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 In another project, Vidali examines college application personal statements by three 
different students who have all been diagnosed with learning disabilities. Vidali explains that 
students with learning disabilities are “consistently and improperly labeled as unfit for university 
study, because they do not necessarily perceive, understand, think or remember in “typical” 
ways” (617). While all three students choose to disclose their learning disabilities in their 
personal statements, Vidali argues in her first section, titled “Rebecca’s and Alison’s Essays,” 
that two of the three students stay within the “tight discursive parameters,” established by the 
“dominant rhetorical tropes of disability” and demanding “a focus on personal issues, rather than 
social and political influences and implications.” These two students “focus exclusively on 
personal issues, struggle to fulfill the “triumph” narrative, and downplay social and political 
concerns” (618). In her next section, titled “Christine and her Admissions Essay,” Vidali singles 
out Christine’s essay for its frank discussion of disability politics and willingness to make 
readers feel uncomfortably complicit with the marginalization of students with learning 
disabilities. Vidali employs the figure of the freak show to better illustrate how “Christine asserts 
herself in a contradictory manner, emphasizing her rhetorical savvy and strong sense of who she 
is – characteristics desirable to an admissions committee – while at the same time painting the 
educational challenges her disability presents (and will continue to present) in bold colors” (629). 
Vidali argues that Christine’s engagement with disability politics allows her to “comment on the 
nature of her learning disability, yet override the rhetorical imperative to tell a personal narrative 
of triumph,” ultimately suggesting that “increased awareness of disability communities and 
discrimination is a powerful tool in rhetorically resisting the invasive imperatives of the 
admissions essay” (629). Vidali is highlighting Christine’s essay as an example of “rhetorical 
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savvy” as it performs rhetorical resistance with regards to the expectations of the admissions 
essay as a venue for disability disclosure.  
 Vidali makes an important point about “Christine and Her Admissions Essay” by calling 
on the “ambiguous agency of the freak in a circus setting” to “rethink the idea of students (with 
and without disabilities) as mere rhetorical dupes of an oppressive admissions system, revealing 
that students can manipulate both existing and unexpected rhetorical tropes for their own ends” 
(616). This rightfully calls attention to the rhetorical work that her focal students are doing as 
they navigate disability disclosure in high-stakes educational contexts.  
However, the manner in which Vidali juxtaposes her three examples functions to validate 
particular disclosure performances over others, based on rhetorical outcomes that Vidali reads as 
more politically disruptive. Her grouping of the first two students together – in the section titled 
“Rebecca’s and Alison’s Essays” – functions to establish a particular expectation of the status 
quo in terms of disability disclosure in personal statements. As Vidali suggests, “Alison and 
Rebecca stay within expected boundaries in performing their disabilities, gracefully swinging 
from the rhetorical trapeze to voluminous applause” (625). This description of their rhetorical 
performances implies that Alison and Rebecca’s disclosure performances were skilled, but 
uninteresting or even disappointing because they simply upheld the status quo. Vidali then uses 
“Christine and Her Admissions Essay” as the lone third example to show how Christine’s 
disclosure performance disrupts the damaging labels and narratives about learning disabilities 
that follow students throughout their academic careers. Here, I read Vidali as implying that her 
first two focal students are not actually manipulating “rhetorical tropes for their own ends,” but 
rather capitulating to those tropes, and that “their own ends” aren’t as worthy of attention 
because they accomplish little with regards to disability politics. Vidali’s decision to juxtapose 
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the examples in this way undermines her efforts to portray all three case studies as equally 
interesting, risky, and demonstrative of rhetorical expertise. I find myself wanting to know more 
about the intricacies of Alison and Rebecca’s experiences with disclosure, as everyday or 
stereotypical or safe as they may seem. Scholarship on the lived experience of disability must 
consider and champion all rhetors, not only those who easily access and employ activist 
vocabularies, in recognizing rhetorical skill.  
 Overall, though, Vidali makes two excellent points in her scholarship that I find 
extremely useful for my work. “The fact that Nara was applying for further scholarly study with 
a brain injury,” she suggests, “may particularly concern some academics because it is often 
assumed that a neurotypical brain is par for the academic course. The reality is that there is 
already “neurodiversity” in higher education, and many students with cognitive differences are 
ready, and deserve, to be included in university settings” (190). Vidali calls attention to the myth 
that the neurodivergent are a) not fit for the academy, and b) are not already present in the 
academy. Neurodivergent students, faculty, and staff are already moving through the academy, 
but must contend with the damaging assumption that they don’t belong. Second, Vidali argues 
that crafting disability disclosure in an admissions essay is a “difficult rhetorical task” that 
“requires that [students] simultaneously “come out” as disabled and “pass” as able-bodied, 
revealing that disclosing disability is not a one-time confession or a functional event but is an 
embodied performance where named and claimed identities are explored” (634). The experiences 
of my participants suggest that disclosure is indeed a “difficult rhetorical task” that demands a 
kind of paradoxical rhetorical performance. They must both reveal that they are autistic – lest 
neurotypicals mistake them as “like them” – while at the same time demonstrating that they 
don’t allow their autism to negatively impact them in any way.  This “difficult rhetorical task” is 
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worth exploring in more detail, and from the perspective of a population of students historically 
considered to be outside the boundaries of human rhetorical ability.  
 While Vidali examines disclosure as rhetorical performance, Margaret Price theorizes the 
academic spaces in which these rhetorical performances are staged, outlining how those spaces 
create and deny opportunities for marginalized rhetors within the academy. In Mad At School, 
which discusses kairos, mental disability, and higher education, Price outlines her theory of the 
“kairotic spaces” of academia. In kairotic spaces, “the moments are fleeting, the timing is precise 
and quick, the cues for appropriate behavior both rigid and subtle” (73). Issues of “quick,” 
“precise” timing and “subtle” “cues” for appropriateness overwhelmingly come to bear upon 
these spaces of high-stakes rhetorical performances. Price turns her attention to how students and 
faculty navigate these spaces, including but not limited to how and when they choose to disclose 
particular diagnoses. Kairotic spaces are governed by key topoi or “commonplace beliefs” that 
contribute “to the construction of a rhetor’s ethos or perceived character” (5). Price argues that 
such academic topoi as “collegiality” or “participation” are shared by the “in-group” of 
academia, often a group that assumes neurotypicality; thus, these topoi are often “unexamined” 
and employed to exclude certain people (5). Price explains that the available literature addressing 
these topoi “tends to view “participation” as an issue of whether “students are getting to class 
and completing their work successfully, rather than how they are experiencing and navigating 
kairotic spaces such as classroom discussions” (74).  
Questioning how these topoi make the kairotic spaces of academia particularly difficult 
for students with disabilities, Price turns to an example of an autistic student, asking, “What 
about a student on the autism spectrum who has difficulty apprehending the subtle social cues 
that govern classroom participation, the difference between “showing engagement” and 
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“dominating the conversation,” the sorts of spontaneous oral performances that are considered 
“smart”? What does “collegiality” mean for a faculty member who has these same difficulties?” 
(6). This example importantly disrupts some of the assumptions that go into expectations of what 
“collegiality” looks like, and identifies collegiality as a rigidly structured rhetorical performance 
that we misrepresent as more natural or instinctual; yet it also calls upon some stereotypes of 
autistic deficits that don’t hold up in my participants’ experiences. It assumes that the autistic 
student or colleague in this example is not already passing as neurotypical or demonstrating 
“smart” qualities through careful rhetorical performances. Such an example runs the risk of 
suggesting that the topos of collegiality entirely excludes the autistic student or colleague 
because it doesn’t spell out behavioral expectations in ways that autistics can understand, or it 
expects behaviors that they are unable to demonstrate. I use this chapter to shift the focus 
towards the kinds of rhetorical situations in which autistic students are already performing all the 
time.  
 In her efforts to define kairos, Price cites Cynthia Miecznikowski Sheard, who suggests 
that kairos goes beyond merely a sense of “the opportune or appropriate time” and instead 
“incorporates multiple elements of context, including…physical space and attitudes” ((306) 60). 
“As this implies,” Price writes, “kairos carries ethical and contextual as well as temporal 
implications” (60). Drawing attention to the ethical implications is essential here, because, as I 
will show, my participants base many of their disclosure decisions on an underlying ethical code 
that helps them sense appropriate times and places to disclose or not disclose. My participants’ 
ethical codes, which emerge from their careful reflections on how they strategize disability 
disclosure, both align and depart from dominant cultural narratives on autism depending on their 
rhetorical goals for a particular situation.  
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The ethical implications of kairos that Price highlights also take on special meaning in the 
context of autism, which is often portrayed as a breakdown of ethics due to the absence of 
empathy and non-social orientation. Writing specifically on autism and disclosure in her book, 
Authoring Autism, Melanie Yergeau says that kairos  “is what rhetoricians and behaviorists both 
cherish and adore: Dissecting time, movements, and spaces in search of rhetoricity, and uplifting 
those bodies which deftly perform as pro-social, effectual bodies” (76). Yergeau’s invoking of 
“pro-social” bodies highlights the ethical expectations built into understandings of kairos. These 
expectations have significant and sometimes dire consequences for bodies that do not “deftly 
perform” as “pro-social.” In a conversation about his individualized education plan (IEP) in 
secondary school, Toby remarked that he identifies as “non-social,” but that it shouldn’t “be 
confused with anti-social.” “Anti-social to me,” he says, “implies rapidly against being social 
whereas I am just not terribly into it. I prefer to do my own thing, you know what I mean?” 
Another participant, Sam, discusses punishments he sometimes received in primary school, 
where his teachers soon discovered that “punishments like being forced to sit alone didn’t work 
[on me]. I’m fine with being alone.” These preferences are often read through a normative gaze 
that privileges the “pro-social,” and therefore interprets “non-social” behaviors as ethically 
dubious or troubling – Toby’s careful defense of his preferences as not “anti-social” reinforces 
this point. In light of narratives that portray autistics as sociopathic and lacking empathy, the 
ethical expectations that Yergeau and Price identify as running through our understanding of 
kairos become grounds for the denial of rhetoricity.  
Autism thus becomes its own topos, possibly representing the absence of the topoi that 
Price identifies in the kairotic spaces of academia. Yergeau writes, “Autism is not only my 
identity, or even my own personal commonplace. Autism is a profoundly kairotic condition, a 
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topos en masse” (173). Autism disclosure thus requires rhetorically upending commonplaces 
about autism that function to completely deny rhetoricity. Speaking out as autistic often has a 
silencing effect. It is thus necessary to look more closely at where, when, and how autistic 
students are disclosing their diagnoses, and to recognize how they call upon kairotic resources to 
do so.  
 
The Trope of “Time and a Half” and “Crip Time”  
 
As discussed in the previous section, Price details the topoi that function as the basis for 
marginalization within or exclusion from the academy. In opposition of such topoi as 
“productivity,” I argue, is the well-worn trope of “time and a half.” This trope has come to 
represent a philosophy on disability accommodations in higher education. It is usually identified 
as the most common, or “default,” as my participant Sam put it, accommodation offered to 
students who diclose a disability diagnosis. The phrase “time and a half” in and of itself performs 
a normative function. “Time” in this instance represents whatever duration has been established 
as the “normal” amount of time offered to complete a test, and obscures the process by which 
that duration of time was decided upon – it is simply, unquestionably “time.” The “and a half” 
part of the phrase represents an add-on to, or slowing of, normal time. It invokes delay, in excess 
of normal limits, and carries a negative connotation across virtually all educational contexts.  
 Some of my participants are familiar with and wary of “time and a half.”  When asked 
what accommodation looks like for autistic students, Mike automatically replies, “It’s more time 
for tests.” Andy’s main accommodation offered in community college was “double test taking 
time,” though he volunteers that he didn’t use it:  
A: Actually, it seems like I don’t use the double test time.  
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P: Even for an essay test where you have to write?  
A: Even for an essay test, I might take a little longer than usual, but weird thing is 
I have this odd habit of finishing tests pretty quickly. I’d be like the first one out 
of the class.  
Andy would ultimately prefer to have the option to take tests on his own time instead:  
P: And you say that makes a big difference for you?  
A: Yes it does. I feel being able to schedule it on my own time, and having the 
extra time just in case I need it is useful even though I don’t actually use the extra 
time. It’s just, I need like, that nice quiet place, where I can be able to focus.  
These comments from Andy show that having control over other aspects of the testing 
environment is more important to him than pacing. What matters more than “time and a half” is 
having the option to access a quiet testing space without distractions from other students or 
unnecessary noise. Andy’s concerns register as a desire for more control over when and where he 
spends his allotted testing time, rather than how much total time he is afforded. In addition to 
having more control over his time, Andy would also like to speed up the time it currently takes to 
process class readings with text-to-speech software. When classes don’t offer online textbooks, 
Andy must “type up the stuff from the chapter I’m reading” and then run it through his text-to-
speech software. “But it’s just – I don’t have a lot of time to work with that,” he says.  
Another participant, Toby, actually worked for the disability services program on campus 
“converting text to speech for students with disabilities. “We’d have the images of scanned 
textbooks and we’d send it through a reader,” he describes, “which we then proofread and look 
for various mistakes like, uh, ‘t’s being turned into ‘I’s and ‘f’s being turned into ‘t’s’, which 
makes the word ‘shifting’ a lot of fun.” This work was tiring, and eventually Toby realized “I 
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wasn’t getting any social interaction between academia, that, and home, and I just couldn’t bring 
myself to do the work anymore.” The long hours working as a text-to-speech processer 
contributed to his having to “go at a slow pace compared to everyone else. I’ve been down as 
low as one class at a time for a few semesters and two classes this semester. I couldn’t handle 
any more. I was just overwhelmed and I couldn’t do it.”  
 The assumptions about ability behind “time and a half” don’t hold up here. Mike and 
Andy confirm that they either complete tests within a “normal” time frame, or even faster. 
Another participant, Sam, self-identifies as “good at tests” and routinely tested his way into 
accelerated educational programs in primary and secondary school. Andy in particular doesn’t 
want extra time because he would rather have more control over his existing allotment of time, 
including the choice of when to take tests and the optimal environment available to him for test 
taking. What really slows Andy down is not his diagnosis, but rather an absence of meaningful 
accommodations, such as when it comes to required textbooks for courses or having to take tests 
in rooms with distracting noises or too many other students. He spends valuable time and 
intellectual resources converting print texts or non-compatible digital texts to a format that is 
easier to process. Mike, on the other hand, conceives of autism not as delay but as a superability 
related to time, enabling him to work for longer periods of time than neurotypicals. In this 
context, “time and a half” could be reinterpreted as an accomplishment, invoking its opposite, 
“half time,” as a deficit of neurotypicals.  
In Feminist, Queer, Crip, Alison Kafer critiques the “grim imagined futures” that 
circulate through commonplace notions of disability and the good life, as she strives to imagine 
“more accessible futures…in which disability is understood…as political, as valuable, as 
integral” (3). Kafer’s focus on futurity and how it manifests in the embodied present – how we 
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read futures through bodily differences, how certain bodies seem to contain futures, or the 
absence of a future – is an invocation of disability similar to Yergeau’s naming of autism as a 
“profoundly kairotic condition.” She establishes that disability is often explored as a “temporal 
category” and described “in reference to time” (25). Much of the temporal language used is 
medical in nature – “prognosis,” “relapse,” “chronic” – but even language that is more accepted 
within disability studies, like “temporarily able-bodied,” suggest that disability is a kairotic, 
embodied experience. Kafer explores how disability shapes one’s orientation to time in her 
discussion of “crip time,” which she in part defines as “an awareness that disabled people might 
need more time to accomplish something or to arrive somewhere” (26). She then suggests that it 
might be more useful to think of crip time as “flex time not just expanded but exploded:  
it requires reimagining our notions of what can and should happen in time, or 
recognizing how expectations of “how long things take” are based on very 
particular minds and bodies. We can then understand the flexibility of crip time as 
being not only an accommodation to those who need “more” time but also, and 
perhaps especially, a challenge to normative and normalizing expectations of pace 
and scheduling (27).”  
Here, Kafer shifts the focus away from crip time as extension and begins to think through a more 
robust notion of the flexibility of time that recognizes the ultimately “normalizing expectations” 
that underlie commonly accepted ideas of “how long things take.”  
 Price argues that the “fraughtness” that persons with disabilities encounter when 
attempting “to access kairotic spaces” have “much to do with time and how it is perceived by 
different persons” (70). Price references crip time as a term referring to “a flexible approach to 
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normative time frames” and offers concrete examples of what that might look like for faculty 
members in academia:  
At a conference, adhering to crip time might mean permitting more than fifteen 
minutes between sessions; it might mean recognizing that people will arrive at 
various intervals, and designing sessions accordingly; and it might also mean 
recognizing that audience members are processing language at various rates and 
adjusting the pace of conversation. It is this notion of flexibility (not just “extra” 
time) that unites kairos and crip time. Even more than academic conferences, 
classrooms tend to be run under strict time constraints. Students are expected to 
arrive on time, absorb information at a particular speed, and perform 
spontaneously in restricted time frames (as in discussions or peer-response groups 
(70).  
Price importantly points out that when it comes to crip time, flexibility should take precedence 
over “just “extra” time.” Her first example, though – “permitting more than fifteen minutes 
between sessions” – does suggest that the primary understanding of crip time is that of delay. To 
counter this overemphasis on delay, Price offers the nonspecific examples of “processing 
language at various rates” and absorbing information “at a particular speed.” To return to Andy 
here, though, it’s not so much about speed, pacing, or scheduling, but about autonomy and 
control of time and environment. What matters is not so much the “particular speed” at which 
Andy processes testing materials, but how much control he has over when he can take tests and 
what is happening in his immediate environment while he is taking a test. Such an example from 
Andy’s experiences call for a better understanding of the kairotic dimensions of crip time.  
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While both Price and Kafer make the point that crip time is not simply “extra time,” the 
majority of current examples of how crip time manifests solely address extensions to normative 
time frames. Outside of disability studies conversations about crip time, too, educational 
understandings of time-based accommodations still overwhelmingly conceive of disability in 
terms of delay. Price’s efforts to theorize the relationship between crip time and kairos leads to a 
call for focusing on a “flexibility” that encompasses more than delay, and an awareness of the 
variety of paces at which diverse students accomplish common educational tasks or processes. It 
is in part a call for looseness, an avoidance of the “strict time constraints” that alienate particular 
learners. In proceeding from this notion of flexibility, and uniting kairos and crip time, I want to 
shift the focus of crip time away from merely an awareness of normative “pacing and 
scheduling.” In this educational context, crip time should not only be about how little or how 
much time students need, but also about how they recognize timely opportunities for rhetorical 
action in pursuit of their own educational goals. Crip time can and should incorporate this notion 
of time as rhetorical resource.5   
In the following case study, I explore in a more in-depth way the concept of crip time as 
time “exploded,” of autism as a “profoundly kairotic” embodied condition. Throughout our 
interviews Mike articulates his own embodied experience of time, particularly in excerpts of 
conversations loosely tied to the topic of disclosure. Mike calls upon his own embodied 
experience of time as a rhetorical resource in navigating the narrow range of identities available 
																																																								
5 While there is not adequate space to discuss fully here, this revision to crip time would 
arguably contribute to Jay Dolmage’s conceptualizing of a “metis epistemology” within our 
education system, which he suggests has always functioned to identify (and sometimes exclude) 
difference (289). Dolmage forwards an understanding of metis, an ancient rhetorical virtue 
embodied largely by the Greek god Hephaestus, as “an embodied rhetoric” that accommodates 
understandings of disability as generative of, rather than an impediment to, rhetorical meaning 
(149). Metis is “cunning, adaptive, embodied intelligence” (156) and “can be a way to recognize 
the need for flexible, embodied, responsive rhetorical movement” (160). 
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to him as an autistic college student. His identity performances, including moments when he 
claims his diagnosis and moments when he chooses to pass as neurotypical, are deeply rhetorical, 
profoundly kairotic, and completely disruptive of normative expectations.  
 
Mike: “I’m just a weird robot-talking autistic kid” 
I turn now to my case study of Mike, whose framing of his diagnosis and experiences with 
disclosure offer an interpretation of autism not as arhetorical difficulty or delay, but as 
rhetorically powerful and kairotically responsive. I show, through Mike’s experiences, that time 
is a rhetorical resource Mike leverages in order to manage his diagnosis for a neurotypical 
audience.    
Mike is an upperclassman majoring in Communication who self-identifies as having 
Asperger Syndrome. In the summer of 2013, the time of our interviews, his diagnosis was 
relatively new, and he had registered with the office of disability resources only a couple of 
semesters before our interviews. Mike’s recent diagnosis means that he is part of the last group 
to be diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, which only first entered the DSM as a diagnosis in 
1994, and which was phased out as a qualitatively distinct disorder from autism in the DSM-V, 
which came out the year of our interviews6. This detail adds yet another layer of kairotic 
complexity to autism disclosure, as a particular generation of students carry a diagnosis that no 
longer exists, at least not as it did at the time of their diagnosis. Unlike my other participants, 
Mike sought out his diagnosis on his own, as a legal adult, and has not shared the news of his 
																																																								
6 It remains to be seen how the disappearance of Asperger Syndrome as a specific diagnosis will 
affect disclosure practices for students like Mike. Critics suggest that the revised diagnostic 
criteria for autism in the DSM-V are narrower and would exclude some of those who displayed 
autistic traits at the “high-functioning” end of the spectrum. It’s possible that Mike himself 
would not receive an autism diagnosis based on today’s criteria.  
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diagnosis with his family. He admits that he is fascinated by how the brain works, including 
“how you can train your brain to become more resilient to adversity and stress,” and watches 
TED talks about neuroplasticity and mindfulness meditation.  
Mike hopes to graduate, eventually get his MBA, and build a career on Wall Street as a 
financial consultant, and he spends his time very purposefully in pursuit of these goals. Mike 
schedules his time around the stock market, tracking its movement online through fee-based 
trading chat rooms. “Stock market…opens at 8:30, and that’s my goal is to be up for that,” he 
explains as he walks me through a typical day. He then looks “through some graphs. Or, [I] look 
through some stock charts” to “see if there’s any opportunities.” Around 11:30 am, Mike heads 
off to work at an internship with a healthcare-focused non-profit in town. “The stock market 
closes at 3,” he explains, “after that, um…[I’m] reading, spend[ing] a lot of time online.” When 
asked what he does online, Mike replied that he reads “a lot of financial articles” and watches the 
aforementioned TED talks on mindfulness meditation and neuroplasticity.  
Mike did not grow up with an official Asperger syndrome diagnosis, and thus did not 
have an IEP in primary or secondary school. He first began to pursue an official diagnosis after 
entering community college, and registered with disability resources once he arrived as an 
upperclassman at his four-year university. For some of my other participants, their journey to a 
diagnosis began when they started doing poorly in school. For Mike, he first began to suspect 
that he was autistic after what he claims was “a period of social failures,” such as “thinking 
you’re flirting with a girl, and she’s not flirting back,” and “not having proper facial expressions, 
not making eye contact with people. Being weird, being different in a social context. And then 
realizing that.” He declined to offer specific examples. Mike specifically interprets his journey to 
a diagnosis in temporal terms: after enduring a “period of social failures” he felt compelled to 
	 99	
seek out psychiatric input. Mike interprets his autism as primarily impacting his social life and 
social interactions in his chosen career field, and not academics, learning habits, or intellectual 
ability per se. He frequently mentions that he does not hang out with anyone by choice, in order 
to free up more time to devote to pursuing his plans to work in finance. When he does bring up 
autism and academics, it is only in positive terms.  
Mike’s main ambition at this point in his life is to achieve what many would recognize as 
mainstream success. His ideal job as a financial analyst on Wall Street is the embodiment of 
wealth, power, and ability. For Mike specifically, the position also represents his exceptionalism 
as afforded by his autistic brain, and which he portrays in terms of time. “Unlike most people,” 
he explains, “I have…the ability to sit down for twelve hours at a time and look at stock charts, 
or…information that I can…digest in long stretches of time.” Mike’s autistic mind allows him to 
exceed normative time frames for intellectual activity. In this expression of kairotic embodiment, 
spending more time on a particular activity does not correlate to delay but rather to excess and 
achievement over that of a neurotypical employee. Mike brings up Michael Burry, “one of the 
better hedge fund managers of all time,” reportedly self-diagnosed with Asperger syndrome, and 
widely credited with predicting the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. He is played by Christian 
Bale in the 2015 oscar-nominated film The Big Short. Mike credits Burry’s success to his autism, 
telling me, “he got to where he was because he has astute attention to detail. He saw things and 
patterns that no one else saw.” He later admits that Burry “doesn’t do hedge funds anymore” 
because “he hates dealing with people…and his clients hated him,” but repeatedly refers back to 
Burry as an example of a positive role model, as someone who demonstrates that autistics can be 
successful.  
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The view that Mike expresses here – that autism is a kind of superability rather than a 
disability – has been articulated by a handful of public figures with autism, most famously by 
Temple Grandin, in support of more purposeful hiring of autistic employees in the workforce. 
This view relies on a different kind of stereotype than the autistic-as-sociopath or autistic-as-
tragic-loner. In this case, the autistic may be quirky, but is obsessive and never misses details; he 
or she is suited for long workdays and repetitive tasks in which even minor errors cannot be 
tolerated (Grandin uses the example of inspecting airplane parts for structural quality in a 
factory). The autistic employee imagined here works all day long, doesn’t take vacations, and 
disregards antisocial or antagonistic company culture that would demotivate neurotypical 
employees. This stereotype of course isn’t accurate – and disability studies scholars have 
critiqued this view for its deference to capitalist notions of productivity and self-sufficiency (see 
Erevelles) – but it is finding purchase in mainstream attempts to portray autism as an asset rather 
than a liability. School has taught Mike that his accomplishments and ability to pursue his 
desired career are entirely dependent upon his individual efforts. He believes that if he works 
hard enough and devotes enough time to his pursuits, he will come out on top.  
Most importantly, though, Mike believes that revealing his diagnosis at the right time and 
place will give him an edge over neurotypical students. As I will discuss later, when Mike goes 
on the job market he plans to disclose his diagnosis in order to take advantage of federal 
mandates to hire employees with disabilities as part of diversity and inclusion initiatives. I can’t 
help but notice how much the stereotype of the “super able” autistic, problematic as it may be, 
motivates Mike. From his perspective, it seems to be the only disability-positive message that he 
is getting about autistic students and employees. This stereotype of the super able autistic is the 
only one that tells a story that isn’t tragic or scary. Mike doesn’t employ a vocabulary of 
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disability rights and the politics of disability activism to express his experiences – in terms of 
disclosure, he makes similar rhetorical choices to Alison and Rebecca, the two undergraduates 
features in Vidali’s article on college admissions essays. Mike stays within the same “tight 
discursive parameters,” not by disclosing his diagnosis in an acceptable way, but by hiding it 
altogether. However, he then later discloses in order to increase his chances of “getting in,” in 
this case referring to either getting a job or being accepted to an MBA program. Mike’s decisions 
here are time-dependent: first, pass as neurotypical, but high-achieving. Then, disclose diagnosis. 
Mike understands that the chronology and timing of these two disclosure choices is crucial to his 
success. Perhaps the same could be said about Alison and Rebecca, though we don’t have 
enough details to know. However, unlike Alison and Rebecca, Mike sees his diagnosis as 
making him more able than neurotypical students, rather than simply as able.  
Mike was by far my most reluctant and skeptical informant. He repeatedly questioned the 
relevance of, or motivations behind, my questions, and didn’t seem particularly interested in 
talking about autism. When it comes to his diagnosis, he says “my thought process was…if I’m 
autistic, if I’m not, I’m still me…there was a point in time where I just stopped really caring, you 
know? So I just have to go along my life doing…what I have to, to achieve my goals and 
ambitions.” At the time of our interviews, Mike’s diagnosis was very recent, and neither his 
friends nor his family know about his diagnosis. As I mentioned earlier, he plans to not tell them. 
He also claims that he has never, and will never, request classroom accommodations. As I will 
show later, when Mike does discuss his diagnosis, it is only in glowingly positive terms, and he 
carefully and consistently disassociates himself from others on the spectrum. He seems to be 
focused on ensuring the comfort of a neurotypical audience, much in the same way that Vidali 
describes Alison and Rebecca’s efforts to achieve “depictions of disability that limited 
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ramifications and responsibilities for others” (626). This is a kairotic decision related to his sense 
of appropriate portrayals of disability for a neurotypical audience.  
In this section, I argue that Mike’s disclosure choices are evidence of the incredibly 
narrow range of acceptable identities available to non-neurotypical students. Mike must both 
hide and reveal his diagnosis in specific educational and career settings and at appropriate times, 
all the way risking the consequences. He must be sensitive to the kairotic dimensions of 
disclosure across different spaces in higher education. He must frame his diagnosis as helping 
him stand out, but only in a good way, and only against a backdrop of perfect academic 
performance. He believes that he must embody the super able autistic in order to have the life he 
wants. Disclosure came up three times in my conversations with Mike. First, Mike told me that 
he has not, and will not, disclose his diagnosis to any family or friends. Second, Mike explained 
that he will never request classroom accommodations. This technically doesn’t preclude 
disclosure of his diagnosis to his instructors, but I found that Mike invokes the rhetoric of 
fairness as part of a broader philosophy on the (un)acceptability and (in)appropriateness of being 
autistic in the classroom. Mike employs a particular disclosure strategy that simultaneously 
distinguishes him from neurotypical students and from the autism community. This is the 
paradox of the exceptional autistic. Mike must both be too normal to be really autistic, and too 
exceptional to be simply normal. In the following discussion, I will analyze Mike’s disclosure 
strategy as it emerged in our conversations.  
Mike is a savvy and focused first-generation college student. He chose to attend 
community college for two years to save money while fulfilling his general education 
requirements, and then transferred to a four-year university to pursue a major in Communication. 
In part because of this plan, he is debt-free and free to devote the majority of his day to acing his 
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classes and completing one internship after another. As evidence of Mike’s drive, a few of his 
many internships have come about not through traditional job advertisements or announcements, 
but because he approached companies without internship programs and asked if he could work 
for them. Mike is a student who knows what he wants.  Though he may sound cynical at times, 
he understands how to play the game of school. In the following excerpt, Mike walks me through 
the academic expectations he tries to meet:  
Yeah. Um, I’m trying to get into an MBA program. So. You have to have that 
high GPA, but, I mean, obviously conversely to that you need a good personal 
story, good experiences, you need, you need all that, but I mean, GPA’s part of it. 
It really is. And, and I came into UIUC very average, uh, like 3.1, so um, I’m up 
to 3.4 now, so. 
Here, Mike explains the paradox of the well-rounded student that MBA programs project to 
applicants. This student achieves an exceptionally high GPA, but isn’t obsessed with grades or 
test scores. He or she is at the top of the class, but still has ample time for “good experiences” 
that don’t solely involve studying.  Most importantly, he or she must have a compelling life 
narrative replete with overcoming struggles and a positive spin that inspires and delights an 
acceptance committee. In his efforts to embody this ideal applicant identity, Mike makes a 
number of tricky disclosure decisions. In the following conversational excerpt, Mike explains to 
me that he plans to “never” request classroom accommodations:   
P: Do you disclose to teachers that you have autism?  
M: I will never use accommodation.  
P: What does accommodation look like for autism? 
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M: It’s more time for tests. It’s, extensions on papers because they clearly tend to 
procrastinate at a really high level, so there’s, there’s really no set deadlines. I, I 
believe they just give them all the material and say, ‘here’s the end of the class.’ 
And I’m just gonna think here that they’re really loose on, on deadlines. And 
they, they probably try to make things more transparent in terms of prompts, and, 
and, just guidance. You know, help them through things, if you’re there. I, I’m 
purely guessing, though.  
P: Wouldn’t you want an extended deadline on a paper?  
M: Nope. If I want to be treated equally, then I deserve to go through the same 
rigor as everyone else. That’s just a personal belief of mine, and I’m fairly high-
functioning so I don’t really need it, so. You know, I’m, I’ll be competing with 
these people for promotions in the future, for jobs, and I think it’s just wrong for 
me to, to get any advantage like that. My diagnosis was purely out of, just 
curiosity and wondering why I was different than everyone else. I don’t want any 
special accommodations.  
While it’s not clear from this excerpt whether or not Mike actually discloses his diagnosis to 
instructors – he is, after all, registered with Disability Resources and works with a campus 
psychologist – he does claim that he “will never use accommodation” in the classroom. He 
frames his reasons for declining available accommodations not as an issue of need, but of 
fairness. Mike’s diagnosis is the most recent of all of my participants, and, unlike them, he 
clearly does not associate himself with other students who have the same diagnosis. Part of this 
disassociation involves rejecting accommodations offered to him as a student registered with 
Disability Resources, while demonstrating and emphasizing his ignorance of what those 
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accommodations would even include. “They clearly tend to procrastinate at a really high level,” 
he says of autistic students, but on the subject of how instructors might work with these students, 
Mike offers, “I’m just gonna think here that they’re really loose on, on deadlines.” “I, I’m purely 
guessing, though,” he says, “I’m fairly high-functioning so I don’t really need it.”  Here, Mike 
invokes the rhetoric of functioning to disassociate himself with other members of the autism 
community based on degree of intellectual functioning or intelligence. Following this logic, 
autistics who are “high-functioning” possess greater ability than those who are “low-
functioning,” and, despite sharing the same diagnosis, inhabit completely different worlds in 
terms of their ability and acceptability as students. He revisits this perspective in a later 
conversation about how he conceived of autism as a disorder:  
M: [Sighs] Once again, I mean, I have the utmost respect for people on the 
autistic spectrum. But I’m well aware that it is indeed a spectrum. Meaning some 
people are well along on it. And I can’t speak for those people. Because I’m, I’m 
definitely more towards the high-functioning side. So I, I do—certainly don’t feel 
I’m a fair representative of them. And I can’t speak collectively.  
Here, Mike emphasizes his “respect” while still maintaining his separation from those who are 
“well along on” the autism spectrum. “I…certainly don’t feel I’m a fair representative of them,” 
he claims, “And I can’t speak collectively.” Recently, the rhetoric of functioning has been 
critiqued by disability activists and scholars, who claim that it has been used to make an autism 
diagnosis more acceptable for some at the expense of others who may be more profoundly 
impaired. I do not believe Mike was trying to be insulting here – if anything, I read this as an 
honest attempt at self-assessment, a cautiously respectful statement that still does the work of 
disassociating with others who “need” accommodation to get by in a neurotypical classroom. As 
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mentioned earlier, Mike claims that “unlike most people” he possesses certain abilities as an 
autistic student that allow him to handle the rigors of a career in finance with comparatively 
more ease. In the above excerpt, he is positioning himself as unlike or otherwise separate from 
other autistic students in terms of ability. He devotes equal time to positioning himself as unlike 
neurotypical students and unlike autistic students in terms of ability. This is the narrow space that 
the exceptional autistic must occupy.  
 Mike operates under the understanding that disclosing his diagnosis will only lead to a 
positive outcome if he has an otherwise ideal student profile. He believes that having a high GPA 
and being able to claim that he has never accepted accommodations will make him a more ideal 
candidate for jobs. Behind this belief is the philosophy that it’s only okay to be autistic if you can 
perform just as well, if not better, than a neurotypical student. Mike also positions himself as an 
outsider to the world of disability accommodation. His justification for refusing accommodation 
comes down to a “personal belief” that it would be unfair for someone as “high-functioning” as 
him to get “any advantage” or “special accommodations” when competing with mainstream 
students for jobs and promotions after college. When I asked him why he then sought a diagnosis 
in the first place, and so late in his life, he replied it was “purely out of, just curiosity and 
wondering why I was different than everyone else.” Here, I want to argue that Mike is 
demonstrating an understanding of the paradoxical rules of disability disclosure and 
accommodation in higher education. Disability is acceptable, as long as one can overcome that 
disability and turn down any special or unfair advantages. Many disability studies scholars will 
recognize this logic as central to the myth of overcoming, in which the responsibility lies with 
the disabled subject to minimize one’s disability as much as possible for the convenience and 
approval of an able-bodied audience, or otherwise “make up for” disability through strict bodily 
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discipline in a way that inspires an able-bodied audience. I think it’s worth noting here that the 
myth of overcoming is similar to, but ultimately different from that of the exceptional autistic. 
The myth of overcoming automatically assumes that disability is always considered a loss or a 
deficit – it is always to be overcome, rather than embraced and accepted. A (generous) reading of 
the myth of the exceptional autistic assumes that what disables someone in one context might 
enable them in another. I read a complex interplay of both the myth of overcoming and the myth 
of the exceptional autistic in the following excerpt, when I prompt Mike to reflect on how his 
diagnosis has changed the way he sees himself as a student:  
P: Has that [diagnosis] changed the way that you think of yourself as a student at 
all?  
M: Good question. Yes. It gives me the confidence that I can be just really 
successful and excel at it. And that’s, I don’t think that’s common among autistic 
students. I think they really harp on their negative traits. And ruminate in their 
head. They don’t focus on the positive aspects of what the autistic brain can do. It 
has immense dedication, skill, work ethic, I mean.  
P: So your diagnosis came with a, a huge confidence boost?  
M: Surprisingly, yes. Surprisingly yes, that’s very rare. I don’t think you’ll hear a 
lot of people say that. But yeah, it’s true. And, and here’s why: um, my passion is 
finances, financial investing. An autistic mind in finance is a needle in a haystack. 
It’s coveted. People need it. You need someone who’s very analytical, willing to, 
to sit at a computer for twelve hours in a day, go over figures, go over stock 
charts. You need that. You need that persistence. And, I’m really hoping that it 
pans out in the coming years. And it gives me confidence. It does.  
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Mike frames his diagnosis as a positive experience that gives him “confidence” that he will be 
“really successful” and excel in higher education and in his chosen career. He returns to the word 
“confidence” for emphasis, in his second response. Mike tells himself and me that he is unlike 
others in this perspective. He frames this experience as “very rare” within the autistic 
community, claiming that autistic students “really harp on their negative traits” and “don’t focus 
on the positive aspects of what the autistic brain can do.” Statements like this suggest that the 
responsibility lies with autistic students to appropriately interpret and act on their diagnosis or 
otherwise risk failure or marginalization. Mike portrays the “autistic brain” as exceptional, 
explaining that it “has immense dedication, skill, work ethic.” It is “rare” and “coveted” in the 
finance industry, which benefits from employees who are “very analytical, willing to, to sit at a 
computer for twelve hours in a day, go over figures, go over stock charts.” Here, he is framing 
his diagnosis as proof to outsiders that his brain has certain exceptional traits that will make him 
a highly sought-after employee. A diagnosis in this context acts as a kind of shorthand for 
desirable abilities. In spite of his emphasis on confidence, I read a little bit of uncertainty in 
Mike’s words. He is “really hoping” that his goal “pans out in the coming years.” That hope is 
evident throughout our conversations and is a response to the kairotic uncertainty of many of 
Mike’s goals.  
When it comes to his family, Mike plans to keep his diagnosis a secret. Mike claims that 
he doesn’t know “anybody else” with an autism diagnosis, though he does suspect that his dad is 
on the spectrum:  
P: Do you have any other friends who have Asperger’s syndrome?  
M: Well, I would assume my dad has it, just genetically, but. I mean, I haven’t 
told my parents that I’m autistic. 
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P: Why did you decide to not share that with them?  
M: Because my dad will deduce that he’s autistic. It’s genetic; he has a computer 
to learn. I don’t want to be the one to tell my dad that he’s been autistic his entire 
life. Don’t put that on me.  
This particular personal detail sets Mike apart from my other participants, the majority of whom 
live at home and rely heavily on their parents as advocates. Mike doesn’t want to tell his father 
about his diagnosis, because “it’s genetic” and his father “has a computer to learn.” Mike 
believes that if his dad discovers his diagnosis, he will connect the dots, so to speak, and 
potentially realize that he, too, is on the spectrum. For Mike, revealing to his dad that he too 
might be autistic would be crushing news. He doesn’t want the pressure that he feels would come 
with having to share such upsetting information. For Mike, his diagnosis is best kept a secret in 
order to preserve close family relationships and avoid disturbing his father’s sense of self. In this 
disclosure scenario, Mike makes a rhetorical choice to withhold information in order to manage 
the comfort and emotional well being of his audience. This is a significant display of empathy, 
since Mike’s understanding of his father’s sensitivities and sense of self is the reason why he 
withholds the news of his diagnosis. This is in stark contrast to my other participants, and even to 
Mike himself, all of whom have claimed that having an official diagnosis has helped them to 
better understand themselves. The perspective Mike expresses here contrasts with his frequent 
claims that his diagnosis makes him more confident and will prove key to his future career 
success. It was a quieter moment in our conversation, and it only came up once, but I think the 
contradiction he performs here is important.  
 While Mike claims that he will never request classroom accommodations, and plans to 
never tell his family about his diagnosis, he does plan to disclose his diagnosis when he goes on 
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the job market in order to take advantage of federal mandates to hire more employees with 
disabilities. He explains:  
M: Um, one of the main reasons that I enjoy being autistic, I don’t know if I’m 
saying that right, but uh, there are a tremendous amount of job opportunities for 
people with disabilities. Federal sector, corporate level. It’s because diversity and 
inclusion is something they predicate pretty heavily. And um, obviously with 
autism I qualify with having a disability. So um, there are far more apps to hire 
people, so when I think of job prospects I think, given my talents, past 
experiences, and my disability, that I, I probably could get fortune 50 employment 
fairly easily. Maybe not in finance because I don’t have the educational 
background to suffice but, uh, just regular corporate or anything. And I’m 
meeting with a few people in career services—and the sentiment is shared among 
them that the sky is pretty much the limit. You know, I’m kind of an outlier in 
terms of the autistic spectrum, and my past work experience. You know, really 
qualified, competent employee. And— 
P: So do you disclose that you have autism? 
M: I never have before.  
P: Okay. But are you planning to when you go on the job market?  
M: Um, for, for my initial job search, I will, based on, on being hired as a Series 
A employee. Which means I have a disability.  
Timing is everything for Mike, it seems. When he enters the job market, he plans to claim his 
status as a Series A employee in order to access a “really lucrative track” to employment. For 
Mike, though, it’s not just about finding work opportunities based on having a recognized 
	111	
disability. He says, “I’m kind of an outlier in terms of the autistic spectrum, and my past work 
experience.” It’s that he both has a recognized disability and “past work experience”; this work 
experience, along with his educational achievements, demonstrate that he is “really qualified” 
and “competent.” Mike’s disability status here is predicated on his own positioning as “kind of 
an outlier.” He is both unlike normal applicants because of his Series A status, and unlike other 
Series A applicants because of his work experience and educational accomplishments, most of 
which are likely related to him passing as neurotypical, or at least declining standard 
accommodations. Mike believes that timing his disclosure in this manner allows him to 
appropriately claim disability while maintaining a competitive edge with neurotypical applicants. 
In addition to claiming status as a Series A employee, Mike explains that for someone with a 
disability, there is a path to prestigious jobs through a number of different consulting firms that 
seek out “lead disability talent.” Mike says these firms have access to internships in “very, very 
nice places,” and that they will “assess you and look at your competency and then place you 
appropriately.” He paints a portrait of job market utopia, a rewarding world of abundance and 
recognition.  
 In addition to seeking out these resources for obtaining employment, Mike tells me he 
has several mentors, or “a cabinet, I should say.” He communicates with them frequently, via e-
mail, where they discuss both his “aspirations” and “how to assimilate into work environments.” 
Here, Mike suggests that his mentors offer prescriptive advice for working with neurotypicals. 
Mike’s mentors are acting as normative informants, spelling out the unwritten rules that govern 
business transactions:  
P: What do you mean ‘how to assimilate’? 
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M: Well, I mean how to make it in business. Business is a game that, you have to 
schmooze, you have to ask people how they're doing, find a common interest. 
Essentially get past 'How are you?' Be friendly. And for me that's something I'm 
not very apt to, so I, and specifically in my healthcare internship, I make it a, a 
predication to ask people about things that I know about them on a personal level. 
Be friendly, just trying to work on that skill.  
P: So you're learning about social relationships.  
M: You could say that. I would say 'how to schmooze and get ahead.' Which is 
probably more relevant. I think I'm pretty good at schmoozing now. It's an 
acquired skill, that fake smile, and that, the laugh, oh yeah. And I say this 
because, you know, this is who I really am. I'm just a weird robot-talking autistic 
kid, but.  
From his mentors, Mike has learned the social function of lying. He knows that “that fake smile” 
and “the laugh” are embodied performances of “schmoozing,” and that some of the unwritten 
rules of conducting successful business relationships are to “find a common interest” and “ask 
people how they’re doing.” These are neurotypical commonplaces, and he is learning to perform 
them in order to get what he wants. After Mike shares in more detail how his mentors are 
framing interactions in the business world – as a kind of game – I offer a paraphrase of his 
response for clarification: “So you’re learning about social relationships.” Interestingly, he 
acknowledges and then rephrases my response in a cynically humorous manner, saying “I would 
say ‘how to schmooze and get ahead,’” and then identifies this rephrasing as “more relevant.” 
This renaming  -- from “learning about social relationships” to “how to schmooze and get ahead” 
– revises my original phrase by invoking ulterior motives, specifically the desire to “get ahead” 
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rather than learning for self-edifying purposes. He understands that the end goal is not merely to 
get along with neurotypicals, to make interactions as comfortable for them as possible. Mike 
insists that it is “more relevant” to name this performance in a way that calls attention to the 
gains and advantages he stands to make through strategic lying. 
 
Conclusion  
Mike’s pursuit of non-standard accommodations is a radical act of self-advocacy and a 
demonstration of his ability to discern appropriate opportunities to get the help he actually wants 
while protecting himself from unwanted attention or stigmas that tend to accompany standard 
accommodations in the classroom. Throughout our conversations, it was clear that Mike sees this 
rhetorical work as enabling him to construct an autistic future that is successful, not tragic.7 He 
carefully manages his disclosures of autism as part of his larger goal to achieve mainstream 
success, and in doing so he avoids stigma and claims autism as an asset. This claiming of autism 
involves some skillful rhetorical maneuvering, and can be understood as a radical act of self-
advocacy in the face of normative expectations. Normative expectations are a heavy burden on 
the rhetorical performance of disability disclosure. These expectations squeeze neurodivergent 
rhetors into narrow, paradoxical positions like those that Mike describes. However, I suggest that 
evidence of self-advocacy like this already exists in all of our classrooms, and future research 
should consider more fully when, where, and how students like Mike are navigating these 
spaces, and how their attempts at self-advocacy are supported or limited by mainstream best 
																																																								
7 I’d like to briefly acknowledge here that Mike’s perspective on disability could be interpreted 
as uncritical of the discourses that function to marginalize people with disabilities. This I argue is 
less a character fault of Mike’s than it is evidence of a gap between activist, disability-positive 
vocabularies and many people with disabilities who don’t have access to those vocabularies.  
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practices. For example, what would it look like to avoid measuring the success of neurodivergent 
rhetors by their approximation of normalcy?  
Finally, Mike’s experiences demonstrate Melanie Yergeau’s point that our handling of 
rhetorical concepts -- like kairos -- consolidate notions of rhetorical ability in part through the 
production of disability. Kairos is not a neutral concept, and conventional readings of kairos are 
in part an exclusionary practice that contribute to the marginalization of diverse rhetors. Jurecic 
argues that the rise in students with Asperger syndrome and autism in college classrooms 
challenges composition and rhetoric scholars to consider what it means to accommodate and 
respect neurological difference in the writing classroom, suggesting that “conventional narratives 
of learning” might not be effective (423). She offers that writing “will be a particular challenge 
for students on the spectrum” because they lack a “theory of mind,” or the ability to understand 
and predict how another person (mind) might behave or react (426). What Jurecic8 misses is that 
Theory of Mind is part of the “conventional narratives of learning” that she implores instructors 
to move beyond. Many of these conventional narratives of learning consolidate notions of ability 
solely through the production of disability, and are complicit in the unnecessary marginalization 
of neurodivergent students. In a 2011 article in College English, Melanie Yergeau and Paul 
Heilker take a more disability positive approach, suggesting that autism is its own rhetoric, and 
autistics are minority rhetors (487). We are thus “beholden to respond…with cultural sensitivity, 
ethical care, and pedagogical complexity” (487). Understanding autistics as minority rhetors 
requires abandoning the deficit framework so often used to position autistics as rhetorically 
unable. I follow this call to abandon deficit frameworks in Chapter Four, which highlights the 
experiences of two students who struggle considerably with writing for an academic audience. 
																																																								
8 Jurecic’s article has been thoughtfully critiqued in a more in-depth way within disability 
studies, most notably by Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, Jay Dolmage, Paul Heilker.   
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Addressing this population of rhetors solely in terms of deficits or difficulties, even if well 
intentioned, is a failure to recognize the rhetorical skills they practice every day. Understanding 
autism as a rhetoric also calls into question most educational interventions on behalf of autistic 
students that aim to help them be as normal as possible. Truly accommodating neurodivergent 
students would challenge tendencies to measure the success of these students by their 




Chapter Four: Imagining Audiences: How Autistic Students Rhetorically Negotiate the 
Normative Constraints of the Writing Classroom 
 
 
The field of composition and rhetoric has always concerned itself with understanding how 
considerations of audience influence a writer’s choices. Much of the field’s writing pedagogy 
draws upon classical rhetorical principles, including those of Aristotelian rhetoric, which features 
audience analysis as central to effective rhetorical practice. What Aristotle believed, and what 
the field has endorsed, is that a successful orator draws upon his knowledge of his audience as a 
rhetorical resource, and that a successful rhetorical performance is one in which the audience is 
convinced or persuaded to adopt the orator’s message. While the field is in virtually unanimous 
agreement that audience matters for all writers, including students, scholars have grappled with 
how best to think about audience conceptually and teach it to student writers entering the 
university. Audience is often portrayed as a “problem” for the composition classroom itself, 
given the unique constraints of the classroom and its role as a space for simulating other 
environments. Who is the audience for student writing, particularly in the first-year composition 
classroom? Should students think of their audience as solely the instructor, or a wider group of 
readers? What are the salient characteristics and priorities of this wider group of readers? When 
students write, do they address a “real” audience, or do they conjure their readers? These 
questions and more have animated pedagogical scholarship in composition and rhetoric for 
decades.  
What has emerged from those conversations is an enduring interest in understanding the 
audience for student writers as fictionalized. This is perhaps best captured by David 
Bartholomae’s foundational 1986 piece, “Inventing the University,” which, among other things, 
claims that “every time a student sits down to write for us, he has to invent the university for the 
	117	
occasion” (604). Bartholomae claims that this act of invention requires student writers to inhabit 
an “elaborate” but “necessary” and “enabling” fiction, one in which they must enact a kind of 
insider status and convincingly feign membership. This conceptualization of audience – as 
fiction, as invented by the student – offered a way of thinking about the first-year composition 
classroom that legitimized it as a space for developing significant writing skills and satisfied 
skeptics who questioned whether students actually wrote for anyone besides their instructors. It 
has become the rubric by which students succeed or fail at college-level writing. In this chapter I 
focus on what the legacy of audience as fiction has meant for the field’s understanding of the 
able or good writer, and how neurodiverse students have experienced this concept. What if 
“inventing the university” is neither “necessary” nor “enabling” for any student writers, 
including those who identify as non-neurotypical?  
In Chapter 3, I explored Mike’s autism disclosure practices, including how he passed as 
neurotypical in the classroom to avoid stigma while disclosing in job applications to take 
advantage of federal hiring mandates. While Mike devoted considerable time and energy to 
learning normative business behaviors, passing as neurotypical in class was simpler because he 
didn’t need considerable help with writing. In this chapter, I foreground the perspectives of two 
autistic students who struggle to access academic writing. Both Sam and Toby demonstrate 
considerable rhetorical awareness of the expectations of their writing instructors and peers, yet 
spoke to me of their immense frustrations with college writing. Sam scored a perfect score on the 
written portion of the ACT and tested out of first-year composition, yet revealed to me that he 
had failed out of every college course thus far that had required substantial writing. Toby was a 
fifth-year student who delayed his graduation and had to work with his advisor to design a 
custom major to avoid courses that required academic essays. Both Sam and Toby claim to have 
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“given up” on college composition, yet they embrace other forms of composing – computer 
coding for Sam; lyrics and creative writing for Toby – and, with the exception of writing, are 
otherwise high-achieving students. My conversations with Sam and Toby often circled back to 
how they approached audience as writers, and the obstacles they faced in writing for an academic 
audience. I argue that their frustrations with audience analysis in academic writing should not be 
understood as evidence that autistic students require disability accommodations in the writing 
classroom; rather, Sam and Toby demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of audience 
expectations, and their experiences show how the fundamental premises behind audience as 
fiction are flawed. Through a lens of neurodiversity, Bartholomae’s “enabling fiction” becomes a 
disabling mixed message wherein students must invent a fictional audience in order to become 
real writers – writers who write for a world beyond their instructor or their classroom, who can 
claim membership within the university, who possess “intellectually significant writing skills” 
(Flower).  
My participants’ stories highlight significant gaps in understanding between composition 
instructors and non-neurotypical students, and illustrate how our own best practices fail to enable 
all students. Sam’s journey from testing out of first-year composition to failing out of other 
writing courses suggests that our metrics for gauging student need for writing instruction are not 
robust enough to serve non-neurotypical students. Sam and Toby also choose not to openly 
disclose their diagnosis in the classroom, a major challenge to current approaches to classroom 
accommodation, which are predicated on disability disclosure. Based on these common practices 
– ACT score placement and accommodation predicated on disability – students like Sam and 
Toby often don’t even enter our classrooms, or if they do, they don’t get the accommodations 
they need. As I argue in Chapter 2, as a field we have tended to try to reach “basic” or otherwise 
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underrepresented writers by focusing on diagnosing student learning deficiencies (including 
causation) and intervening with rehabilitative pedagogy. Here, following a disability studies 
perspective, I shift the focus to our practices and scholarship, with the intent to complicate our 
tradition of advocacy and trace the contours of normativity as it informs our work and the lenses 
through which we view our students.  
In this chapter, I call for the field to drastically revise how it recognizes, labels, and 
supports neurological difference in the writing classroom, including the tendency to pathologize 
writers who demonstrate learning and writing processes that are different. Such pathologizing 
distorts our understanding of the strengths and needs of students like Sam, and obscures the 
contours of normativity as it functions through our scholarship and long held best practices. 
Evidence of such normativity can be found in the field’s tight association between understanding 
audience as fiction and demonstrating “intellectually significant” writing skills. First, I briefly 
review the historical genealogy of audience analysis and awareness in composition studies, with 
an emphasis on its role in the acquisition of writing competency in college. The legacy of 
foundational conceptualizations of audience – most notably that of “audience as invented” or 
“audience as fiction” – has functioned in part to limit possibilities for neurodiverse writers and 
learners by associating “intellectually significant” writing skills with a particular kind of pro-
social (Yergeau) rhetorical performance. Bartholomae describes inventing the university as an 
“elaborate” but “a necessary and enabling fiction.” He is right that such a practice of 
fictionalizing one’s membership within an invented university is “elaborate,” though I want to 
call into question his other two descriptors: “necessary” and “enabling.” Next, I suggest that 
through the eyes of my participants such a fiction is neither. Rather than view Sam and Toby’s 
frustrations with audience as evidence of autistic learning deficits, or understand their 
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experiences as limited to neurodiverse students, I argue that their perspectives demonstrate the 
limitations of the current mainstream model of audience for all students. In their discussions of 
academic writing frustrations, Sam and Toby follow audience as fiction to its logical extreme, 
uncovering its more problematic and untenable expectations for all student writers in the 
university.  
 
The Problem of Audience  
Writing on neurodiversity and traditional rhetorical practice, Melanie Yergeau claims that 
rhetoricians “cherish and adore…uplifting those bodies which deftly perform as pro-social, 
effectual bodies” (76). With the term “pro-social,” Yergeau indexes bodily values that favor 
those who actively promote and prioritize sociality, group association, and cooperation. While 
these values on their own aren’t inherently problematic, one consequence of the “uplifting” 
Yergeau describes is that pro-sociality becomes interchangeable with effective rhetorical 
practice, and the range of rhetorical performances that might be considered effective narrows. 
Rhetors who fail to perform pro-sociality are excluded from the rhetorical tradition – or worse, 
used to demarcate the boundaries of rhetorical ability – while the bodily values informing 
rhetoric’s “pro-social” orientation go unquestioned. In fact, the rhetorical tradition has never 
been neutral about which bodies it uplifts and which bodies it denies (Dolmage; Yergeau).  
In this section, I look for evidence of the “pro-social” in the field’s approach to 
understanding, studying, and teaching audience in the college writing classroom. As a field, 
composition and rhetoric has always paid careful attention to the role of audience analysis in the 
composing process, tracing the roots of this analysis back to the philosophical pillars of classical 
Aristotelian rhetorical practice.  Throughout the 1970s and 80s, though, our pedagogical 
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attention turned to new understandings of audience as fictionalized or invented by the student-
writer, and this turn toward fictionalization has had consequences for neurodiverse learners and 
writers. I argue that conceptualizing audience as fiction problematically assumes a pro-social 
orientation to writing and rhetorical practice.  While, as a field, we have upheld audience as 
fiction as optimal for guiding students in crafting effective prose, we have obscured the 
normative and pro-social values that inform such a stance, thereby excluding those who cannot 
or do not buy the fiction we’re selling. Only by understanding the normative and ableist stances 
that inform our audience pedagogy can we begin to retool our approach to allow neurodiverse 
learning and writing practices to flourish. As mentioned earlier, what I intend for this Chapter to 
accomplish is a shift in perspective for writing instructors, from applying a pedagogy of 
diagnosis and rehabilitation – outlined in Chapter 2 – to seeing our own practices and beliefs 
through the lens of neurodiversity. What this Chapter offers is an exercise in the field looking at 
itself through the eyes of students like my participants.  
Audience in the college writing classroom – given its separation from other university 
spaces and from public spaces, and limited immediate readership – has long been a problem in 
the eyes of composition instructors and scholars. In an issue of College Composition and 
Communication from 1965, Donald Stewart identifies “providing the student an audience” as a 
“fundamental problem within composition courses.” The problem itself is one of fictionality, or a 
lack of “any very real or discernible connection with life outside…[the student’s] college 
environment” (35). Stewart claims that the audience “we provide the student with” is ultimately 
“hypothetical”; it is a fiction that writing instructors contrive for students in the classroom. One 
enduring theme from Stewart’s work is the idea that the writing classroom does not offer 
students a naturally occurring or inherent audience, outside of the instructor as an evaluator. 
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Instructors who wish for students to gain competence in writing for diverse audiences must 
instead make up or otherwise “provide” students with such audiences. Stewart’s problem 
statement introduced the concept of the hypothetical audience, which set in motion decades of 
scholarship in composition that ultimately mobilized behind a refined concept of audience as 
fiction.  
Initially, however, audience analysis was tied to an understanding of audience as 
fundamentally real. Earlier dominant conceptualizations of audience were derived from classical 
rhetoric (Park; Ede), in which audiences were not hypothetical but real (Ong). Audience was 
conceived of a collective of people witnessing an orator’s speech. Their embodied presence 
demanded the attention of the orator, whose own body, voice, and movements would be 
calibrated in real time to enhance the conditions for persuasion. Ede writes that Aristotle’s 
conception of audience was “based upon common sense or stereotypic knowledge,” and was 
“essentially pragmatic” (“Audience” 144). The idea was that a successful orator would “analyze 
the character” of his audience, taking into account their age, relative wealth, and other 
demographic “stereotypic” details. This particular method of audience analysis was once 
considered to be an indispensable component of effective rhetorical practice.  
 What led scholars and instructors away from such an understanding of audience were a) 
emerging disciplinary conversations about the differences inherent in writing versus speaking, 
and b) a growing distaste for and distrust of stereotype. In his landmark 1975 piece, “The 
Writer’s Audience is Always a Fiction,” Walter Ong points out that this understanding of 
audience analysis is grounded in a tradition of orality, and argues that it does not adequately 
capture how audience works in writing. Ong suggests that the audience for writing is removed, 
and thus not real in the same way. Because of this removed characteristic, writers must invent 
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their audience when they sit down to write – they must imagine them and inhabit their mindset. 
Composition scholars like Russell Long adopted this idea for teaching writing, arguing that 
writing instructors should treat audience not as a pre-existing entity to be analyzed, but as an 
entity to be invented by the writer in the act of writing. One of Long’s main objections to 
previous understandings of audience analysis was their reliance on “stereotyping,” or reducing 
an audience to certain broad traits and reductive characteristics. For Long, stereotypes are 
harmful and should not be at the core of written rhetorical practice for moral reasons. Imagining 
or inventing a fictional audience offered a way around this distasteful practice. It’s worth 
mentioning here that the imagined student writer in these conversations is almost certainly 
assumed to be neurotypical, while still struggling to write effectively for different audience in the 
college composition classroom. Struggling with audience was not considered to be abnormal or a 
sign of particular learning deficits – rather, it was understood as an attribute of the average 
student writer making the leap to academic writing.   
 Other scholars in composition studies countered that audience as invented fiction went a 
step too far. Minot, in his 1981 response to Long, insists that there are still “actual readers” of 
writing, and that this “real” audience did require some “generalization,” despite the fact that 
others critiqued this as stereotyping or “putting the audience before the message.” In a 1982 
review of two composition textbooks’ treatment of audience, Patricia Bizzell prioritizes material 
relations between instructor and student over pretending or fictionalizing processes. In her 
review, Bizzell points out that the professor “is almost always the sole reader of the research 
paper” (200), and critiques the two composition textbooks for ignoring this basic truth and 
having students pretend otherwise (201). The compromise that got ironed out in this scholarly 
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exchange between Ong, Long, and Minot suggested that writers must both analyze and invent 
audiences when they write.  
 Scholars like Long, Minot, and Bizzell kicked off a decade of composition scholarship 
that attempted to better understand the nature of audience analysis in the writing classroom 
(Berkenkotter; Ede; Park; Black; Berke; Roth; Flower and Hayes; Elbow; Roen; Rafoth). Similar 
to scholarship from that time on basic writing and writers – covered extensively in Chapter 2 – 
audience analysis scholarship emphasized employing interdisciplinary research methods 
(including protocol analysis) and theoretical frameworks to construct one-off studies 
investigating big questions about audience, as outlined by Ede:  
To whom are we referring when we ask our students to analyze their audience? 
Are we alluding to real people or to the intended audience as defined and created 
by the author and implied by the text? What is the relationship – surely, a 
dynamic one – of audience to other elements in a rhetorical situation, such as 
genre or occasion of publication. Are there essential differences between the 
audience of a speech and that of a written discourse? (Ede 144)9 
As I argued in Chapter 2, approaches to diagnosing and rehabilitating writing process 
deficiencies in composition scholarship from the 1970s and 80s  – including for blocked writers 
or basic writers, both groups of “struggling” writers that were otherwise considered neurotypical 
– established an orientation of the writing scholar and instructor as expert diagnostician, and the 
student or his or her writing habits as diagnostic material. Much like that scholarship, audience 
analysis scholarship focused on whether or not students could perform effective audience 
																																																								
9 Despite modest gains in insight and field-wide consensus, I argue that the answers to these 
questions continue to elude composition scholars and instructors.  
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analysis, and how to best help them do so, thereby obscuring the normative values that 
established such a focus in the first place. Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford argue that “an enriched 
conception of audience” helps us to “better understand the complex act we call composing,” (93) 
and the preferred method of accessing that complex act was to design studies that centered 
students and student writing.  
 While the complexity of composing certainly makes demands on the student, who must 
“both analyze and invent an audience,” (86) projects like these begin from hidden normative 
assumptions about good or able writers and uncritically apply those assumptions to a population 
of students. In her 1981 article, “Understanding a Writer’s Awareness of Audience,” Carol 
Berkenkotter conducts a protocol analysis of “experienced” writers in order to understand how 
particular types of rhetorical training could “affect a writer’s sense of audience” (3). 
Berkenkotter contrasts expert writing with writing that is “topic-bound,” or with writers who 
“could not think beyond the content of their essays” (1). She also links expert writing with 
“cognitive maturation,” citing Scardemalia et al and Koll, who found that such maturation is 
characterized by the “ability of the writer to “decenter” from his or her own perceptions of 
reality”: 
Kroll concluded that "the crucial factors in an investigation of audience awareness 
are not the salient characteristics of audiences, but the constructive processes 
operative in the mind of the writer." He calls for "further research efforts aimed at 
identifying the specific cognitive correlates of audience awareness” (3). 
Berkenkotter makes several significant links here. First, she equates good writing, or 
“experienced” writing, with “cognitive maturation,” thus linking good writing with a particular 
stage of cognitive development. She then implies that this stage of cognitive maturation can best 
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be gauged by paying attention to the particulars of the “internal representation or mental sketch a 
writer makes of the audience” during the writing process. Finally, she links cognitive maturity to 
the demonstration of a particular ability – the ability to “decenter” from “one’s own perceptions” 
– which just so happens to emphasize and reify pro-social values. We see pro-sociality in the 
equating of the ability to “decenter” from one’s “own perceptions of reality” with cognitively 
mature, skilled writing.10  
Linda Flower proposes the concept of writer-based prose as a way of explaining “some of 
the most common and pervasive problems in academic and professional writing” (19). Writer-
based prose is characterized by an obvious prioritizing of the writer, resulting in a kind of private 
writing style that might alienate or confuse readers, or otherwise be indifferent to their needs and 
expectations. Reader-based prose, however, invites outside readers into the text, and 
demonstrates evidence that the writer had an audience “in mind” when crafting his or her text. 
Here, the affinity of reader-based prose with the “pro-sociality” Yergeau mentions is hard to 
ignore, and it even suggests that the work of the pro-sociality Yergeau describes extends to how 
we conceive of the construction of audience.  For Flower, an inability (note the reference to 
ability) to move from writer-based to reader-based prose is what holds basic writers back and 
even suggests underlying cognitive deficiences. “Transforming writer-based prose,” she argues, 
“is…not only a necessary procedure for all writers at times, but a useful place to start teaching 
intellectually significant writing skills” (34). Read through a lens of neurodiversity, such a 
statement unequivocally and irresponsibly equates sociality with intellect. Additionally, Flower’s 
emphasis on reader-based prose as a cognitive feat of the writer – and not pertaining to a “real” 
or material audience, à la Bizzell and Minot – links sociality and intellect with the concept of 
																																																								
10 Upon closer reading, the decentering process described here seems to ask writers to depart 
from their own reality or even suspend rational thought, which is quite an interesting proposition. 
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audience as fiction, thereby reinforcing a normative understanding of what good writing 
performs and how it is produced. “[I]ntellectually significant writing skills” are understood as a 
kind of intuitive pro-sociality, and writers who fail to meet this standard are in need of 
pedagogical intervention and rehabilitation. These linkages are significant because they run the 
risk of reducing the intellectual work of academic writing to a savvy wink at a fictionalized 
academic readership, the written version of smiling at the right time, moves that perform insider 
status and knowing.   
This obscuring of normative values that determine how we assess effective student 
writing (and writers) is perhaps most salient in David Bartholomae’s now-canonical piece 
“Inventing the University,” which offered a take on audience analysis that would go on to enjoy 
enduring success and largely positive reception across composition studies. In 1986, 
Bartholomae joined the conversation on audience, insisting that “every time a student sits down 
to write for us, he has to invent the university for the occasion” (604). Bartholomae frames the 
task of writing at the college level as one of appropriating “a specialized discourse” and doing so 
“as though he [the student] were easily and comfortably one with his audience” (606). It is this 
piece of Bartholomae’s argument – the “easily and comfortably one” part – that merits a closer 
look through the lens of neurodiversity. Bartholomae sets the bar for effective academic writing 
with terms that invoke a vague sense of effortlessness and “pro-social” orientation. He does 
further clarify these terms as referring to a kind of membership within the academy, as “though 
he [the student] were a member of the academy or an historian or an anthropologist or an 
economist” (606). Effective writing, it seems, is ultimately about fitting in, belonging to a social 
group within the academy and employing one’s resources as a writer to index that membership. 
To achieve this membership, Bartholomae argues that “there is an elaborate but…a necessary 
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and enabling fiction at work…as the student dramatizes his experience in…the setting required 
by the discourse – where he can speak to us as a companion” (607). To support this argument, he 
analyzes samples of student writing – some more successful, some less – to point out moments 
where that “fiction is broken,” where the student-writer betrays his or her utter lack of 
membership within the academy.  
What Bartholomae is doing here resonates with Yergeau’s comment on how rhetoricians 
go looking for “pro-social, effectual bodies.” Bartholomae purports to be a neutral observer of a 
larger phenomenon – that the university is invented by students when they write – when in fact 
he is performing a normative and exclusionary reading of students and their writing. He has gone 
looking for student work that successfully establishes a kind of fictional membership within the 
academy and then “uplifted” it (to borrow Yergeau’s term) as an example of what strong, 
successful writers do and what struggling writers fail to achieve.  The particular writing moves 
that Bartholomae uses to set the terms for membership within the academy emphasize 
appropriate and savvy socializing, the subtle nods that show that a writer fits in, gets it, belongs 
within the university.   
To clarify, I don’t think the error lies in any one particular conceptualization of audience. 
Where I think we go astray is in our insistence on finding the one best way to think about 
audience, and the narrow range of student performances that we recognize as effective. I wonder:  
• Why is it necessary to always think of audience as fiction, student as inventor?  
• What happens when students do not buy the fiction we are selling?   
• How is this fiction “enabling” for the non-neurotypical writer, who may never 
feel “comfortably one” with an audience of neurotypicals, or for whom writing in 
the academy is anything but effortless?  
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Inherent in the arguments put forth by Ede and Lunsford, Flowers, or Bartholomae is a core set 
of values and assumptions about how normal or able students should learn and write. Because 
these values and assumptions are obscured, or go unquestioned, the field’s scholarship 
contributes to a tendency to read students as disabled or deficient when they do not meet those 
normative standards. What I call for in this chapter is a healthy skepticism of the expertise we 
attribute to ourselves as researchers and instructors of composition, and a willingness to question 
how we arrive at some of the labels – good writer, effective writing – we take for granted. 
 
Sam 
Sam, nineteen years old at the time of our first interview, was a sophomore majoring in computer 
science. Labeled a “gifted” student for as long as he could remember, Sam – who was diagnosed 
with Asperger syndrome as a teenager – attended a competitive-admission high school and 
scored a perfect 36 on the writing section of the ACT, and was later accepted to a competitive 
computer science program for college. Sam first taught himself to code in middle school; he is 
full of insight on composing for the computer, including the unique affordances and limitations 
of each programming language. Yet, when the topic of writing essays came up in our interviews, 
Sam expressed an unambiguously negative opinion of writing, comparing it to various 
sensorially painful forms of torture – “like having your eyeballs extracted with a spoon.”  
Sam recalled struggling to write in high school, and described how his dad would 
intervene to help him finish papers.  “I remember at one point,” he recalled, “my dad forced me 
to sit there and ramble about a topic and then he would just write down everything I said about 
whatever I was supposed to write about…and then I turned that in as an essay.” Sam says he 
“somehow magically got a B” on the essay, “mostly because the teacher felt sorry for me I 
	130	
think.” Sam revealed in our first interview that, despite being exempt from first-year composition 
due to his high ACT score, he had failed every college course thus far that had required 
substantial writing. Only three semesters in, Sam had growing concerns about graduating on time 
and was preoccupied with choosing courses that wouldn’t require him to write major papers. 
Sam believed his hatred of writing was largely due to the immense effort it took to write for an 
audience of his peers and writing instructors. While it would be tempting to interpret Sam’s 
frustrations with audience as evidence of his mindblindness, or inability to intuit the expectations 
of peers and instructors, A disability studies approach to understanding Sam’s frustrations with 
writing would avoid emphasizing Sam’s personal deficiencies, and instead interpret what his 
experiences tell us about the disabling effects of composition pedagogy and scholarship. In this 
section I offer an alternative interpretation of frustrations like those Sam describes in light of 
canonical scholarship on audience in composition studies, which I argue enforces a compulsory 
pro-sociality informed by normative understandings of how “expert” writers conceive of 
audience when they write.  
Sam’s frustrations with writing stem from the amount of time and effort required of him 
to anticipate and accommodate his neurotypical audience’s expectations. He describes these 
efforts using a digital-era metaphor: that of having to “manually process” a large amount of data. 
Doing so highlights the inefficiency of the work Sam must undertake each time he sets out to 
write. What Sam finds so inefficient about writing is the need for him to write “for everyone who 
could possibly ever read” his work:  
I have to process everything manually for everyone. Um, if I’m writing a paper 
and I don’t know who is going to read it I have to write for everyone who could 
possibly ever read it. And I have to think about their perspectives, and constantly 
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evaluate and put, word it the best way, and it’s really hard. If I know that exactly 
one person is going to read it and I know the person well, it’s as easy as talking to 
them. If I write it to one person but I don’t know them very well I have to write 
for every person they could possibly be. Which is still easier than writing it for 
every person that anyone could possibly be. And that’s why it goes so terribly 
slowly, and sometimes doesn’t happen at all. Because it’s often impossible to 
write something that everyone will appreciate.  
The possibilities that Sam feels compelled to consider when thinking about his audience are 
nearly limitless. He understands the task not as inventing the university, but the universe – the 
inventional demands placed upon him as a student writer thus become prohibitively broad and 
complicated. Sam understands that strong writing must “think about [the]…perspectives” of the 
audience, and strong writers must consider the types of messages that their audience will 
“appreciate.” Such expectations, I argue, fit with writing instructors’ understanding of the work 
required to produce strong writing. However, where Sam’s experiences diverge is his struggle to 
sort out non-audience members from audience members, and to comprehensively imagine (or 
invent) the sheer diversity of the different people who might be reading his work. “I have to 
write,” he explains, “for everyone who could possibly ever read it…If I write it to one person…I 
have to write for every person they could possibly be.” Sam describes this task as “often 
impossible,” since he understands how unlikely it is that he will craft a message that “everyone 
will appreciate.” What is significant here is that this happens only when Sam doesn’t know “who 
is going to read” his paper. When the audience for his work is vague, and he is left to simply 
imagine or invent an audience for his work, Sam experiences major frustrations with narrowing 
down or comfortably reducing an imagined audience. I argue that this cannot be explained away 
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as an autistic deficit, or evidence of Sam’s “mindblindness”; rather, it is evidence that Sam 
understands (perhaps more than neurotypical students) just how hard it is to persuade effectively 
when the audience to be persuaded is poorly defined or imaginary. What he demonstrates here is 
the logical extreme of a premise like that of “Inventing the University,” which is that we are 
asking students to attempt the impossible, and burdening them with a contradiction: that to be a 
real writer – or a cognitively mature writer, or a writer with “intellectually significant” skills – 
one must invent one’s readers. Sam contrasts this with his process for writing for someone he 
knows well – in that case, “it’s as easy as talking to them.” Sam’s frustrations with audience are 
clearly limited to conceptualizations of fictional audiences, particularly the vague audience 
students are tasked with imagining when they write academic essays.  
While academic writing presents many challenges, Sam turns to computer coding as a 
type of composing that feels more intuitive for him. From elementary school through high 
school, Sam basically taught himself Java, JavaScript, C++, PhP, and Python. He tested out of 
the intro-level coding course required in his major. When asked to compare coding to writing, 
Sam describes says coding is writing, except that “all the hard things about writing have been 
taken out.” He describes the process of writing for a computer to be “super easy” because he 
knows “exactly who the computer is”: 
Uh, the computer just follows the instructions you give it. Um, if it doesn’t like 
the instructions it will tell you, and it doesn’t get angry if you get it wrong 
repeatedly because it doesn’t…do that. And it’s right there. You can send it to the 
computer and it says no, try to fix it, still says no, um, it’s very, very specific. Not 
a lot to process on my end, I can, um, devote all my thinking to just the writing, as 
opposed to interpreting the reader. Because the reader is so dead simple.  
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Writing for the computer means less time: Sam has less “to process” when “interpreting the 
reader,” and the computer delivers instant, judgment-free feedback that he can rely on as a 
corrective to bad code. The computer, he says, is “dead simple” because it communicates clearly 
– “if it doesn’t like the directions it will tell you, and it doesn’t get angry if you get it wrong 
repeatedly” – and is “right there,” immediate to the writer and offering instant feedback as the 
composing process unfolds. Here I’d like to highlight Sam’s construction of the teacher, as a 
figure who “gets angry” with his or her students for getting things wrong “repeatedly.”  This says 
a lot about the experiences struggling writers may have with their writing instructors, and 
portrays teachers very differently than most pedagogical scholarship: more emotional, more 
mercurial, less patient and benevolent. In this depiction, the teacher is just as frustrated as the 
student may be, and is betraying the fiction of the neutral instructor who merely acts as a conduit 
for the expectations of the larger university. It brings to mind the manner in which a lot of 
composition and rhetoric scholarship analyzes student writing, pointing out endlessly where and 
how students aren’t getting it right. What Sam sees as truly neutral, or significantly more neutral, 
is the computer. This sort of machine presence lies in contrast to both the remote, imaginary 
audience member and the mercurial teacher Sam describes in previous excerpts. The computer is 
close, engaged, and real. This description of the computer as more present than an imagined 
human audience challenges common understandings of audience, or the tendency to assume that 
writers will always find it easier, or more effective from a learning standpoint, to write to people. 
With the computer, Sam has an immediate chance to “try to fix” code that the computer rejects. 
There is no need to spend considerable effort writing something without a clue as to whether it 
will work, or to tolerate long delays before feedback arrives.  
	134	
 Despite his high level of comfort with writing for the computer, Sam acknowledges the 
importance of persevering in his efforts to write for a human audience. In fact, he has found 
ways to bridge those two types of writing to allow him practice that builds on his skills. In the 
following excerpt, Sam bridges the audience he finds comfortable with a less familiar audience 
requiring more rhetorical labor. He describes the requirement in many of his coding courses that 
he embed “comments” into his code, and explains why such comments are “good practice,” even 
for coders: 
Unfortunately, all the classes want me to put in comments, which are for the 
humans to read when they try to figure out what your code does. Um, it’s when 
you type something into the code that doesn’t actually do anything. You should 
do those a lot, it’s good practice. Even for yourself, you can’t remember what 
your code does indefinitely if you come back to it later. So, that can be harder. 
I’ve never been good at writing comments but it’s still not that hard because 
you’re only writing for a programmer. So it narrows it down.  
Here, Sam identifies written comments as a useful resource for sharing code with “humans,” and 
even for himself, when he revisits code he has already written. He acknowledges that writing 
comments like these is “good practice,” rather than an irritating class assignment with no 
purpose beyond the classroom. Another positive feature of this kind of writing is the 
consolidated audience: “you’re only writing for a programmer,” explains Sam, “so it narrows it 
down.” Sam draws a contrast here between two different discipline-specific conceptualizations 
of audience. Within the discipline of computer science, he understands the audience to be 
comprised of programmers, while in writing classrooms the audience is uncomfortably broad and 
vague. When it comes to embedding comments into his code, identifying one general 
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(stereotypic?) feature of the audience for these comments makes writing comments more 
accessible for Sam.  This is an example of a writing assignment that a) has a narrow audience 
that Sam can use stereotypic knowledge to engage; b) is useful for others reading Sam’s code 
and for Sam himself, who might revisit his code; and c) that Sam identifies as difficult but worth 
practicing (buy-in). Stereotypes really serve Sam in this capacity, because they offer him a kind 
of shorthand for understanding his audience. When discussing his work with computer code, 
Sam talks about the affordances of the language Python, which heavily influence its reception 
among other coders. “For one thing,” he says, “there’s a lot of stuff that’s already been written in 
Python that you can use.” Sam chooses to use Python because “it makes a lot more sense than 
other programming languages.” By this he means, “For example, most programming languages 
you just type in curly brackets to nest functions and then indent it so that people can actually tell 
what’s going on. Because, I mean, you could just put it all on one line and it would be fine, but 
all the people who have to actually read your code will kill you.” Ultimately, Sam says he is 
learning that “computer code isn’t just written for the computer. Other people do have to read it. 
And so, now it’s even more like writing. Or it’s adding some of the hard parts about writing back 
in.” Here, Sam articulates a complex understanding of the interplay between computer, 
programmer, and other programmers. He understands the affordances of different computer 
languages, and how those affordances are tied in part to how other people can read and 
understand code.  
 Like Sam’s preference for composing for an audience of programmers, he describes how 
writing specifically for a teaching assistant (TA) is a less burdensome task because of what he 
already understands about the priorities and proclivities of his instructors:  
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S: I know what TA’s generally are like. It's not like it's going to be read by 
students or some sort of future employer or something. If that were true, I'd have 
to write it completely differently. 
P: What do you mean by that? 
S: Well, it's just a TA. They're grading a question to see how it is. They're not 
going to read it too closely and so it's not that important to get it completely right. 
A student would probably be evaluating me as a person, not my answer. Trying to 
see whether I'm a person they'd want to know or not. And so I'd have to write a 
completely different way. I'd have to try to impress them or something or at least 
tell a joke. A TA is evaluating my answer.  
Here, Sam describes the ease of writing for an audience that is simply “evaluating” his “answer” 
without reading his work “too closely.” The key here is that Sam believes the TA will not be 
“evaluating…[him] as a person,” and therefore he doesn’t need to “impress” in the same way. 
Like writing for programmers, Sam has constructed some of his own broad stereotypical 
knowledge about TAs and applied it to his efforts to write for them as an audience. In Sam’s 
conceptualization, TAs are less invested or are otherwise preoccupied, rushed readers; they are 
simply evaluating his “answer”; they are unconcerned with extra flourishes, like jokes or savvy 
social gestures. This applies even for discipline-specific courses that required Sam to produce 
substantial writing – completing formal essays in addition to code, or comments embedded in 
code –  including his mandatory upper-level computer science ethics course. This stereotypical 
knowledge is what enables him to write with confidence and free of the burdens he shoulders in 
trying to “impress” an audience with other priorities or less knowable tastes. Inventing the 
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university is a loaded, bewilderingly complex task, and it is the stereotype, rather than the 
fiction, that ends up being “necessary” and “enabling” for Sam as a writer.  
 
Toby  
At the time of our interviews, Toby was 25 years old and a seventh-year senior majoring in 
“creative writing, mathematics, and technology.” We met the semester before he was scheduled 
to graduate, after completing a customized degree curriculum he negotiated with administrators 
at his university. Toby identifies as a creative writing major; “mathematics” and “technology” 
refer to areas of coursework in which he had made substantial progress but later abandoned. 
“Those last two…[are] what I started out with and have since gone right off but they didn’t want 
me to think I’d done all that for nothing, so…it was very kind of them,” he explains. Toby also 
had an IEP in high school, and he recalls that it was designed to help him work on “various 
social aspects…that aren’t apparent to me [and my]…not-so-human brain, if you will.” In 
college, he admits, “I’ve had to go at a slow pace compared to everyone else. I’ve been down as 
low as one class at a time for a few semesters and two classes this semester. I couldn’t handle 
any more.”  
Toby goes by two names; one is the name given to him by his parents, and the other a 
handle he invented in early 2008 to interact with peers online, where he blogs for a small, 
devoted readership about his psychedelic vinyl collection and posts clips of himself playing the 
guitar and performing original compositions. Reflecting on his name change, Toby offered, “you 
know what I think it is, I think [my old name] is more who I used to be, who I was growing up, 
more computer-oriented, not so outgoing, more withdrawn, whereas [my new name] is more 
open and loose, if you will.” The name change, then, reflects a shift in Toby’s interests – from 
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computers to creative writing and music – and his style of interaction with others, indicating a 
shift towards openness and extraversion. On his shift from computers and math to poetry, Toby 
reflected:  
Yeah, I don’t really know how poetry tied in with it all. I guess poetry is just a 
good byproduct of words and sneaky manipulation. That’s more possible with 
them than it is with plain numbers that work this way…it’s more concrete, I 
guess, and I used to be more concrete. Maybe I just got bored with concreteness. 
What Toby describes here is a loss of interest in the affordances of composing for the computer 
or with numbers. He turned away from computer programming because it was “very rigid, very 
rule-bound,” and toward poetry and lyrics because he felt that “more [is] possible.” He 
continues:  
T: Anything I may have thought about using [a computer] program for, I can't 
remember what it was now…[it] can come down to writing versus…trying to find 
a place in [the world]… or at least make a place in it. Of course, [music]…always 
happened to be, as far as I can tell, the best for getting a point across to people. 
P: Why do you say that? 
T: Those people can remember so much more easily, like the kind of catchy 
lyrical hook with a little catchy melody, and [it] just clicks and people will 
remember that. It seeps into their brain. 
In this excerpt, Toby describes how he has abandoned or embraced other forms of composition 
based on their affordances, this case the audience-based affordances of composing music and 
lyrics versus writing programs for the computer. For Toby, music and lyrics are a means of 
“trying to find a place ” or “at least make a place” in the world. They shape the world for him 
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and help him situate himself within a wider social collective. Lyrics are also catchy; “people will 
remember” catchy hooks. Toby places a high value on forms of writing that he sees as doing this 
work. He also portrays creative writing as less constrained, as a mode in which “more [is] 
possible.” It is a fiction that enables him to “make a place” in the world and to create things that 
“people will remember.” Toby has fully embraced creative writing because of its affordances and 
its potential to connect him to others. This kind of fictionalized writing, however, is in stark 
contrast to the fiction that Bartholomae envisions for students. When Bartholomae asks students 
to invent the university, he isn’t telling them to write fiction. Instead, he tasks them with crafting 
a very limited, limiting fictional world in which they must demonstrate a narrow range of 
behaviors.  
Throughout our interviews, Toby articulated a number of frustrations with college 
writing, which he contrasted with the forms of creative writing he prefers. Some of his 
frustrations boiled down to a complete disinterest in following assigned lines of inquiry or 
instructor-chosen topics. Describing academic essays in particular as “not my strong point,” 
Toby explains that he often doesn’t “have anything much to say on the subjects I am fed.” Such a 
statement resonates with Stewart’s claims about instructors providing students with a 
hypothetical audience, or a situation, for their work. When asked if he gets negative feedback on 
academic essays, Toby replied, “Primarily I have trouble doing them at all. It’s kind of why I 
switched over into this independent plan of study that I’m doing now.” When asked to describe 
his “trouble” with “doing [academic essays] at all,” Toby offered,  
T: I sit mostly at a computer until maybe a couple of sentences come to mind and 
I write those down and then [spend] a few more days just blanking out. Maybe 
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another couple of sentences then I'll blank out for the final time or never come 
back. But that's always been for me. 
P: Do you have a hard time just completing the essay?  
T: Yes. Like just... I fail to think of anything at all, really. 
P: What do you do when you're having trouble with your writing?  
T: I pretty much give up, really. 
Here, Toby is describing struggles with invention, wherein he fails “to think of anything at all” to 
say, and spends “a few more days just blanking out” before abandoning an academic essay. 
Troublingly, and like Sam, Toby says, “I pretty much give up, really.” Toby’s admission that he 
“pretty much gives up” after failing “to think of anything at all” is in stark contrast to his earlier 
description of how he uses lyrics and melody to find his place in the world and connect with 
others. It seems that Toby struggles to claim ownership over “subjects” he is “fed” by writing 
instructors. To claim ownership over such subjects would be, in effect, a sort of pretending or 
fictionalizing of both audience and writer – Toby in this scenario must imagine himself as a 
writer-researcher with particular concerns or lines of inquiry.  The tension arises from the fact 
that Toby doesn’t identify with this fictionalized writer or his fictionalized audience; he cannot 
embody a pretend voice that has “something to say” on a received topic. The very idea that he 
has something to say to this audience is itself a fiction, and strikes Toby as a kind of imposter 
syndrome that alienates him from academic writing. This, I argue, makes Toby like so many 
other students in the college writing classroom, who struggle to feign interest well before they 
encounter the inventional demands of fictionalizing an academic audience, and goes completely 
unacknowledged in accounts of what successful writers do in their writing.  
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Troublingly, Toby associates this unsuccessful writing situation with research in the 
academy as a whole: “Most of this university is research-based and I just never got into that. Not 
much I care to research I guess. Maybe there is, but I was just never exposed to it, I don’t know.” 
Here, Toby seems to equate all research with the writing projects he has been assigned in his 
classes, and the negative association is enough to discourage him from pursuing any academic 
research. It’s possible, he admits, that he was “never exposed” to more fruitful areas of research, 
or open-ended assignments that let him follow areas of interest to him. Overall, this statement 
illustrates one consequence of composition pedagogy that assumes students come pre-packaged 
with something to say and will write themselves into the academy by inventing an audience for 
their particular topic or line of inquiry. The tacit task at hand for students is not just one of 
imagining the audience, but imagining themselves as the type of person who cares and has 
something to say on an (often) assigned topic. These kinds of classroom simulations can actually 
have the opposite effect, as students like Toby elect to avoid academic research altogether. 
 Tied to his described frustrations with invention on assigned topics, Toby describes an 
ongoing frustration with satisfying length requirements, lamenting, “Pretty much any instructor 
any place wants length and I don’t do length. If I have a point to make I make my point and I get 
out.” When asked to recall a particular assignment in which length was a major factor 
contributing to his frustrations, Toby narrated his experiences writing an assigned “travel essay” 
in a creative nonfiction course. “The travel essay was supposed to be seven-plus pages,” he said, 
“which…I haven’t done any traveling, and I came up with like a page and a fraction. Length is 
not my strong suit.” Toby brought the completed and graded essay with him to our interview, 
where he read through some of the feedback he received from his instructor and peers. “A couple 
of people, including [the instructor] interpreted what I wrote as anti-travel, which it wasn't at all, 
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it was a longing for travel that I haven't experienced,” he explained. What he finds “unhelpful” is 
“the desire for more.” 
Toby has a clear point of view and goal as an author – to express “a longing for travel 
that I haven’t experienced’ – but is constrained by the length requirement for the essay and the 
assignment’s normative assumption that students have traveled. Here, Toby balks at what is, in 
his view, the requirement to adopt an emotion or feeling other than the one he wants to express. 
Regardless of whether such an expectation is a routine and important part of learning to be an 
adult, or a member of the academy, or an employee, the point here is that what we are asking of 
students is much more complex than we let on. Asked to describe another writing course in 
which he struggled, Toby recalled an intro-level short story class, in which “you are supposed to 
come up with three short stories and I came up with exactly one,” a “vaguely autobiographical 
piece of a cat lover deprived of cats who gradually becomes the cat.” “If my heart’s not in it,” he 
says, “I put something where my heart is. I turn the music on or see if I can connect with people 
online.” Such comments contrast with prevalent portrayals of autistics as mind-driven, or even 
mindblind; for Toby, writing is more about the heart than the mind. His work as a writer is not 
about “decentering” his own perception of reality, but about putting his perceptions out into the 
world in the hopes of connecting. His online writing embodies many of the pro-social spirit of 
academic writing, yet doesn’t meet the sanctioned conditions for success within the academy.  
This desire for a real connection was a recurring topic throughout all of my interviews 
with Toby. Toby identifies his desire to connect with others as a kind of “base human” feeling, 
and a major influence on his creative process. “I just feel like there’s no…human emotion 
floating around. There is no desire to include or connect with people.” Toby says he feels like 
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“Everybody’s sealed off in their own worlds, and…basically I’m wandering around trying to find 
someplace where I feel reasonably comfortable, and happy.” 
In connection with his observations that there is “no desire to include or connect with 
people,” Toby is often concerned that he doesn’t really have an audience for his college writing. 
“I guess I’m not so convinced that I have an academic audience,” he says, “Therefore, maybe 
I’m not so driven…that’s why I’m off with my academic writing.” When asked who the 
audience might be for his work, Toby replied, “At best the professor.” In general, Toby often 
talks about feeling like he has no audience, like people don’t actually read his work or care. He 
has a desire to connect. Toby admits that he has a Facebook account and is quite active with 
posts and comments. He is not completely satisfied by Facebook’s interface for connecting with 
others, though he says he won’t get rid of his account “quite yet” because “it’s become too much 
my notebook. For random ideas, observations, and other opportunities to flaunt wit [laughs].” 
When asked if having an audience for his work was important to him as a writer, Toby replied:  
T: you could say that.  
P: is that what drives you to write?  
T: well that I don't know about, but...yeah I, I guess it's true, I do dig having an 
audience, that's why I haven't done the open mics at [the local bar] on Tuesdays 
since, you know, roughly since the semester began. The crowds there have just 
been too sparse and apathetic for my taste.  
Toby stopped playing open-mic nights in the summer, because the “crowds are so sparse” that he 
didn’t “feel the love.” What these excerpts suggest is that, for Toby, there is no joy or fulfillment 
in rhetorical practice. Toby prefers the potential for connection and self-expression that comes 
with rhetorical performance. When it comes to anything less, he doesn’t see the point.  
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There is a strong temptation to interpret Sam and Toby’s struggles with academic writing 
as proof that autistics cannot write for an audience. Based on what we assume to be true about 
autistic writers, Sam and Toby’s challenges with writing stem from the fact that they “cannot 
consistently define a line of argument, guide a reader from one point to the next, or supply 
background information for references that will otherwise be unclear,” (Jurecic 429) moves that 
we understand to be predicated on the ability to sense an audience’s expectations. However, what 
I hope to accomplish in this section is a change in perspective, to one that sees how the work of 
fictionalizing audiences for writing students is opaque and normative, and ultimately not 
enabling for all. My participants are in fact incredibly rhetorically aware, as demonstrated by 
their commentary on the writing process and interacting with instructors and peers in the writing 
classroom. They express a desire to write for real people, as real writers, rather than identify as 
the fictionalized student writer who is provided with topics in which to feign interest and 
fabricated audiences to engage. Their struggles with writing cannot be accounted for by the 
reductive trope of the mindblind autistic writer; instead, it is through their experiences that we 
are called to rethink our own practices and assumptions about how best to conceptualize 
audience to enable all student writers.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I show how composition scholarship since the 1970s has concerned itself with 
how to best conceptualize the audience for student writing in the university. This scholarly 
thread has consolidated over time around an understanding of the academic audience as a fiction 
invented by the student. Writing instructors and scholars gather behind audience as fiction 
because it offers a way around some of the obstacles presented by the composition classroom, 
and more closely ties the work students do in the classroom to broader conversations happening 
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around it. From the perspective of non-neurotypical students – students, in other words, who 
don’t ascribe to the pro-social, neurotypical orientation of many composition scholars and 
writing instructors – however, this conceptualization of audience proves problematically opaque 
and favoring of a particular kind of tacit knowledge that instructors associate with “intellectually 
significant” writing skills. The field has yet to come to terms with how tightly it has associated 
the measurement of intellect and cognitive maturity with a narrow set of writing skills and 
against the backdrop of a deep, unexamined bias towards particular performances of writerly 
identity. Such associations and biases have a disabling effect that often goes unrecognized in 
conversations about struggling writers and successful writers. As excerpts from my interviews 
with Sam and Toby demonstrate, not all students can or want to buy into the fiction sold to them 
in their college writing classrooms. When that fiction is the only thing on offer, the result for 
many neurodiverse students looks less like the “enabling fiction” Bartholomae imagines and 
more like exclusion, failure, and avoidance of writing (and, in Toby’s case, research) in the 
university altogether.  
 Interviewing autistic students about their experiences writing for various audiences in the 
academic is a loaded task. This is in part due to common assumptions about autistic people in 
general, and autistic writers in particular. Autistic writers are often portrayed as uniquely unable 
to connect with audiences, either due to pathological disinterest or neurological impairment. 
Following from theories like that of mindblindness, audience is often assumed to be the “piece” 
of rhetoric, and of effective writing, that disqualifies autistics from participating and from 
academic achievements related to writing. Yet, what I show in this chapter is that my participants 
possess a sophisticated awareness of the various audiences for which they write in college, as 
well as a desire to connect with others and to have positive, meaningful interactions. Their 
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struggles and frustrations are too often distorted by deficit models of disability and damaging 
stereotypes about what autistic people can and cannot do, and distract from the disabling work of 
some mainstream pedagogical practices.  
Ultimately, though, the fact that my participants identify as autistic is sort of beside the 
point. My participants and their stories are not exceptional; in fact, I argue that they resonate 
with the experiences of many college composition students, including those who don’t identify 
as neurodiverse. What these stories show is that what composition scholars claim to ask of 
students is, in this instance, different from the feats they must actually accomplish. As I argued 
in my previous chapter on disclosure, students in the university must often reconcile their 
identities with the narrow range of inhabitable student identities in college. Here, I argue that this 
includes the identities students assume when they write academic essays. This becomes clear 




Conclusion: A Writing Classroom for All Writers 
 
 
Throughout this dissertation, I have endeavored to engage the perspectives of a community of 
students whose very identity violates educational norms in order to advance conversations on 
intellectual inclusivity in the college writing classroom. These perspectives have led me back to 
foundational scholarship in the field of composition and rhetoric, where I have uncovered hidden 
work being done to consolidate normative notions of rhetorical and intellectual ability in student 
writers. In my introduction to this dissertation, I ask: How do we define ourselves as rhetorically 
able, beyond merely labeling certain writers as rhetorically disabled? How does current writing 
and rhetorical instruction serve to consolidate and reinforce a shared understanding of normal 
intellectual ability that excludes diverse learners and writers? While I cannot claim to have 
definitively answered these questions, what I have contributed is a deep dive into sites of 
foundational scholarship in composition and rhetoric – including scholarship on basic writing, on 
cognition and composition, on rhetorical ability, and on audience analysis – and a re-reading of 
this scholarship through the lens of neurodiversity and through the eyes of my neurodiverse 
student participants. Next, I have explored productive areas of overlap between disability studies 
and composition and rhetoric, demonstrating how disability frameworks bring new insight into 
how issues of access and self-advocacy in composition affect all learners. It is my hope that 
neurotypical or able-bodied readers of this dissertation understand that when we explicitly 
exclude some students, we inexplicitly exclude far more; that disability is not “someone else’s 
problem,” or a niche issue, or outside of the scope of acceptable or desirable diversity in higher 
education; that understanding “expert” medical literature is not a prerequisite for addressing 
access; and that access is an unfinished project that will require all voices at the table.  Finally, 
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and most significantly, I have foregrounded the stories and experiences of a nearly invisible and 
highly misunderstood community of students. These five students’ stories are loaded, complex, 
and likely to be surprising for many readers. My participants’ stories take the field of 
composition and rhetoric to a turning point from which we cannot go back.  
One of my goals in Chapter 4 was to show that an area of composition scholarship and 
pedagogy that we don’t necessarily think of as related to access does, in fact, affect access in our 
classrooms in very real ways. In this final chapter, I briefly turn to official and unofficial 
classroom practices that are overtly associated with access, and foreground the perspectives of 
the students these access measures are intended to serve. This chapter aims to begin to fill in the 
aforementioned missing perspective of non-neurotypical students on classroom access measures 
that facilitate or undermine their educational pursuits. I synthesize my participants’ perspectives 
in the context of recent scholarship by and about students with autism, which complicates the use 
of “autistic” as an official label in the classroom and calls for a less reductive approach to 
understanding the needs and learning processes of autistic students. Both Toby and Sam resist 
the “autistic” label and question its usefulness in helping instructors understand their needs. This 
perspective should matter as much or more than “expert” scholarship on autism in the classroom.  
While I recognize the important accomplishments of our field’s long tradition of 
advocacy on behalf of underrepresented student writers, I have also traced the normative 
contours of this work, and have teased out thorny issues impeding intellectual inclusivity. My 
participant Andy understands resolving these issues to be incredibly difficult. “It takes a change 
of mind, I think, really,” he explains. “You have to be aware of what you’re doing. You have to 
say ‘this is not right.’ And you have to think of a different way of being able to do it. And I 
mean, it’s a tall order to ask of people, to change the way they think.” What I have done with this 
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dissertation is establish a platform for the perspectives of students who experience college on the 
margins, or who struggle to inhabit the narrow intellectual roles and ways of being that lead to 
academic achievement. Part of the work of unpacking and dismantling normative practices in 
composition involves recognizing non-neurotypical students as experts on their own learning 
processes, and reconciling these expert perspectives with the field’s existing wisdom on enabling 
neurodiverse learning and writing practices to flourish. I use this chapter, my conclusion, to 
synthesize some of this student expertise and its implications for current approaches to access. 
This is a synthesis of three salient pieces of insight across my participants’ stories, insight that 
calls for changes to access in higher education that would benefit all students, not just those who 
identify as non-neurotypical: 
• My participants (nearly all of them, nearly all the time) avoid disclosing their 
diagnosis in the classroom, despite an expressed desire for focused writing help or 
for accommodations that would make class more accessible.  
• My participants are concerned that accepting accommodations in college is unfair, 
or appears unfair to neurotypical students, instructors, and even myself (as their 
interviewer). 
• While my participants have expressed interest in pursuing particular in-class 
accommodations, they reject accommodations that would be obvious to other 
students or that would visually or situationally set them apart from other students.   
My participants’ views, as I will discuss in greater detail, are consonant with best practices 
emerging from the intersection of composition scholarship and universal or participatory design 
principles. This conclusion, however, will not enter the debate over the merits of implementing 
universal (UD) principles into the college writing classroom; such an argument would fall 
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outside the scope of this project. Instead, I argue that my participants’ insight is significant and, 
going forward, belongs at the forefront of conversations about access.   
 
Ditching Labels to Rethink Autistic Writers 
The majority of my participants do not disclose their diagnosis in college classrooms, even while 
registering with the office of disability services on campus. This challenges prevalent practices 
regarding classroom access and inclusivity. Current approaches to access are predicated on 
student disclosure, as writing instructors and faculty tend to follow an “assume normal unless” 
model of classroom and curricular design. It is often only after a student comes forward and opts 
to disclose an “official” diagnosis that a writing instructor would be vaguely duty-bound to 
design retrofits to his or her classroom and major course assignments. If we hold up this model 
for ensuring access to my participants’ stories, a gap emerges wherein students who might 
benefit from or desire greater access to the classroom or major course assignments are 
overlooked because of their own disclosure choices. The disclosure imperative – which I explore 
in Chapter Three, through Mike’s experiences – puts students at risk by exposing them to stigma 
and might actually impede access. Such an imperative edges out consideration of how these 
writers see themselves, and fails to enact the values of student expertise and self-advocacy. This 
is not to say that some students won’t benefit by disclosing a particular “official” diagnosis. 
Rather, it is an insistence that composition instructors acknowledge what students are asked to 
do, and risk, if they want help.  
 Nearly all of my participants choose not to disclose in the classroom, in large part 
because they feel that autism as an educational label is unflattering and can actually foment, 
rather than mitigate, misunderstandings about autistic students and learning. Recent disability 
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studies scholarship on autism in the classroom echoes these sentiments and emphasizes that no 
two autistic students are alike, challenging assumptions that all autistic students’ differences fall 
neatly under a rubric of core deficits. What emerges from this scholarship is a desire to move 
away from autism as a “label of convenience” and toward recognizing the full complexity of 
autistic experience. In this section, I argue for less use of the label of “autism” to index certain 
deficit writing or learning traits and more listening to neurodivergent writers as they articulate 
their own needs and frustrations.  
The danger of the label is that it acts as a narrow lens through which we read autistic 
behavior, ability, and achievement. In ““Geniuses” without Imagination,” Marion Quirici 
acknowledges the “temptation to defer to the authority of acclaimed autism experts in cognitive 
and neurological fields,” while asserting that “autism as a collective phenomenon is an aggregate 
of experiences, which ought to be articulated in all their complexity whether or not they fit the 
bill for what we think we know about autism” (74). Quirici offers the example of autistic artist 
Jessica Park, whose mother writes lovingly of her talents but appraises her artistic choices solely 
as an extension of her autistic mind. As Quirici writes, “Jessy’s artwork is not her greatest 
accomplishment in her mother’s eyes, but a symptom of the disorder. For an autistic artist, there 
is no escaping the clinical paradigms of imaginative deficit” (84). Similarly, when we read 
autistic writing through a deficit lens, we recast each rhetorical choice as evidence that autistics 
cannot write for audiences. Even rhetorical successes are read through a lens of overcoming, 
applauding the autistic rhetor for transcending his or her intrinsic limitations. Quirici warns that 
“received wisdom about autism should not dictate the way autistic achievement is discussed” in 
the classroom (86). Future research should presume “the competence of autistic individuals” and 
allow them “to represent themselves,” as well as look closely at what our labels “tell us about the 
	152	
anxieties of the nondisabled majority” (86). The concept of “presuming competence” is not new, 
and has in fact been applied to other populations of so-called at-risk, under-prepared, or 
otherwise marginalized student writers as a corrective to deficit lenses that over-emphasize 
remediation. Presuming competence, however, is unique in the context of neurological diversity 
or neurodivergent learners, who have been used at times to represent the fundamental limits of 
competence. “Presuming competence” in this particular context challenges us to rethink what 
“competence” even looks like, and how current understandings of competence serve to reinforce 
narrow concepts of normalcy.  
To actually “presume competence” in this context also involves recognizing how Autism 
as label constrains attempts at inclusivity because it erases the staggering diversity of autistic 
students.  Kerschbaum echoes this label skepticism in Toward a New Rhetoric of Difference, 
arguing that deploying labels as repositories of knowledge about particular types of students 
forecloses possibilities for productively addressing difference with those students.  Kerschbaum 
devotes several pages to a careful critique of Ann Jurecic’s 2007 College English article, now 
notorious among disability studies scholars for its methodological missteps. Kerschbaum’s 
theory of “markers of difference,” which theorizes difference as emergent, dynamic, and 
constituted and re-constituted in the minutiae of daily interactions, sheds new light on how 
Jurecic misses the mark in her discussion of how to support neurological difference in the 
classroom. Ultimately, Kerschbaum argues, Jurecic “fixates on learning about Gregory rather 
than with him” (61). In fact, “difference is never fully knowable, and teachers should not aim to 
know their students as much as willingly participate with them in the processes of coming-to-
know one another in the writing classroom” (59). Kerschbaum critiques Jurecic’s call to mine 
earlier scholarship on cognition and composition in order to better understand autistic writers, 
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claiming that the point is not “laying out the terrain of autism,” but rather to participate with 
students in “processes of coming-to-know” (63). Such a call echoes my earlier point in Chapter 2 
that composition’s tradition of advocacy has tended to position the scholar-instructor as expert 
diagnostician, and that that practice has infused some of the field’s most commendable advocacy 
work with ableist undertones. However, I would point out that some of my participants seek out 
the same “expert” opinions and resources that scholars like Kerschbaum and Quirici caution us 
against. The problem doesn’t lay with expert scholarship itself, but with the practice of erasing 
students’ perspectives from discussion of how to best meet the needs of diverse learners.  
A common thread in this recent disability studies scholarship insists that autistic students 
themselves are the authority on their own learning processes, and that turning to them rather than 
deferring to “experts” holds more promise for improving intellectual inclusivity in the classroom. 
As Kerschbaum acknowledges, “Scholars working on autism and rhetoric have in fact 
challenged Jurecic’s claim that working with autistic students necessitates learning about autism 
from a variety of popular and medical discourses”(63). Kerschbaum cites Yergeau and Heilker’s 
2011 article “Autism and Rhetoric” and its declaration that most discourse about autism and 
learning leads instructors astray. “We might do best,” write Yergeau and Heilker, “to unlearn 
everything we think we have learned about autistics, who, as a group, are about as amorphous 
and diverse as neurotypicals”(496). In “Aut-ors of our Experience: Interrogating Intersections of 
Autistic Identity,” Benham and Kizer – who both self-identify as autistic and emerging scholars 
– experiment with formal and stylistic choices to disrupt academic normativity and narrate their 
autistic experience, claiming, “I WANT, I said, to hear more of the perspectives of people 
like me, not read the perspectives of teachers who SEEMED FRUSTRATED AND 
AFRAID of anyone different” (88). Just as Quirici references the “anxieties of the nondisabled 
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majority,” so do Benham and Kizer pick up on the fear and worry inherent in mainstream 
conversations about neurological difference. Many scholarly takes on autistic difference in the 
classroom betray a fear of that difference, particularly those that emphasize interventions 
designed to promote normal learning behaviors and processes. Benham and Kizer situate 
themselves in the “contested spaces between how Autism is understood and how Autistic 
identity is constructed” (93). “We write our narratives,” they assert, “using Autistic hands that 
are scrutinized and regulated by a culture that does not celebrate them” (93). Here, the authors 
zero in on how autism as label functions not as a celebration but rather betrays a fearful impulse 
to contain and eradicate difference.  
While my participant Toby was diagnosed with Asperger syndrome earlier than my other 
participants, and therefore had the most time to come to terms with his diagnostic label, he rarely 
uses medical terminology to identify himself.  Instead, Toby referred to himself through our 
interviews as a “demented poet songwriter,” a “wanderer,” “non-standard thinker,” or a “stranger 
on this planet.” Musically, Toby is very interested in what he calls “obscure 60s, early 70s 
bands,” though when asked what his “top five” musical acts are, he offered, “Dylan, The Dead, 
Springsteen, Joni Mitchell is a good one, and…The Who, Floyd, I need some more obscure 
people…How about Caravan, there’s one from the Canterbury scene.” On the subject of his own 
songs, Toby described his sound as “kind of a…space-pop-folk-psych-tinged…I, I don’t know 
how to describe it.” He writes and performs original compositions, and usually posts clips on his 
blog, though recently he admitted branching out to a local open-mic night. Such alternative 
labels correspond to the forms of composing that Toby has embraced, and highlight 
characteristics of Toby’s identity that he feels are more salient and germane to understanding 
him as an individual. They highlight his creative endeavors – poetry and songwriting – and 
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outsider status without grounding such traits in a stigmatized medical diagnosis. Like Sam, Toby 
resists medical labels and questions their relevance to his identity and his life. He says if he is in 
a “different mood…I say…look I’m autistic, don’t get on me [laughs].” As I will discuss later, 
just as Sam doesn’t bring up his diagnosis except in situations where instructors don’t take 
seriously his requests for additional help accessing a class, Toby falls back on medical 
terminology as a sort of last resort to avoid hardship. When asked if his college instructors take 
his diagnosis into account in the classroom, Toby replied, “instructors don’t really talk about that 
with me much…if [I] talk with anyone, it would either be the advisers or [the clinical 
psychologist]. I don’t know if I ever exclusively mentioned it to any of them or if they’re in 
contact with her or whatever. All things are possible.” Toby has discussed his diagnosis with his 
advisers, who have stepped in to help him find a path to graduation that avoids further delays. In 
the classroom, however, Toby doesn’t disclose his diagnosis.  
In college, without the disability mandates that made high school more accessible, Sam 
says that he “sort of gave up” when it came to writing. “It’s just really hard,” he says, noting, “I 
can write, I have written…it’s just sometimes I’m able to and sometimes I’m not and I haven’t 
figured out why yet.” When asked if he still has an IEP, Sam replied, “no, unless somebody’s 
making one behind my back. I can’t exactly stop them.” He claims he has received “some minor 
sort of default” accommodations from the office of disability resources on campus. “I think I get 
to pick classes…earlier than normal.” For Sam, there are limits to having an official autism 
spectrum diagnosis. In the following excerpt, Sam explains why he ultimately distances himself 
from the label of autism: he believes he can get better help through thoughtful and careful 
communication with instructors. Such an approach challenges current practices for 
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accommodating disability, which, as explained previously, are predicated on students coming 
forward with an official medical diagnosis:  
S: From what I found, what you can get through rules and legal shenanigans is not 
that much more powerful than simply asking nicely. People are understanding if 
you phrase stuff correctly. I can just say that I’m bad at writing…and that seems 
to give people enough information to help me. 
P: Rather than saying what? 
S: Going on about a diagnosis and what they have to do, and that’s sort of a 
recourse fallback if they don’t believe me or something, but yeah, it seems to be 
best just to say that you’re a person with really distinctive, I need a word, skills… 
Sam’s explanation that “People are understanding if you phrase stuff correctly” demonstrates his 
understanding of the rhetorical work that goes into negotiating classroom accommodations and 
teacher relationships. He inhabits the mindset of an instructor listening to a student “going on 
about a diagnosis and what they have to do,” and understands that approach as potentially heavy-
handed and alienating to instructors. Sam thinks instructors are more likely to help when students 
“ask nicely” rather than make demands based on official diagnoses. Importantly, Sam shows 
here that he doesn’t even need to offer up his diagnosis to “give people enough information to 
help.”  
The autism label doesn’t do any important work on Sam’s behalf to make classrooms, 
peer interactions, and instructor relationships more accessible.  For Toby, it doesn’t 
communicate meaningful information about his identity. Neither Sam nor Toby are trying to 
identify as neurotypical; their identity performances and avoidance of the autism label don’t 
seem to be motivated by a valuing of normalcy. Rather, they claim a non-neurotypical student 
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identity without factoring medical terminology into the equation. Such personal decisions 
suggest that classroom approaches to access that rely on diagnoses as labels indexing particular 
deficits (or, more optimistically, particular needs) aren’t helping students who resist these labels. 
Remarkably, both Sam and Toby acknowledge the possibility that instructors are talking about 
them but not to them. This perception is echoed by Yergeau and Kerschbaum, who both caution 
against a tendency to consult expert literature about students with medical diagnosis without 
bothering to communicate with those students (who are experts on their own learning). The 
autism label indexes a particular kind of expertise – that of medical experts – and silences the 
voices and perspectives of other experts.  
The classroom is a site where my participants are opting not to disclose, as they 
understand their disclosure choices to be compromised by the stigma behind “autism” as an 
education label. They acknowledge that such a disclosure may entail their instructors’ learning 
more about them without directly talking to them, and adds the burden of ensuring access on top 
of the demands of teaching. These experiences resonate with some initiatives that follow from 
universal design principles, which emphasize the legitimization of students’ own expertise about 
their learning processes, and prioritizes eliminating the need for students to disclose and 
instructors to retrofit. Universal Design originated in the field of architecture in the 1970s, as set 
of principles or goals to achieve in designing built environments. Succinctly, the aim behind 
Universal Design is to enable the widest possible access without having to retrofit structural 
elements, so that as many people as possible could immediately and independently use a 
particular space “as is” (King-Sears). A simple example would be, when designing an elevated 
entrance to a building, to incorporate a ramp alongside stairs in the initial design, rather than 
design an entrance with steps and later retrofit the space, or add a ramp on top of the existing 
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design. Speaking on the promise of Universal Design for the digital humanities, George 
Williams appeals to UD’s efficiency by pointing out that, for web designers, “coding everything 
twice – first for nondisabled people and then again for disabled people – is time consuming and 
expensive” (206). The goal, he explained, should be to “create just one version of a resource and 
to make design choices that ensure the resource suits the needs of all users” (206).  
 Universal Design has since been taken up enthusiastically across several academic 
disciplines, including disability studies (Price; Hamraie), technical communications (Salvo), 
education (King-Sears; Michael and Trezek; Chita-Tegmark et al; Dutt-Doner and Grande), and 
more recently in the digital humanities (Williams). Recent scholarship at the intersection of 
disability studies and composition and rhetoric has begun a dialogue about how to incorporate 
these principles into the writing classroom (Dolmage; Price; Yergeau; Kerschbaum; Bruch; 
McAlexander; Dunn and Dunn De Mers; Kiedaisch and Dinitz). In her coverage of the term 
“design,” Melanie Yergeau asks of composition and rhetoric, “Whose bodyminds are centered in 
the design of our field, and how might we enable broader participations?” (53).  What Yergeau 
accomplishes with a question like this is a shift in understanding universal design from a discrete 
checklist for instructors to a political and material framework for access.  
While initial conceptions of Universal Design did not suggest incorporating user 
feedback into the design process, the borrowing of UD principles by fields such as Technical 
Communications and, more recently, by Disability Studies, has led to calls for integrating 
participatory elements into the design process. Yergeau differentiates between the principles of 
universal design and participatory design, since “Participatory theories of design assert that users 
of a given product should be involved in the very process of creating that product…[while] 
universal design…entails designing for the widest array of users possible” (54). Michael J. 
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Salvo, a technical communications scholar, echoes Yergeau in crediting participatory design as 
“one possible solution on a continuum of dialogic relations between technological producers and 
consumers” (278). In a study of how universal design might be implemented in the college 
writing classroom, Jay Dolmage, along with his student participants, explains that “Together we 
realized that, although UDL validated their standpoint, there was nothing explicit in the 
principles of UDL that provided for student-feedback as part of a dynamic process of pedagogy 
design and revision.” This key oversight of Universal Design meant that student expertise had no 
official role in the design process. Dolmage ultimately retooled his study to “look into the ways 
that Universal Design might interact with the principles of usability to make for a more iterative 
design – a design of pedagogy that could be more continually responsive to students, more 
dynamic, that could offer students more tangible negotiable roles.” Dolmage acknowledges that 
this “iterative design” process borrows principles from usability tests more commonly employed 
in the field of Technical Communications; he suggests borrowing the principle of “testing…a 
product on actual end-users,” and applying it to the composition classroom, specifically to 
students who identify as disabled. “In the classroom,” Dolmage claims, “the usability model also 
allows students to evade the role of passive consumer.” Disability Studies has contributed 
significantly to the universal design conversation by pointing out this critical oversight, and 
calling for formal and informal channels for immediate feedback from users, or students. 
Ultimately, Dolmage claims that “teachers can’t be the sole designers of pedagogy, and students 
must direct the re-engineering of the classroom. The result is that teachers and students work 
together to develop a pedagogy that is broad and responsive–not a teaching catch-all, but a 
considered and flexible pedagogy, localized as it is globalized.” The scene Dolmage describes 
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here resonates with the concerns that my participants have about their own self-knowledge and 
understanding of their needs being erased by “expert” literature on autism.  
 
Classroom Accommodations and Fairness  
Toby, Sam, Andy, and Mike have expressed a concern that accepting extra accommodations in 
college is unfair to other students. Accommodations at the postsecondary level in particular are 
caught up in wider discourses about academic rigor, achievement, and standards, where some 
question their legitimacy and suspect students who accept particular accommodations as taking 
unfair advantages. Sam, for example, as I will show, claims it’s not fair for him to receive help 
on account of his diagnosis, since he believes it’s arbitrary that “they just have a word for” why 
he struggles with writing, while another student may “just be bad at math.” Sam’s point is an 
entry point into a complex site of rhetorical negotiation, whereby instructors and other 
educational stakeholders grapple with determining who deserves accommodations in higher 
education. One side effect of the messy work of distributing accommodations that some of 
participants experience is teacher pity, and my participants’ relationship to that pity is often 
ambivalent.  
Andy’s pursuit of accommodations – a process that necessitates risky disclosure practices 
– is very cautious, and illustrates how even students with a recognized medical diagnosis 
question the fairness of official and unofficial accommodations. “Usually I try to give [teachers] 
as much information as I can, actually, without going too far,” Andy says of his pursuit of 
accommodations. “So I’ll give them the letter which has my accommodations, and then I’ll tell 
them a little bit about what’s going on with me. Just enough so that they have an understanding.” 
Here, “the letter” refers to the ubiquitous official accommodations letter that writing instructors 
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periodically receive from students. Such letters are themselves complex sites of authority, and 
many students rely on them to legitimize their requests for accommodations from instructors. 
Andy says he hopes sharing “the letter” and “just enough” personal information means that 
instructors “might understand” if he were “to mess up or something,” though immediately after 
he said this, he followed up, “thinking about that now, that wouldn’t sound too fair.” Here, Andy 
shares his goal for this type of instructor-student interaction, then questions the fairness of that 
goal. His ambivalence about the fairness of accommodations, as well as the considerable caution 
he exercises in pursuing them, show how complicated these rhetorical situations can be and the 
pressure on individual students to navigate them successfully. 
Sam, too, feels at an impasse when it comes to seeking additional accommodations to 
help him with writing in college. “I’m not sure what they’re supposed to do,” he says. “I mean, I 
still have to learn the stuff, still have to do the work.” Ultimately, he explains,  
It’s hard to tell what things are autism and what things are just me. If somebody 
else…didn’t have a diagnosis, they were just, say, bad at math, would they get 
accommodations for math? I don’t think that’s very fair. To me, it just seems that 
I’m good at some things and bad at others. I just got lucky that they had a word 
for it, so I get help.” 
Here, Sam highlights the tensions that surround accommodations in college, positioning himself 
as the unwanting recipient of various advantages that don’t seem fair. He identifies “autism” as 
an educational label and expresses ambivalence over its relation to his identity and his skills or 
struggles as a student.  He identifies with other students who may struggle in college but don’t 
have “a word for it,” and therefore don’t have the access to help that he has. Sam separates 
autism the label and its implications from his own identity as a student who is simply “good at 
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some things and bad at others.” Labels also break down in peer-to-peer interactions. Sam says 
his interactions with peers don’t involve explicit talk about autism, and that he assumes they 
don’t use medical terminology when they think of him. “I think a lot of people don’t know what 
Asperger’s syndrome is,” he explains, “so they just think I’m weird.”  
One significant undercurrent of current approaches to access, which too often follow 
from the assumption that autism is tragic or that autistics are sociopathic, is pity, an emotion that 
has always troubled disability studies scholarship and disability activism. A central tenet of 
disability studies, and disability activism more generally, is the insistence that narratives and 
representations of disability move away from fear, pity, and the trope of the inspiring supercrip, 
towards “awareness, acceptance, and integration” (Chrisman 173). Chrisman cites John B. Kelly, 
who says that stories about disability are often highly problematic because of how they deploy 
pity and inspiration, emotions that carry an “underlying assumption that we are as a group 
inferior to normals, thereby making remarkable our smallest achievements…[and] reassuring 
normals about the superiority of their ways” (Chrisman 176). Underneath expressions of pity 
from able-bodied or neurotypical people is the assumption that it is always preferable to not be 
disabled or not be neurodivergent. This underlying preference for neurotypicality can manifest as 
displays of pity or fear regarding autistic students in the classroom.  
Pity demonstrates, again and again, that there are limits to the kinds of human difference 
that the general public finds acceptable or valuable. The rhetoric of pity is thus a rhetoric of 
division and disidentification, forestalling attempts at connection and coalition forming between 
members of the disability community and able-bodied individuals. Howard Sklar references 
qualitative research on sympathy by Candace Clark, whose interview participants described 
receiving “unwanted sympathy” from able-bodied individuals, or that “the sympathy of others 
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made them feel somehow “beneath” the sympathizer” (140). Because pity denies the 
vulnerability and interdepence that all humans share, the “rejection of pity – as well as sympathy, 
with which pity frequently is conflated” is a “guiding principle” of the disability rights 
movement (Sklar 137). Just as Benham and Kizer insist that their “Autistic-ness is not the 
problem, the expectations promoted by these teachers are” (89), so too do my participants 
describe their wariness of the expectations of their teachers. They feel pressure to respond 
appropriately to treatment from teachers that betrays an underlying expectation that to have 
autism is sad and that autistic students deserve to be pitied for their struggles. In the classroom, 
teachers’ emotional attitudes towards diagnoses like autism and towards accommodations are an 
ever-changing landscape that students must careful navigate.  
Sam, for example, doesn’t enjoy being the recipient of pity, but also doesn’t reject it 
outright. The relationship to pity that he describes is more ambivalent, and illustrative of a gap 
between disability activist vocabularies and the resistance strategies of “everyday” autistic 
students. Sam has expressed that recognizing pity from his instructors makes him feel “pitiable,” 
though he believes that it sometimes leads to him getting higher grades on his essays than he 
deserves, and he accepts this minor advantage. Like all students, my participants are concerned 
about earning high grades in their college courses, and have found that accepting or working 
with their instructors’ emotional stance on autism can be a productive path to reaching their 
educational goals.  
Sam attributes his post-diagnosis academic successes in high school to the sympathy of 
his instructors, his counselors, and his own family. Sam recalled how he “somehow magically 
got a B” on an essay in high school, “mostly because the teacher felt sorry for me I think.” Sam 
had an IEP as a high school student, and he says that his particular IEP was light on “official” 
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accommodations, but included “a whole of unofficial” accommodations. In general, he explains, 
“it mostly boiled down to the counselor told all my teachers to be nice to me.” Sam’s memories 
of his counselors and instructors highlight their sympathy, or even pity, for his struggles as a 
learner and writer. He recognizes his relationship with instructors as being heavily influenced by 
their emotions about autism and the difficult academic period that led to his diagnosis. He 
believes his grades are in large part a reflection of how teachers “felt sorry” for him, rather than 
his writing abilities. For Sam, being labeled as autistic changed how his teachers and counselors 
perceived him in ways that affected his academic success. Describing one essay assignment that 
he completed, Sam demonstrates how he factors teacher pity into his expectations regarding the 
grade the assignment received:  
P: Did you do well on the assignment? 
S: I don't remember the grade I got. I don't know if the teacher was taking pity on 
me at that point.  
P: So, the pity thing…how did that make you feel?  
S: Pitiable, but... well, the way I see it, I didn't really do the assignment. I did the 
assignment, but I didn't design it well, and I didn't deserve a good grade. But 
grades are also meaningless. I don't think that grades have anything to do with 
what you deserve. It's just what the teacher wants to give you. And if they give 
me a better grade because of pity, whatever, then I get a better grade.  
Here, Sam draws a distinction between the grade he received and the grade he deserved. From 
his own assessment of his work, Sam says he didn’t “design…[the assignment] well,” and 
“didn’t deserve a good grade.” He then questions the meaning of grades, suggesting that they 
don’t reflect student achievement, but rather “what the teacher wants to give you.” Finally, he 
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admits the possibility of him receiving “a better grade because of pity,” and reluctantly accepts 
that outcome. Here, Sam justifies his acceptance of the advantages he may enjoy as a result of 
teacher pity by appealing to the meaninglessness of grades in general. From Sam’s perspective, 
grades don’t directly reflect student achievement, and this fact informs his overall ambivalence 
about pity. This excerpt shows the complexities of encountering teacher pity in the writing 
classroom, and illustrates the conditions in which student like Sam can both dislike and accept 
pity in their pursuit of educational goals.  
 What Sam’s experiences call for is a way around the problematic and complicated work 
of sorting students according to how deserving they are of accommodations, as well as prevalent 
attitudes towards students who do come forward and claim a particular diagnosis. Conversations 
about how to accommodate students with an official medical diagnosis are often preoccupied 
with whether said accommodations are fair to “normal” students, but present also in this 
conversation are the students who may qualify for a particular diagnosis but don’t have one. 
Indeed, medical diagnoses are too often unequally distributed, and a system that overemphasizes 
codified assistance for those with an official diagnosis can actually contribute to greater 
inequality.  In her discussion of the merits of incorporating universal design into the basic 
writing classroom, Patricia McAlexander calls for greater recognition of all the students who get 
left out of the conversation on accessibility when we over-emphasize official labels or diagnoses. 
Indeed, not all LD students actually carry a diagnosis, and what’s the difference between 
“between students who have never had an opportunity to develop critical thinking and writing 
skills . . . and those students who have some disability which makes the development of those 
skills difficult?” she asks (April 5, 2001). McAlexander believes “that it is right to give 
modifications to students who have been tested and diagnosed with disabilities,” while also 
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recognizing that “doing so for them and not for others may discriminate against those others.” 
This example illustrates how policies that single out a particular group of students as needing 
help or accommodations can actually impede educational justice for all students, by stratifying 
students according to official categories to which some do not have access.  
 
Accommodations without Stigma 
Andy has expressed an interest in receiving accommodations, and he actually does take some of 
the accommodations offered to him without any major concerns about fairness; however, he 
doesn’t want any accommodations to call special attention to him. Andy says he is easily 
distracted in test-taking environments, and on test days when students take a test (such as a 
midterm) in class, he has the option to take the same test in an alternate location that is free of 
other students or distractions. This accommodation makes a big difference for Andy, since he 
feels that he needs “that nice quiet space, where I can be able to focus.” While Andy appreciates 
this accommodation, and said it has improved his performance on exams, he explained to me that 
whenever he exercises this accommodation, at the next regular class meeting students ask him 
where he’s been, and why he wasn’t in class on test day: 
A: Well...I don't know, it's almost always with an accommodation there's always 
s---almost some way to tell that this person obviously has something going on 
with them. And I think that they can be the targets of um, questions, maybe like 
why doesn't the person show up on these test days? And it's like only these test 
days they don't show up on? 
P: So in receiving or pursuing that accommodation, people will see you 
differently? Or they'll see that you are asking for an accommodation? 
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A: Yeah. 
These kinds of questions aren’t always welcome, as Andy has concerns about how best to 
represent the nature of his accommodations to his peers. Taking accommodations like those 
described above can force a kind of disclosure in that they advertise to other students that a 
particular student is different and unable to perform in a typical class setting. As long as there is 
considerable negative stigma attached to diagnoses like autism, approaches that uncritically 
require students to reveal diagnoses or other differences that might attract unwanted attention 
will impede the access and inclusivity initiatives they claim to support.  
While Toby and Sam use accommodations that function outside of the classroom – they 
have been granted permission to register for courses early, take only one course per semester, or 
have a personal selection of courses count towards a custom major – Andy has sought in-class or 
coursework-related accommodations, and his experiences with these leave him ambivalent about 
current approaches to disability in higher education. As a learner, Andy says he “prefers to read 
by listening” and has “trouble with proofreading,” and relies heavily on a software program 
called Kurzweil, which converts printed text to an audio file that recites the text aloud.  He will 
often combine reading with listening, following along in a text while it is recited aloud, or 
uploading his own written drafts and listening to hear “if there’s anything that sounds off.” 
Doing so helps Andy catch more errors in his own writing, remember more detail from texts, and 
read both more quickly. “I think the multiple sources, or the multiple ways of looking at it, trying 
to understand it, helped me,” he recalls. Using Kurzweil takes a considerable amount time 
outside of class, as Andy has to “upload… something that I’ve written” or “reading 
assignments,” and then “have a robotic kind of voice read it [all] to me.” Sometimes, though, 
“it’s harder to get good clean copies of [class] reading material. And you can’t like, go from your 
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book to the program unless you…scan it.” It’s clear that the burden of converting text to speech 
falls on Andy, who must devote considerable time to doing so. He must also deal with 
inconsistencies in course materials, since some are easily converted and others, particularly print 
texts, require a lot of labor to render them for Kurzweil. Each of my interviews with Andy 
circled back to discussions about the complexities of accommodations in higher education. Andy 
voiced issues he had with accommodations in college, and expressed a desire for a more 
supportive approach to accommodating students with disabilities. This begins, he explained, with 
“more awareness, just in general. And then I think you can take steps to include those who have 
certain disabilities in with the rest of people.” He believes that if teachers “try to explain things” 
in a number of different ways, it might “benefit both sides of the equation.” Here, Andy makes 
the case that all students benefit from receiving information in multiple, varied ways; his point in 
disability-positive, in that it illustrates the potential of moving away from accommodations 
discourse that focuses on distributing specific accommodations to deserving students, and 
towards an orientation that sees varied delivery of course material as beneficial for all students.  
 Throughout our interviews, I encouraged Andy to brainstorm accommodations that he 
would find really useful in class. He seemed stuck on how best to integrate the text-to-speech 
software he used into the classroom, where students are asked to read all the time. The following 
situation that Andy describes demonstrates just some of the many material and logistical 
obstacles to retrofitting a text-based class for one listening learner at a time. “If we had 
something like [Kurzweil] in the classroom, and then you have a set of headphones that you 
could put on,” Andy began suggesting, before realizing mid-thought that students using the 
headphones wouldn’t be able to hear other spoken class instruction while they were reading. He 
revised his idea: “or at least you could put it on one ear so that you can still be able to listen out 
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of the other. Or something like that.” Andy ultimately abandoned his headphone solution, since 
he thought it “might be distracting.” “The headphones,” he explained, “and the program or the 
device in general [would be distracting] because…other people will be hearing it read out loud, 
unless you have it turned down low enough.” The least desirable outcome of Andy’s headphone 
idea is that 
attention would be drawn to you, and [other students would] be wondering, like, 
‘why do you need this for?’ I would like to be able to choose when to disclose 
information. If I have something like that, that would be basically sending out a 
message all the time without me really having anything to say about it. So that 
might actually deter me from using it.  
The headphone idea fails on a number of levels. While it would enhance some students’ ability 
to read texts in class, it would impede their ability to simultaneously receive spoken instructions. 
It would also take away some privacy, since the headphones would advertise to other students 
that a particular student needed help, or that he or she wasn’t normal. Most importantly, it 
doesn’t meet Andy’s goal of accommodating different learning preferences without calling 
undue attention to them.  
 The solution to issues with accommodation in college is elusive, but for Andy it comes 
down to a need to “work with” students like himself, who may identify officially as autistic or 
otherwise generally as non-neurotypical. “I’m asking for people to change the way they see 
things, and that is again, a tall order,” he says. “To ask everyone to see autism as not something 
bad, just as a difference.” He acknowledges that “each individual with autism is different,” and 
that “we need to be able to acknowledge those differences” as well: 
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A: I feel like it's good to have the different viewpoints that people with autism 
have. And I think without those then, I don't know, we kinda get drawn into the 
normal, I guess. I almost talk about the normal like it's bad. And I don't mean to 
do that when I do it, it's just I see what people do. I see how they think. I wonder 
how they can think this way, when I'm clearly wired in a completely different 
way. And I see autism almost as a benefit because I can figure out answers in 
different ways. And maybe we aren't so strong on personal interactions but, if we 
could have a way someone could be able to still benefit the world and then not 
have to have interactions, I still think that's okay. 
My conversations with Andy explored some competing wishes of his related to classroom 
disclosure and disability accommodations. Andy wants to identify as a non-neurotypical student, 
and wouldn’t prefer to pass as neurotypical or hide his differences. To him, his diagnosis is 
generative and offers him a position of insight – he “can figure out answers in different ways,” 
and he wants to “still benefit the world” without conforming to neurotypical expectations.  Other 
times, as in his use of Kurzweil software, Andy wishes his differences didn’t cost him valuable 
time and resources spent personally optimizing learning conditions. Finally, Andy sometimes 
prefers accommodations that don’t require him to openly advertise his differences and invite 
invasive questions from peers. He is cautious about when and how he reveals his diagnosis, and 
understandably wants as much control over those decisions as possible. Andy’s position across 
these interviews is one of appreciating disability as insight, and resisting pressure to conform to 
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nerurotypical expectations, while trying to avoid stigma and situations where he must forfeit 
control over how his differences are demonstrated11. 
  While my project yields significant insight into the experiences of neurodiverse students 
and attests to the importance of recognizing these students’ expertise regarding their own 
learning and writing processes, it also runs into some key limitations.  First, as I discussed at 
length in Chapter One, the framework of neurodiversity – which informs much of my vocabulary 
and underlying assumptions behind my research – is itself problematic in a number of ways. In 
spite of neurodiversity’s steps toward realizing a disability-positive, embodied understanding of 
autism (among other neurological conditions), it can tend to gloss over, ignore, or even denigrate 
the experiences of autistics who claim, at times, to suffer, either directly or indirectly, from 
autism. A more robust framework would incorporate disability-positive and embodied 
knowledges, yet also allow for more ambivalent attitudes towards autism and create a space of 
non-judgment around the pursuit of medical therapies.  
Second, this project features four participants who identify as male, and one participant 
who identifies as female. The intersection of autism and gender is a rich site of research and 
conversation, as scholars (see Jack) have begun to tease apart the coded, gendered ways in which 
autism has been theorized and represented publicly. My work does not make use of gender as an 
analytic tool, and my data is under-representative of the experiences of autistic students who 
identify as female. Frameworks like Neurodiversity resonate with feminist and queer theory, 
																																																								
11 Many of the complexities Andy experiences in his pursuit of accommodations can be traced 
back to the underlying fact that the classroom, as it currently is, is set up in normative ways and 
calls attention to non-normative learning processes. Frustrations like these resonate with 
universal design principles, which can address “the design of curriculum delivery in which 
students who struggle to gain information through the reading process or who have difficulty 
writing to express their thoughts are provided with alternative means to not only assist their 
labor, but allow expression in a form of preference, consistent with true intentionality and 
ownership” (Michael and Trezek 313). 
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particularly when it comes to theorizations of the material body. More work can and should be 
done to understand how gender inflects the experiences of autistic students, particularly with 
regards to the experience of stigma and the performance of disclosure.  
Finally, I hope in the future to devote more attention to the rhetoric of functioning, 
particularly how it has been employed by students like my participants to position themselves in 
the eyes of a neurotypical audience. Some autism advocacy groups critique the rhetoric of 
functioning for the divisions it creates within the autism community and for how it functions 
merely to re-assign, rather than eradicate, stigma. A couple of my participants, particularly Mike, 
invoke the rhetoric of functioning to identify as “high-functioning,” a move that may help them 
claim more credibility and agency in the eyes of neurotypicals, but that undeniably does so at the 
expense of others in the autism community. Such rhetoric also fails to recognize the flaws in 
common measurements of functioning, particularly in autistic individuals who may be non-
verbal or who don’t communicate in traditional ways. These critiques of the rhetoric of 
functioning are emerging, and I hope to participate in them outside the scope of this dissertation. 
 
Future Directions  
This dissertation has endeavored to break new ground across several sites of access in the college 
writing classroom, and to do so by foregrounding the perspectives of the students most affected 
by access measures. Foregrounding the perspectives of my participants and other autistic writers 
and activists, I demonstrated how official labels like “autistic” can function to make the 
classroom more inaccessible, and how unofficial practices like teacher pity – which I trace back 
to broader ableist orientations that assume it is always preferable to not be disabled – are 
received with ambivalence by students who don’t share the same assumption about their 
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diagnosis. Neurodiverse writers and learners, who possess an under-utilized expertise on their 
own learning processes and embodied experiences, belong in these conversations about access. 
This work draws on disability studies frameworks that emphasize a shift in perspective 
from disability as an individual attribute towards the disabling effect of environments and 
cultural practices. Such a framework compels composition and rhetoric scholars to turn away 
from current expertise on working with autistic writers and re-examine the normative work of 
pedagogical best practices. As I demonstrated in my discussion of audience scholarship in 
Chapter Four, these best practices don’t have to be explicitly connected to access to have an 
impact on how neurodiverse students experience the college writing classroom. Normativity 
operates across all spheres of pedagogical praxis, not just those devoted to accommodating 
disability. I offer this conclusion as an example of the kinds of insight that we gain when we 
foreground the perspectives of neurodiverse students in conversations about how best to support 
them in our classrooms. The perspectives of students like Sam, Toby, Mike, Andy, and Amy 
allow us to better trace the contours of normativity and understand its reach in our scholarship 
and advocacy work. These perspectives demonstrate how “disability’s presence, like the 
presence of students with race, class, or gender differences, is not a “problem” but rather an 
opportunity to rethink our practices in teaching writing” (Wood et al 148).   
What students like Sam, Toby, and Andy (another participant) describe collectively over 
their course of their interviews is a longing for accommodations that allow them unfettered 
access to classroom spaces but don’t call unnecessary attention to them as individuals. Writing 
programs specifically can do more to establish consistent, formal and informal communication 
with neurodiverse students, invite their expertise and self-knowledge into the classroom, and to 
support them, thereby contributing to a long tradition of advocacy in composition and rhetoric 
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that aims to empower and include diverse minds and bodies. It is toward writing programs, and 
specifically the role of the writing program administrator (WPA), that I would like to turn next. I 
would like to consider how universal design and disability-positive philosophies might be better 
codified in our WPA guidelines, NCTE outcomes, and other official documents that act as 
guideposts for the field and for writing instructors across the country. While changes on this 
level will be slow to manifest, they are worth pursuing because they send the message that 
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